Abela, Paul. “Kant on receptivity and representation.” Contemporary Kantian Metaphysics: New Essays on Time and Space. Eds. Roxana Baiasu, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore (op cit.). 23-40??. [WC]
Abresch, Rolf. Kausalität bei Kant: der Mensch zwischen Naturnotwendigkeit und Freiheit. Munich: AVM, 2012. [274 p.] [WC]
Aichele, Alexander. “Ich denke was, was Du nicht denkst, und das ist Rot: John Locke und George Berkeley über abstrakte Ideen und Kants logischer Abstraktionismus.” Kant-Studien 103.1 (2012): 25-46. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: The paper discusses Berkeley’s classical critique of Locke’s theory of generating concepts by abstraction, rebuts it and shows that concerning, at least, the forming of empirical concepts even Kant holds a Lockean position of abstractionism. After having analyzed the meaning of “idea” Berkeley’s use of his own concept of abstraction to launch his attack on the Lockean one, which according to Berkeley affirms the possibility of forming simple abstract concepts, is scrutinized. Since Locke doesn’t maintain that and Kant, as it is shown in the last step, himself agrees to the Lockean kind of abstractionism post-Lockean esp. Humean critique on Kant concerning this point ends also in nothing.
Allais, Lucy. “Perceiving Distinct Particulars.” Contemporary Kantian Metaphysics: New Essays on Time and Space. Eds. Roxana Baiasu, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore (op cit.). 41-66??. [WC]
Allison, Henry E. Essays on Kant. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. [xiv, 289 p.] [WC]
[Note][Hide Note]Contents: Commentary on section nine of the Antinomy of pure reason — Where have all the categories gone? Reflections on Longuenesse’s reading of Kant’s transcendental deduction — Kant and the two dogmas of rationalism — Transcendental realism, empirical realism, and transcendental idealism — We can act only under the idea of freedom — On the very idea of a propensity to evil — Kant’s practical justification of freedom — The singleness of the categorical imperative — Kant on freedom of the will — Is the Critique of Judgment "post-critical"? — Reflective judgment and the application of logic to nature: Kant’s deduction of the principle of purposiveness as an answer to Hume — The Critique of Judgment as a "true apology" for Leibniz — Kant’s antinomy of teleological judgment — The gulf between nature and freedom and nature’s guarantee of perpetual peace — Kant’s conception of Aufklarung — Teleology and history in Kant: the critical foundations of Kant’s philosophy of history — Reason, revelation, and history in Lessing and Kant.
Almeida, Guido Antônio de. “Self-Consciousness and Objective Knowledge in the Transcendental Deduction of the Critique of Pure Reason.” Kant in Brazil. Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 26-55. [M]
——. “Critique, Deduction, and the Fact of Reason.” Kant in Brazil. Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 127-54. [M]
Altman, Matthew C. Kant and Applied Ethics: The Uses and Limits of Kant’s Practical Philosophy. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012. [336 p.] [WC]
[Note][Hide Note]Contents: Introduction: Why Kant Now -- Applying Kant's Ethics. Part Introduction -- Animal Suffering and Moral Character -- Kant's Strategic Importance for Environmental Ethics -- Moral and Legal Arguments for Universal Health Care -- The Scope of Patient Autonomy -- Kantian Arguments against Kant's Conclusions. Part Introduction -- Subjecting Ourselves to Capital Punishment -- Same-Sex Marriage as a Means to Mutual Respect -- Limitations of Kant's Theory. Part Introduction -- Consent, Mail-Order Brides, and the Marriage Contract -- Individual Maxims and Social Justice -- The Decomposition of the Corporate Body -- Becoming a Person -- Conclusion: Emerging from Kant's Long Shadow -- Bibliography -- Index.; Animal suffering and moral character -- Kant's strategic importance for environmental ethics -- Moral and legal arguments for universal health care -- The scope of patient autonomy -- Subjecting ourselves to capital punishment -- Same-sex marriage as a means to mutual respect -- Consent, mail-order brides, and the marriage contract -- Individual maxims and social justice -- The decomposition of the corporate body -- On becoming a person -- Conclusion: emerging from Kant's long shadow.
[Note][Hide Note]From the publisher: Kant’s Elliptical Path explores the main stages and key concepts in the development of Kant’s Critical philosophy, from the early 1760s to the 1790s. Karl Ameriks provides a detailed and concise account of the main ways in which the later Critical works provide a plausible defence of the conception of humanity’s fundamental end that Kant turned to after reading Rousseau in the 1760s. Separate essays are devoted to each of the three Critiques, as well as to earlier notes and lectures and several of Kant’s later writings on history and religion. A final section devotes three chapters to post-Kantian developments in German Romanticism, accounts of tragedy up through Nietzsche, and contemporary philosophy. The theme of an elliptical path is shown to be relevant to these writers as well as to many aspects of Kant’s own life and work.
The topics of the book include fundamental issues in epistemology and metaphysics, with a new defense of Ameriks’s ‘moderate’ interpretation of transcendental idealism. Other essays evaluate Kant’s concept of will and reliance on a ‘fact of reason’ in his practical philosophy, as well as his critique of traditional theodicies, and the historical character of his defense of religion and the concepts of creation and hope within ‘the boundaries of mere reason’. Kant's Elliptical Path will be of value to historians of modern philosophy and Kant scholars, while its treatment of several literary figures and issues in aesthetics, politics, history, and theology make it relevant to readers outside of philosophy.
——. “Kant, Human Nature, and History after Rousseau.” Kant’s Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide. Eds. Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley (op cit.). 247-65. [M]
Anderson, Pamela Sue. “The Philosophical Significance of Kant’s Religion: ‘Pure Cognition of’ or ‘Belief in’ God.” Faith and Philosophy 29.2 (2012): 151-62. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: In my response-paper, I dispute the claim of Firestone and Jacobs that “Kant’s turn to transcendental analysis of the moral disposition via pure cognition is perhaps the most important new element of his philosophy of religion” (In Defense of Kant’s Religion, 233). In particular, I reject the role given — in the latter — to “pure cognition.” Instead I propose a Kantian variation on cognition which remains consistent with Kant’s moral postulate for the existence of God. I urge that we treat this postulate as regulative. So, in place of pure cognition, “belief in” God grounds our hope for perfect goodness.
——. “Metaphors of spatial location: understanding post-Kantian space.” Contemporary Kantian Metaphysics: New Essays on Time and Space. Eds. Roxana Baiasu, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore (op cit.). 169-98??. [WC]
Andreanský, Eugen. “Kant’s Philosophy of Religion and Practical Rationality.” [Slovak] Filozofia 67.3 (2012): 195-207. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: The paper deals with Kant’s philosophy of religion as related to his theory of practical rationality. The introductory parts explain the foundations and place of the philosophy of religion in Kant’s works. A special attention is paid to the relationship between religion and morality in Kant’s practical philosophy. The social dimension of religion as conceived by Kant is explained as well. Finally, the paper offers a description of the main features of Kant’s practical rationality.
Araujo, Saulo de Freitas. Rev. of Kant and the Human Sciences: Biology, Anthropology and History, edited by Alix Cohen (2009). History of the Human Sciences 25.1 (2012): 140-45. [HUM]
Arndt, Andreas. See: Jaeschke, Walter and Andreas Arndt.
Bader, Ralf M. “The Role of Kant’s Refutation of Idealism.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 94.1 (2012): 53-73. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This paper assesses the role of the refutation of idealism with in the Critique of Pure Reason, as well as its relation to the treatment of idealism in the first education and to transcendental idealism more generally. It will be argued that the refutation of Idealism and the fourth paralogism of the first edition are consistent and that their consistence can be explained by reference to the distinction between appearances and phenomena. While the fourth paralogism appeals to the fact that space is a form of intuition to establish that the immediate objects of awareness, namely appearances, that are represented as being in space really are in space and classify as spatial objects, the refutation attempts to show that at least some of these outer appearances are empirically real and have objective correlates, namely phenomena. By appealing to this distinction we can make sense of the idea that the refutation is an extension of the transcendental deduction. While the deduction, considered on its own, constitutes a ‘regressive argument’, the refutation allows us to turn the transcendental analytic into a ‘progressive argument’ that proceeds by the synthetic method — the method that Kant attributed to the Critique in the Prolegomena. Accordingly, we will see that the refutation occupies a crucial role in the analytic. This understanding of the refutation as attempting to establish the existence of phenomena that correspond to empirically real appearances also explains why Kant placed the refutation of idealism after the second postulate, rather than leaving it in the transcendental dialectic amongst the paralogisms.
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This article highlights the merits of Stephen Engstrom’s attempt of placing Kant’s ethics in the tradition of practical cognitivism, in contrast to intuitionist and antirealist ways of appropriating Kant’s legacy. In particular, it focuses on two issues: first, the special character of practical knowledge — as opposed to theoretical knowledge and craft expertise; and second, the apparent tension between the demands of morality and the requirements of instrumental reason, when this is understood as driven by concerns for happiness, prudence, and personal integrity. In contrast to Engstrom, the author argues for a form of practical cognitivism that is constructive and importantly refers to the constitutive role of moral sensibility.
Baiasu, Roxana. “Space and the limits of objectivity: Could there be a disembodied thinking of reality?” Contemporary Kantian Metaphysics: New Essays on Time and Space. Eds. Roxana Baiasu, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore (op cit.). 207-32??. [WC]
——, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore. “Introduction.” Contemporary Kantian Metaphysics: New Essays on Time and Space. Eds. Roxana Baiasu, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore (op cit.). 1-22??. [WC]
——, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore, eds. Contemporary Kantian Metaphysics: New Essays on Time and Space. Houndmills/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. [xi, 300 p.] [contents][WC]
[Note][Hide Note]Contents: Paul Abela, “Kant on receptivity and representation”; Lucy Allais, “Perceiving distinct particulars”; John Campbell, “Is spatial awareness required for object perception?”; Steven Crowell, “The normative in perception”; Graham Bird, “Is there any value in Kant’s account of mathematics?”; Leslie Stevenson, “Thinking of everything? Kant speaks to Stephen Hawking”; Jeff Malpas and Günter Zöller, “Reading Kant topographically: From critical philosophy to empirical geography”; Pamela Sue Anderson, “Metaphors of spatial location: understanding post-Kantian space”; A.W. Moore, “Bird on Kant’s mathematical antinomies”; Roxana Baiasu, “Space and the limits of objectivity: Could there be a disembodied thinking of reality?”; Michael Inwood, “Heidegger on time”; Françoise Dastur, “Time and subjectivity: Heidegger’s interpretation of the Kantian notion of time”; Dan Zahavi and Søren Overgaard, “Time, space and body in Bergson, Heidegger and Husserl”.
Bailey, Tom. Rev. of Kantian Deeds, by Henrik Jøker Bjerre (2010). British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20.5 (2012): 1039-41. [PW][contents][Amazon.com]
Banham, Gary. “New Works on Kant’s Practical Philosophy.” Kant Studies Online (2012): 1-22; posted April 2, 2012. [pdf] [M]
——. Rev. of Kant’s Theory of Virtue: The Value of Autocracy, by Anne Margaret Baxley (2010). British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20.2 (2012): 415-17. [PW][online][Amazon.com]
——. “Kantian Friendship.” Critical Communities and Aesthetic Practices: Dialogues with Tony O’Connor on Society, Art, and Friendship. Eds. Francis Halsall, Julia Jansen, and Sinéad Murphy (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012). 171-80. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: The purpose of this contribution is to address an apparent paradox in Kant’s treatment of friendship. In describing friendship Kant uses the device of thinking of it as involving an essential tension between respect and love. This tension is pictured in terms of the relationship between attraction and repulsion that Kant elsewhere uses in framing his understanding of the dynamic forces at work in the natural world. However, this reference to natural law is one that is peculiar given that Kant understands friendship as a form of ideal relation that is not dependent on empirical forms of feeling, a paradox accentuated by his general reference to love and respect. In the paper I argue that the nature of this paradoxical device requires recourse to Kant’s general use of analogy in practical philosophy, which depends on his notion of the “typic” and that this is employed in relation to the formula of humanity, and requires reference to the idea of another person in its understanding of “respect”.
——. Rev. of Kant’s Theory of Virtue: The Value of Autocracy, by Anne Margaret Baxley (2010). British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20.2 (2012): 415-17. [PI][online][Amazon.com]
——, Dennis Schulting, and Nigel Hems, eds. The Continuum Companion to Kant. New York/London: Contiuum, 2012. [xiv, 394 p.] [WC]
Bartsch, Volker. Ich und andere: Hume - Rousseau - Kant. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2012. [347 p.] [WC]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Both parties in the active philosophical debate concerning the conceptual character of perception trace their roots back to Kant’s account of sensible intuition in the Critique of Pure Reason. This striking fact can be attributed to Kant’s tendency both to assert and to deny the involvement of our conceptual capacities in sensible intuition. He appears to waver between these two positions in different passages, and can thus seem thoroughly confused on this issue. But this is not, in fact, the case, for, as I will argue, the appearance of contradiction in his account stems from the failure of some commentators to pay sufficient attention to Kant’s developmental approach to philosophy. Although he begins by asserting the independence of intuition, Kant proceeds from this nonconceptualist starting point to reveal a deeper connection between intuitions and concepts. On this reading, Kant’s seemingly conflicting claims are actually the result of a careful and deliberate strategy for gradually convincing his readers of the conceptual nature of perception.
Baxley, Anne Margaret. “The Problem of Obligation, the Finite Rational Will, and Kantian Value Realism.” Inquiry 55.6 (2012): 567-83. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Robert Stern’s Understanding Moral Obligation is a remarkable achievement, representing an original reading of Kant’s contribution to modern moral philosophy and the legacy he bequeathed to his later-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century successors in the German tradition. On Stern’s interpretation, it was not the threat to autonomy posed by value realism, but the threat to autonomy posed by the obligatory nature of morality that led Kant to develop his critical moral theory grounded in the concept of the self-legislating moral agent. Accordingly, Stern contends that Kant was a moral realist of sorts, holding certain substantive views that are best characterized as realist commitments about value. In this paper, I raise two central objections to Stern’s reading of Kant. The first objection concerns what Stern identifies as Kant’s solution to the problem of moral obligation. Whereas Stern sees the distinction between the infinite will and the finite will as resolving the problem of moral obligation, I argue that this distinction merely explains why moral obligations necessarily take the form of imperatives for us imperfect human beings, but does not solve the deeper problem concerning the obligatory nature of morality — why we should take moral norms to be supremely authoritative laws that override all other norms based on our non-moral interests. The second objection addresses Stern’s claim that Kantian autonomy is compatible with value realism. Although this is an idea with which many contemporary readers will be sympathetic, I suggest that the textual evidence actually weighs in favor of constructivism.
Beckenkamp, Joãosinho. “Symbolization in Kant’s Critical Philosophy.” Kant in Brazil. Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 348-58. [M]
Beiser, Frederick. Rev. of Neo-Kantianism in Contemporary Philosophy, ed. by Rudolf A. Makkreel and Sebastian Luft (2010). Journal of the History of Philosophy 50.1 (2012): 145-46. [M]
Benhabib, Seyla. “Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Kant: Sovereignty and International Law.” Political Theory 40.6 (2012): 688-713. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Carl Schmitt’s critique of liberalism has gained increasing influence in the last few decades. This article focuses on Schmitt’s analysis of international law in The Nomos of the Earth, in order to uncover the reasons for his appeal as a critic not only of liberalism but of American hegemonic aspirations as well. Schmitt saw the international legal order that developed after World War I, and particularly the “criminalization of aggressive war,” as a smokescreen to hide U.S. aspirations to world dominance. By focusing on Schmitt’s critique of Kant’s concept of the “unjust enemy,” the article shows the limits of Schmitt’s views and concludes that Schmitt, as well as left critics of U.S. hegemony, misconstrue the relation between international law and democratic sovereignty as a model of top–down domination. As conflictual as the relationship between international norms and democratic sovereignty can be at times, this needs to be interpreted as one of mediation and not domination.
Benjamin, Andrew. “Towards an Affective Structure of Subjectivity. Notes on Kant’s An Answer to the Question: What is the Enlightenment?” Parallax 18.4 (2012): 26-41. [HUM]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: The article reviews the book Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment: Critical Essays, edited by Paul Guyer and compares it with an essay “An Answer to the Question: What is the Enlightenment? written by Immanuel Kant. It is stated that the essay showcases emergence of both subjectivity and rationality. The subject’s being-in-place locates the domain in which affect occurs at the same time locating the interrelationship between affect and place within a conception of historical time.
Bernasconi, Robert. “True Colors: Kant’s Distinction Between Nature and Artifice in Context.” Klopffechtereien – Missverständnisse – Widersprüche? Methodische und methodologische Perspektiven auf die Kant-Forster-Kontroverse. Eds. Rainer Godel and Gideon Stiening (op cit.). 191-207. [M]
Bernecker, Sven. “Kant on Spatial Orientation.” European Journal of
Philosophy 20.4 (2012): 519-33. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This paper develops a novel interpretation of Kant’s argument from incongruent counterparts to the effect that the representations of space and time are intuitions rather than concepts. When properly understood, the argument anticipates the contemporary position whereby the meaning of indexicals cannot be captured by descriptive contents.
Beyrau, Michael. Die Pflicht zur bürgerlichen Gesellschaft: Kants Lehre von der sittlichen Notwendigkeit des Staates. Hamburg: Kovac, 2012. [169 p.] [WC]
Bies, Michael. Im Grunde ein Bild: die Darstellung der Naturforschung bei Kant, Goethe und Alexander von Humboldt. Göttingen: Wallstein, 2012. [371 p.] [WC]
Billioud, Sébastien. Thinking through Confucian Modernity: A Study of Mou Zongsan’s Moral Metaphysics. Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2012. [xii, 255 p.] [WC]
Bird, Graham. “Is there any value in Kant’s account of mathematics?” Contemporary Kantian Metaphysics: New Essays on Time and Space. Eds. Roxana Baiasu, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore (op cit.). 109-27??. [WC]
——. See: Baiasu, Roxana, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore.
——. See: Baiasu, Roxana, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore, eds.
Bitran, Maurice. “Remarque philologique sur le terme «Classe» dans le § 11 de la Critique de la raison pure.” Kant-Studien 103-2 (2012): 234-36. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: § 11 of the Critique of Pure Reason, intended to strengthen the explanation of the categories in the second edition, introduces in its two first remarks the important distinction between the mathematical and the dynamical that will occur also in other later works. In these remarks Kant creates a two-fold grouping within the categories, which seems to be spoilt by a lexical weakness concerning the terms «Classe» and «Abtheilung». As this textual anomaly does not rest on any philosophical foundation we propose a correction aiming at expressing the original Kantian thought.
Blomme, Henny. “The Completeness of Kant’s Metaphysical Exposition of Space.” Kant-Studien 103.2 (2012): 139-62. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: In the first edition of his book on the completeness of Kant’s table of judgments, Klaus Reich shortly indicates that the B-version of the metaphysical exposition of space in the Critique of Pure Reason is structured following the inverse order of the table of categories. In this paper, I develop Reich’s claim and provide further evidence for it. My argumentation is as follows: Through analysis of our actually given representation of space as some kind of object (the formal intuition of space in general), the metaphysical exposition will show that this representation is secondary to space considered as an original, undetermined and as such unrepresentable intuitive manifold. Now, following Kant, the representation of any kind of object involves diversity, synthesis and unity. In the case of our representation of space as formal intuition, this involves, firstly, a manifold a priori, i.e. space as pure form, delivered by the transcendental Aesthetic, secondly, a figurative, productive synthesis of that manifold, and, thirdly, the unity provided by the categories. Analysing our given representation of space – the task of the metaphysical exposition – amounts to dismantling its unity and determine its characteristics with respect to the categories.
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: The question of Kant’s relation to Spinozist thought has been virtually ignored over the years. I analyze Kant’s pre-critical ‘possibility-proof’ of God’s existence, elaborated in the Beweisgrund, as well as the echoes that this proof has in the first Critique, in beginning to uncover the connection between Kant’s thought and Spinoza’s. Kant’s espousal of the Principle of Sufficient Reason [PSR] for the analysis of modality during the pre-critical period committed him, I argue, to Spinozist substance monism. Much textual evidence suggests that he was aware of this commitment. However, by transforming the PSR into a regulative principle the critical Kant has transformed his pre-critical proof into a regulative ideal. He is thereby (consciously) committed, I argue, to regulative Spinozism.
——. Rev. of Kant and Spinozism: Trancendental Idealism and Immanence from Jacobi to Deleuze, by Beth Lord (2011). British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20.5 (2012): 1041-45. [HUM]
Bojanowski, Jochen. “Is Kant a Moral Realist?” Kant and Contemporary Moral Philosophy. Ed. Dietmar H. Heidemann (op cit.). 1-22??. [WC]
Boldyrev, Ivan A. Rev. of Kantian Ethics and Economics: Autonomy, Dignity, and Character, by Mark White (2011). Journal of the History of Philosophy 50.2 (2012): 298-99. [M]
Bonaccini, Juan Adolfo. See: Perez, Daniel Omar and Juan Adolfo Bonaccini.
Borges, Maria de Lourdes. “A Typology of Love in Kant’s Philosophy.” Kant in Brazil. Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 271-82. [M]
Bouton, Christoph. “Idéalité transcendantale ou réalité absolue du temps? Temps du sujet et temps du monde chez Kant.” Kant-Studien 103.4 (2012): 429-47. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: If we reduce time to an a priori form of human intuition as Kant did, and if we think that time is nothing in itself and outside of the human subject, then how can we make sense of the age and history of earth or of the universe — a history going back far beyond the emergence of humanity? The issue to be decided is whether this objection can be raised against Kant without being guilty of anachronism, and to consider the possible answers that could be formulated. After considering the ideality of time, the aporias of the subjectivity of time and the idea of an indefiniteness of time as elaborated in the First Antinomy, this paper argues for the need to reassess the thesis of the absolute reality of time.
Brandt, Reinhard. “Kant as Rebel against the Social Order.” Kant’s Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide. Eds. Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley (op cit.). 185-97. [M]
Brandt, Reinhard. “Die Idee der Universität und Der Streit der Fakultäten.” Kants “Streit der Fakultäten” oder der Ort der Bildung zwischen Lebenswelt und Wissenschaften. Ed. Ludger Honnefelder (op cit.). 45-65. [M]
Brassington, Ian. “The Concept of Autonomy and its Role in Kantian Ethics.” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 21.2 (2012): 166-76. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Among bioethicists, and perhaps ethicists generally, the idea that we are obliged to respect autonomy is something of a shibboleth. Appeals to autonomy are commonly put to work to support legal and moral claims about the importance of consent, but they also feed a wider discourse in which the patient’s desires are granted a very high importance and medical paternalism is regarded as almost self-evidently indefensible.
Brewer, Kimberly and Eric Watkins. “Difficulty Still Awaits: Kant, Spinoza, and the Threat of Theological Determinism.” Kant-Studien 103.2 (2012): 163-87. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: In a short and much-neglected passage in the second Critique, Kant discusses the threat posed to human freedom by theological determinism. In this paper we present an interpretation of Kant’s conception of and response to this threat. Regarding his conception, we argue that he addresses two versions of the threat: either God causes appearances (and hence our spatio-temporal actions) directly or he does so indirectly by causing things in themselves which in turn cause appearances. Kant’s response to the first version is that God cannot cause appearances directly because they depend essentially on the passive sensibility of finite beings. Kant’s response to the second version is that human beings are endowed with transcendental freedom, which blocks the causal transitivity that is presupposed by this version. We also contrast his position on this topic with Leibniz’s and Spinoza’s.
Brignone, Marco. La duplicità dell’uomo: la dialettica antinomica in Kant e Pascal. [Italian] Milan: Alboversorio, 2012. [144 p.] [WC]
Browning, Gary. Rev. of The Founding Act of Modern Ethical Life: Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Moral and Political Philosophy, by Ido Geiger (2007). History of Political Thought 33.1 (2012): 169-73. [PI]
Brum Torres, João Carlos. “Intuitive Knowledge and De Re Thought.” Kant in Brazil. Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 56-80. [M]
Burcher, Paul. “The Noncompliant Patient: A Kantian and Levinasian Response.” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37.1 (2012): 74-89. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: When a patient fails to follow the advice or prescription of a physician, she is termed to be “noncompliant” by the medical community. The medical community’s response to and understanding of patient noncompliance fails to acknowledge noncompliance as either a relational failure between physician and patient or as a patient choice. I offer an analysis of Immanuel Kant and Emmanuel Levinas that refocuses the issue of noncompliance by examining the physician role, the doctor-patient relationship, and the nature of responsibility.
Bynum, Gregory Lewis. “Immanuel Kant’s Account of Cognitive Experience and Human Rights Education.” Educational Theory 62.2 (2012): 185-201. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: In this essay Gregory Bynum seeks to show that Immanuel Kant's thought, which was conceived in an eighteenth-century context of new, and newly widespread, pressures for nationally institutionalized human rights-based regimes (the American and French revolutions being the most prominent examples), can help us think in new and appreciative ways about how to approach human rights education more effectively in our own time. Kant’s discussion of moral experience features prominently in Bynum’s analysis, which emphasizes the following: Kant’s conception of a Categorical Imperative to treat humanity as an end in itself; his conscious avoidance of, and his discussion of the necessity of avoiding, the limitations of empiricist and rationalist extremes of thought; and his discussion of moral experience in interrelated individual, community, and global aspects. Bynum demonstrates the usefulness of Kant’s approach by using it as a lens through which to appreciatively examine an Japanese-born university professor’s account of her ultimately successful effort to teach American students about U.S.-instigated human rights violations abroad.
Caimi, Mario. “The Logical Structure of Time According to the Chapter on the Schematism.” Kant-Studien 103.4 (2012): 415-28. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Usually, when studying schematism we devote almost exclusive attention to the study of the modifications that the categories suffer when combined with time. Instead, we have focused our attention on the determinations that time receives when combined with the categories. Departing from the definition of the transcendental schemata as “determinations of time”, an attempt is made to establish the various determinations that time receives from each one of the categories, as these perform the determination of time in schematism. The categories of quantity allow us to think of time as a series of homogeneous unities; the categories of quality show each instant of time as a receptacle able to receive the different intensities (degrees) of the real; the categories of relation establish a rule-dependent order on the flow of time; finally, the categories of modality determine the whole of time forming a collective unity that gathers or embraces each one of the instants of time preserving its specificity (its individual features).
Campbell, Catherine Galko. Rev. of Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian Foundations of Justice as Fairness, by Robert S. Taylor (2011). Ethics 122.3 (2012): 632-37. [PW]
Campbell, John. “Is spatial awareness required for object perception?” Contemporary Kantian Metaphysics: New Essays on Time and Space. Eds. Roxana Baiasu, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore (op cit.). 67-80??. [WC]
Campo, Mariano. “Totalità della problematica kantiana.” [Italian] Studi Kantiani 24 (2011): 121-30. [PW]
Capozzi, Mirella. “Le inferenze del Giudizio riflettente nella logica di Kant: l'induzione e l'analogia.” [Italian] Studi Kantiani 24 (2011): 11-48. [PW]
Cavallar, Georg. Rev. of Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary, edited by Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (2011). Kantian Review 17.3 (2012): 527-30. [PW]
——. Rev. of Immanuel Kant: Zum ewigen Frieden und Auszüge aus der Rechtslehre: Kommentar, by Oliver Eberl and Peter Niesen (2011). Kantian Review 17.2 (2012): 367-69. [PW]
Chadwick, Ruth. See: Williams, Garrath and Ruth Chadwick.
Chance, Brian. “Scepticism and the Development of the Transcendental Dialectic.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20.2 (2012): 311-31. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Kant’s response to scepticism in the Critique of Pure Reason is complex and remarkably nuanced, although it is rarely recognized as such. In this paper, I argue that recent attempts to flesh out the details of this response by Paul Guyer and Michael Forster do not go far enough. Although they are right to draw a distinction between Humean and Pyrrhonian scepticism and locate Kant’s response to the latter in the Transcendental Dialectic, their accounts fail to capture two important aspects of this response. The first is that Kant’s response to Pyrrhonian scepticism is also a response to Hume. The second is that aspects of this response are decidedly positive. In particular, I argue (1) that Kant believed Hume’s scepticism manifested important elements of Pyrrhonian scepticism and (2) that both Pyrrhonian scepticism and Hume had a significant positive influence on the development of the Transcendental Dialectic.
Cheng, Chung-Ying. “World Humanities and Self-Reflection of Humanity: A Confucian-Neo-Confucian Perspective.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 39.4 (2012): 476-94. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This article presents and develops Zhu Xi’s Neo-Confucian theory of heart-mind-will and human nature as the source and basis for the understanding of humanity. This article next shows how Kant and Confucius could be said to share the same vision of humanity in light of one particular historical connection between them. Finally, I have explored four forms of knowledge in light of a distinction between feeling and observation as well as their basic unity. This gives rise to our vision of humanity as world-rooted, and so indicates further how it can serve as a grounding for world-humanities.
Chiba, Kiyoshi. Kants Ontologie der raumzeitlichen Wirklichkeit:
Versuch einer anti-realistischen Interpretation der Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2012. [xi, 427 p.] [M]
Chignell, Andrew. “Introduction: On Defending Kant at the AAR.” Faith and Philosophy 29.2 (2012): 144-50. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: I briefly describe the unusually contentious author-meets-critics session that was the origin of the book symposium below. I then try to situate the presentsymposium within broader contemporary scholarship on Kant.
——. Rev. of Kants Vorsehungskonzept auf dem Hintergrund der deutschen Schulphilosophie und -theologie, by Ulrich Lehner (2007). Journal of the Philosophy of History 6.1 (2012): 143-47. [HUM]
Chlewicki,Jaciej. Kant a problem filozofii religii. [Polish] Bydgoszcz: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Kazimierza Wielkiego, 2012. [276 p.] [WC]
Class, Monika. Coleridge and Kantian ideas in England, 1796-1817: Coleridge’s Responses to German Philosophy. London/New York: Bloomsbury, 2012. [xiv, 245 p.] [WC]
Clewis, Robert R. “Kant’s Distinction between True and False Sublimity.” Kant’s Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide. Eds. Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley (op cit.). 116-43. [M]
Çörekçioğlu, Hakan. “The History of Violence and Remembrance in Kant and Benjamin.” [Turkish] Felsefe ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi 13 (2012): 1-9. [HUM]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This study focuses on the connection between history, historiography and the political aspect of remembrance, as established by Kant and Walter Benjamin. Kantian history is hypothetical-progressive, whereas Benjamin’s departure point is critique of progress. Even though both philosophers agree on the connection between historiography and the political aspect of the faculty of remembrance, they differ in the methodological instruments of remembrance. Yet, both philosophers envisage human as a being in his own historical situatedness with ethical and political responsibilities.
Cohen, Alix. “Enabling the Realization of Humanity: The Anthropological Dimension of Education.” Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary. Eds. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (op cit.). 152-62. [M]
——. “Kant’s ‘Curious Catalogue of Human Frailties’ and the Great Portrait of Nature.” Kant’s Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide. Eds. Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley (op cit.). 144-62. [M]
Costa Rego, Pedro. “The Purposiveness of Taste: An Essay on the Role of Zweckmässigkeit in Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgment.” Kant in Brazil. Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 305-20. [M]
Crone, Katja. “Pre-conceptual Aspects of Self-consciousness in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.” Kant’s Philosophy of the Unconscious. Eds. Piero Giordanetti, Riccardo Pozzo, and Marco Sgarbi (op cit.). 131-46. [M]
Crowell, Steven. “The normative in perception.” Contemporary Kantian Metaphysics: New Essays on Time and Space. Eds. Roxana Baiasu, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore (op cit.). 81-108??. [WC]
Cubo, Óscar. Kant: Sentido común y subjetividad. [Spanish] Pozuelo de Alarcón: Plaza y Valdés, 2012. [236p.] [WC]
Curtis-Wendlandt, Lisa. “No Right to Resist? Elise Reimarus’s Freedom as a Kantian Response to the Problem of Violent Revolt.” Hypatia 27.4 (2012): 755-73. [HUM]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: One of the greatest woman intellectuals of eighteenth-century Germany is Elise Reimarus, whose contribution to Enlightenment political theory is rarely acknowledged today. Unlike other social contract theorists, Reimarus rejects a people’s right to violent resistance or revolution in her philosophical dialogue Freedom (1791). Exploring the arguments in Freedom, this paper observes a number of similarities in the political thought of Elise Reimarus and Immanuel Kant. Both, I suggest, reject violence as an illegitimate response to perceived political injustice in a way that opposes Locke’s strong voluntarism and the absolutism of Hobbes. First, they emphasize the need to maintain the legal state as a precondition for the possibility of external right. Second, they share an optimistic view of the inherently ‘just’ nature of the tripartite republican state. And finally, Reimarus and Kant both outline an alternative, nonviolent response to political injustice that consists in the freedom of public expression and a discourse on the moral enlightenment of man.
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: L'exemple de Kant" s'emploie à montrer que l'examen de la fonction de l'exemple permet de situer les enjeux essentiels de la philosophie critique de Kant, aussi bien dans le domaine théorique que dans le domaine pratique. Nous examinons les rôles attribués par Kant aux exemples ("Darstellung" d'un objet, preuve de possibilité de la vertu, outil rhétorique ou encore oeuvre de jugement politique), pour ensuite analyser les difficultés qu'il y a à justifier la possibilité de ces rôles dans les termes mêmes de sa pensée. Cette étude est aussi un plaidoyer pour l'importance de la troisième "Critique" dans l'économie de l'oeuvre kantienne puisqu'il s'agit de montrer d'une part, que c'est là que la méthode transcendantale fait l'épreuve de ses propres limites, et, d'autre part, que Kant y élabore une réponse originale au scepticisme - par le biais d'une théorie originale de l'exemple.
Custer, Olivia. “Angling for a Stranglehold on the Death Penalty.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (2012): 160-73. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Responding to Elizabeth Rottenberg’s invitation to consider good signs, I first raise a question about ‘good’ and ‘too good’ signs by referring to a letter of Louis Althusser’s that describes the risk that ‘too good’ signs will be misread. I then turn to the distinction Rottenberg makes between deconstructive signs and Immanuel Kant’s historical signs. Borrowing an image from Jacques Derrida’s The Animal That Therefore I Am (2008), I suggest that we think of the task of abolition of the death penalty as requiring a particular kind of strangulation of Kantian discourse, a strangulation that would reach the center of its nervous system and disarm its powers without putting it to death. Finally, I turn to a recent initiative by a Belgian nongovernmental organization (Groupe d’action dans l’interet des animaux or Global Action in the Interest of Animals [GAIA]) in their campaign to abolish the practice of castrating piglets without anesthetic, reading it as an example of a strategy that mobilizes the discourse of rights while at the same time undermining the sovereign power that sustains it. This provides an image of the sort of stranglehold with a certain lightness of touch that, I argue, Derrida’s work on the death penalty prescribes as the task for unconditional abolition.
Dall’Agnol, Darlei. “On the Faktum of Reason.” Kant in Brazil. Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 109-26. [M]
Dastur, Françoise. “Time and subjectivity: Heidegger’s interpretation of the Kantian notion of time.” Contemporary Kantian Metaphysics: New Essays on Time and Space. Eds. Roxana Baiasu, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore (op cit.). 253-69??. [WC]
Davey, Nicholas. “In between Word and Image: Philosophical Hermeneutics, Aesthetics, and the Inescapable Heritage of Kant.” Critical Communities and Aesthetic Practices: Dialogues with Tony O’Connor on Society, Art, and Friendship. Eds. Francis Halsall, Julia Jansen, and Sinéad Murphy (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012). 23-35. [PI]
Davies, Paul. Rev. of Kant and Spinozism: Transcendental Idealism and Immanence from Jacobi to Deleuze, by Beth Lord (2011). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (April 2012, #13). [online] [M]
Dean, Richard. “Moral Education and the Ideal of Humanity.” Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary. Eds. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (op cit.). 139-51. [M]
DeBord, Charles E. “Kant, Fichte, and the Act of the I.” Philosophy Study 2.1 (2012): 9-18. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Fichte’s various articulations of the Wissenschaftslehre (“theory of scientific knowledge”) are self-conscious attempts to systematize Kant’s critical philosophy. Fichte’s notion of the pure I (‘ich’) serves as the theoretical starting-point for his exposition of transcendental idealism, and in many ways this concept is analogous to Kant’s notion of the transcendental unity of apperception explained in the ‘Critique of Pure Reason’. This paper argues that although Fichte and Kant agree on (1) the active nature of the pure I, (2) the distinction between pure and empirical apperception, and (3) skepticism concerning the possibility of theoretical knowledge of any positive (i.e., noumenal) content of the pure I, their respective notions of pure apperception differ in that Kant affirms the conceptual priority of the pure I to its objects while Fichte denies the same. Fichte’s departure from Kant on this point foreshadows many later recognition theories of consciousness, e.g., those of Hegel and Marx.
——. “Geist and Communication in Kant's Theory of Aesthetic Ideas.” Kantian Review 17.2 (2012): 177-90. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: In his Critique of the Power of Judgement, Kant explicates the creation of works of fine art (schöne Kunst) in terms of aesthetic ideas. His analysis of aesthetic ideas claims that they are not concepts (Begriffe) and are therefore not definable or describable in determinate language. Nevertheless, Kant claims that aesthetic ideas are communicable via spirit (Geist), a special mental ability he associates with artistic genius. This paper argues that Kant’s notion of Geist is central to his analysis of fine art’s expressive power. The notion of Geist constitutes a conceptual link between Kant’s aesthetic theory and that of G. W. F. Hegel, for whose analysis Geist is the subject.
Deckard, Michael. Rev. of Kant and Milton, by Sanford Budick (2010). Philosophy in Review 32.5 (2012). [online] [M][Amazon.com]
De Freitas Araujo, Saulo. Rev. of Kant and the Human Sciences: Biology, Anthropology, and History, by Alix Cohen (2009). History of the Human Sciences 25.1 (2012): 140-45. [PI]
Degen, Andreas. “Concepts of Fascination, from Democritus to Kant.” Journal of the History of Ideas 73.3 (2012): 371-93. [MUSE]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This study presents a historical-systematic outline of the conceptual history of fascination. The argumentation is oriented to the term “fascination” and takes into consideration the variance of the scientific explanations and basic theoretical approaches linked to it. For the period of the Greek Antique up to the eighteenth century this article distinguishes four transitive approaches: the substance-based, the epistemological, the psychological and the erotic approach. A fifth approach, which is derived from the epistemological approach, defines fascination as intransitive. It dates from the eighteenth century and is the basis of the modern concepts of fascination.
Deligiorgi, Katerina. The Scope of Autonomy:
Kant and the Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. [xiv, 233 p.] [WC]
[Note][Hide Note]Contents: Introduction: autonomy: specification of a term, recognition of a problem — Moral knowledge: pure reason and the law — Moral action: normativity, motivation and autonomous willing — Freedom as constraint: the morality of autonomy — Knowing hearts: emotion, value, and judgement — The scope of autonomy: agency, freedom, and morality.
——. Rev. of The Form of Practical Knowledge: A Study of the Categorical Imperative, by Stephen Engstrom (2009). Kantian Review 17.2 (2012): 369-74. [PW][online][Amazon.com]
——. Rev. of Culture as Mediation: Kant on Nature, Culture, and Morality, by Ana Marta González (2011). Kantian Review 17.3 (2012): 519-21. [PW]
DiCenso, James. Kant’s Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: A Commentary. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. [ix, 269 p.] [WC]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason is one of the great modern examinations of religion’s meaning, function and impact on human affairs. In this volume, the first complete English-language commentary on the work, James J. DiCenso explains the historical context in which the book appeared, including the importance of Kant’s conflict with state censorship. He shows how the Religion addresses crucial Kantian themes such as the relationship between freedom and morality, the human propensity to evil, the status of historical traditions in relation to ethical principles, and the interface between individual ethics and social institutions. The major arguments are clearly and precisely explained, and the themes are highlighted and located within Kant’s mature critical philosophy, especially his ethics. The commentary will be valuable for all who are interested in the continuing relevance of religion for contemporary inquiries into ethics, public institutions and religious traditions.
Dicker, Georges. “Kant’s Refutation of Idealism: Once More Unto the Breach.” Kantian Review 17.2 (2012): 191-95. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: In ‘Kant's Refutation of Idealism’ (Noûs, 47), I defend a version of the Refutation, pioneered by Paul Guyer in Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, whose core idea is that the only way that one can know the order of one’s own past experiences, except in certain rare cases, is by correlating them with the successive states of perceived external objects that caused the experiences. Andrew Chignell has offered a probing critique of my reconstruction of Kant’s argument (Philosophical Quarterly, 60), and I have responded (Philosophical Quarterly, 61). In a rebuttal of my response, Chignell raises three new objections (Philosophical Quarterly, 61). My purpose in this paper is to reply to these.
Dierken, Jörg. “Philosophie und Theologie: Zur vernünftigen Bildung des Glaubens nach Kant.” Kants “Streit der Fakultäten” oder der Ort der Bildung zwischen Lebenswelt und Wissenschaften. Ed. Ludger Honnefelder (op cit.). 89-108. [M]
di Giovanni, George. “On Chris L. Firestone and Nathan Jacobs’s In Defense of Kant’s Religion: A Comment.” Faith and Philosophy 29.2 (2012): 163-69. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: In this comment on Firestone and Jacobs’s book, In Defense of Kant’s Religion, I take issue with (1) the authors’ strategy in demonstrating that it is possible to positively incorporate religion and theology into Kant’s critical corpus, and (2) their intention to focus on the coherence of Kant’s theory without necessarily recommending it for Christianity. Regarding (1), I argue that in pursuing their strategy the authors ignore the fact that Kant has transposed what appear to be traditional religious doctrines to a completely different level of reflection, in effect turning them into imaginary tropes intended to mask otherwise irreducible contradictions in his view of human agency. As for (2), I claim that the authors’ intention runs the risk of being disingenuous, since Kant presented his religion as the true religion, opposing it to historical Christianity (unless the latter, of course, is re-interpreted according to his own precepts).
Diop, El Hadj Ibrahima. “Die Kant-Forster-Kontroverse über Menschenrassen als WEndepunkt der europäischen Afrikadiskurse.” Klopffechtereien – Missverständnisse – Widersprüche? Methodische und methodologische Perspektiven auf die Kant-Forster-Kontroverse. Eds. Rainer Godel and Gideon Stiening (op cit.). 179-89. [M]
Dorrien, Gary J. Kantian Reason and Hegelian Spirit: The Idealistic Logic of Modern Theology. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012. [x, 605 p.] [WC]
Doyle, Michael W. Liberal Peace: Selected Essays. London: Routledge, 2012. [243 p.] [WC]
Doyle, Tsarina. “The Kantian Background to Nietzsche’s Views on Causality.” Journal of Nietzsche Studies 43.1 (2012): 44-56. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This article addresses the Kantian background to Nietzsche’s metaphysics. Focusing on the issues of causality and force, I argue that Nietzsche’s will to power thesis emerges in response to Kant’s approach to the question of causality. I contend that Nietzsche sides with Kant, contrary to Schopenhauer, in his identification of force with efficient causality, indicating his approval of Kant’s restriction of the objective applicability of the concept of causality to the phenomenal sphere. However, Nietzsche contends that Kant fails to fully execute his project due to his retention of the thing-in-itself as the realm in which the inner determinations of things reside. I argue that Nietzsche makes it his task to complete the Kantian project by reconciling force with its disinherited inner determinations at the level of phenomena rather than things-in-themselves.
Dubbink, Wim and Bert van de Ven. “On the Duties of Commission in Commercial Life. A Kantian Criticism of Moral Institutionalism.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15.2 (2012): 221-38. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: In latter-day discussions on corporate morality, duties of commission are fiercely debated. Moral institutionalists argue that duties of commission — such as a duty of assistance — overstep the boundaries of moral duty owed by economic agents. “Moral institutionalism” is a newly coined term for a familiar position on market morality. It maintains that market morality ought to be restricted, excluding all duties of commission. Neo-Classical thinkers such as Baumol and Homann defend it most eloquently. They underpin their position with concerns that go to the core of liberalism — the dominant western political theory that sustains the ideals of both the free market and the free, rational person. Those authors claim that liberalism calls for a fully differentiated market because it resents the politicization of the market. Fully differentiated markets exclude duties of commission. They also claim that full differentiation of the market closes the troublesome gap between moral motivation and moral virtue. Full differentiation redeems the promise of “easy virtue”. In this paper moral institutionalism will be rejected from a Kantian point of view, mostly inspired by Herman’s thesis on the invisibility of morality. Liberalism may perhaps ban the politicization of the market; it does not forbid its moralization. The idea of a fully differentiated market must also be rejected because it is either morally over-demanding (to the morally autonomous person) or morally hazardous (to the person with failing moral motivation). Contrary to what the moral institutionalists claim, right action, morally, is actually quite difficult in fully differentiated markets.
Duncan, Sam. “Moral Evil, Freedom and the Goodness of God: Why Kant Abandoned Theodicy.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20.5 (2012): 973-91. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Kant proclaimed that all theodicies must fail in ‘On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy’, but it is mysterious why he did so since he had developed a theodicy of his own during the critical period. In this paper, I offer an explanation of why Kant thought theodicies necessarily fail. In his theodicy, as well as in some of his works in ethics, Kant explained moral evil as resulting from unavoidable limitations in human beings. God could not create finite beings without such limitations and so could not have created humans that were not prone to committing immoral acts. However, the work of Carl Christian Eberhard Schmid showed Kant that given his own beliefs about freedom and the nature of responsibility one could not account for moral evil in this way without tacitly denying that human beings were responsible for their actions. This result is significant not only because it explains an otherwise puzzling shift in Kant's philosophy of religion, but also because it shows that the theodicy essay provides powerful evidence that Kant’s thinking about moral evil and freedom underwent fundamental shifts between early works such as the Groundwork and later works like the Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason.
Dunlop, Katherine. “Kant and Strawson on the Content of Geometrical Concepts.” Nous 46.1 (2011): 86-126. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: The article focuses on Immanuel Kant's concept of sensible representation (intuition), considering his view of geometry. It also argues on P. F. Strawson’s interpretation suggesting that Kant intends to explain the imaginative activity by which people recognize concepts. It discusses aspects of Kant’s theory of geometry relative to topics including the definition of concept, mathematical concepts as factitious a priori, and heterogeneity between concept and intuition.
Duque, Félix. “Illusion and Strategy of Reason.” Kant’s Philosophy of the Unconscious. Eds. Piero Giordanetti, Riccardo Pozzo, and Marco Sgarbi (op cit.). 61-75. [M]
Dutoit, Thomas. “Kant’s Retreat, Hugo’s Advance, Freud’s Erection; or, Derrida’s Displacements in his Death Penalty Lectures.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (2012): 107-35. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This article analyzes the role played by Immanuel Kant’s defense of the death penalty, in the first and the second years of Jacques Derrida’s Death Penalty Seminars, delivered from 1999 to 2001. Regarding the first year, the initial part of this article charts how Derrida introduces Kant’s writings that purport to elaborate the categorical imperative of the death penalty, not by Kant’s primary arguments but rather precisely through Kant’s concession of an exception to this categorical imperative, concerning the impunity of a mother’s infanticide. Derrida’s lectures juxtapose Kant’s philosophy of the death penalty with Victor Hugo’s claim for the inviolability of life, and in doing so, the sessions introduce other examples of the applicability of the death penalty to mothers who have killed their children. What is at stake is the status of philosophy relative to the death penalty. Concerning the second year, the latter part of this article isolates the logic of Kant’s categorical imperative, as deconstructed by Derrida, through recourse to the additions that Kant was obliged to append to his initial argument — those involving precisely sex crimes. The article follows how Derrida thoroughly takes apart both the simplicity of Kant’s categorical imperative of the death penalty by means of the complications that are its abyssal foundation and the phallogocentrism of Freud’s sexual oppositions through the extraction of insights into another thinking of sexual difference that Freud’s categories foreclosed.
Dutra, Delamar Volpato. “In ricordo di Valerio Rohden.” [Italian] Studi Kantiani 24 (2011): 131-36. [PW]
Dyck, Corey W. “Chimerical Ethics and Flattering Moralists: Baumgarten’s Influence on Kant’s Moral Theory in the Observations and Remarks.” Kant’s Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide. Eds. Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley (op cit.). 38-56. [M]
Ellis, Elisabeth. “Introduction to Kant’s Political Theory.” Kant’s Political Theory: Interpretations and Applications. Ed. Elisabeth Ellis (op cit.). 1-24??. [WC]
——, ed. Kant’s Political Theory: Interpretations and Applications. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2012. [viii, 256 p.] [WC]
[Note][Hide Note]Contents:
Onora O’Neill, Kant and the Social Contract Tradition;
Arthur Ripstein, Kant and the Circumstances of Justice;
Thomas W. Pogge, Is Kant’s Rechtslehre a ‘Comprehensive Liberalism’?;
Louis-Philippe Hodgson, Realizing External Freedom: The Kantian Argument for a World State;
Robert S. Taylor, The Progress of Absolutism in Kant’s Essay ‘What is Enlightenment?’;
Michaele Ferguson, Unsocial Sociability: Perpetual Antagonism in Kant’s Political Thought;
Ian Hunter, Kant’s Political Thought in the Prussian Enlightenment;
Mika LaVaque-Manty, Kant on Education;
John Christian Laursen, Kant, Freedom of the Press, and Book Piracy.
Emundts, Dina. “Kants Kritik an der traditionellen Metaphysik.” Kants Prolegomena: ein kooperativer Kommentar. Eds. Holger Lyre and Oliver Schliemann (op cit.). 195-214??. [WC]
Esteves, Julio. “The Noncircular Deduction of the Categorical Imperative in Groundwork III.” Kant in Brazil. Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 155-72. [M]
Euler, Werner. “Einheit der Abstammung oder Gattungseinteilung? Kants Begriff der (Menschen-)Rasse als Idee einer Naturgeschichte.” Klopffechtereien – Missverständnisse – Widersprüche? Methodische und methodologische Perspektiven auf die Kant-Forster-Kontroverse. Eds. Rainer Godel and Gideon Stiening (op cit.). 55-96. [M]
Evans, C. Stephen. Rev. of Understanding Moral Obligation: Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, by Robert Stern (2011). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (July 2012, #23). [online] [M]
Falduto, Antonino, Caroline Kolisang, and Gabriel Rivero, eds. Metaphysik, Ästhetik, Ethik: Beiträge zur Interpretation der Philosophie Kants. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2012. [199 p.] [WC]
[Note][Hide Note]Contents:
Manfred Baum, Metaphysik. Ontologie und Transzendentalphilosophie bei Kant;
Till Hoeppner, Die Reflexivität der Transzendentalphilosophie und die Herleitung der Kategorien: Ergänzungen zu Manfred Baum;
Félix Duque, Kant und Hegel über das Selbe;
Gabriel Rivero, Kants Konzeption der Selbsterkenntnis der Vernunft: Anmerkungen zu Félix Duque
Heiner F. Klemme, Ästhetik und Ethik. Johann Georg Sulzers "vermischte Sittenlehre": ein Beitrag zur Vorgeschichte und Problemstellung von Kants Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten;
Saneyuki Yamatsuta, Kant über die Popularphilosophie und den Begriff der Achtung: Anmerkungen zu H.F. Klemmes Johann Georg Sulzers "vermischte Sittenlehre";
Birgit Recki, Kants Ästhetik der Sitten : ein Beitrag zum Problem der moralischen Motivation;
Gabriele Tomasi, Das Gefühl als Empfänglichkeit und die Bedeutung einer Ästhetik der Sitten: Anmerkungen zu Birgit Recki -- Gefühl und Erkenntnis in Kants Konzeption der ästhetischen Erfahrung;
Thomas Höwing, Tomasi über die Grundform der ästhetischen Erfahrung bei Kant.
Fenves, Peter. “Absent an Even Finer Feeling: A Commentary on the Opening of Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime.” Kant’s Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide. Eds. Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley (op cit.). 219-33. [M]
Ferguson, Benjamin. “Kant on Duty in the Groundwork.” Res Publica 18.4 (2012): 303-19. [HUM]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Barbara Herman offers an interpretation of Kant’s Groundwork on which an action has moral worth if the primary motive for the action is the motive of duty. She offers this approach in place of Richard Henson’s sufficiency-based interpretation, according to which an action has moral worth when the motive of duty is sufficient by itself to generate the action. Noa Latham criticizes Herman’s account and argues that we cannot make sense of the position that an agent can hold multiple motives for action and yet be motivated by only one of them, concluding that we must accept a face-value interpretation of the Groundwork where morally worthy actions obtain only when the agent’s sole motive is the motive of duty. This paper has two goals, one broad and one more constrained. The broader objective is to argue that interpretations of moral worth, as it is presented in the Groundwork, depend on interpretations of Kant’s theory of freedom. I show that whether we can make sense of the inclusion of nonmoral motives in morally worthy actions depends on whether the ‘always causal framework’ is consistent with Kant’s theory of freedom. The narrow goal is to show that if we adopt an ‘always causal’ framework for moral motivation, then Herman’s position and her critique of the sufficiency-based approach fail. Furthermore, within this framework I will specify a criterion for judging whether an action is determined by the motive of duty, even in the presence of nonmoral motives. Thus, I argue Latham’s conclusion that we must accept a face-value interpretation is incorrect.
Ferguson, Michaele. “Unsocial Sociability: Perpetual Antagonism in Kant’s Political Thought.” Kant’s Political Theory: Interpretations and Applications. Ed. Elisabeth Ellis (op cit.). 150-69. [WC]
Ferri, Sabrina. “Vittorio Alfieri’s Natural Sublime: The Physiology of Poetic Inspiration.” European Romantic Review 23.5 (2012): 555-74. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This essay examines Vittorio Alfieri’s representation of the natural sublime in his autobiography, Vita scritta da esso (1804), and situates it in the context of the eighteenth-century philosophical discourse on the aesthetics of the sublime. A comparative analysis of its relation to Burke’s physiological sublime, as opposed to Kant’s rationalistic model, shows how Alfieri’s description of the sublime is in line with the body-centered Burkean system. In fact, Alfieri’s natural sublime is a corporeal experience that stresses the primacy of the senses at the expense of reason. Following Longinus, however, Alfieri poses the question of the sublime in terms of poetic inspiration and describes a physiology of creativity that involves both the bodily passions and the imagination. By situating Alfieri’s sublime in a wider European context, the essay provides a conceptual framework to comprehend more fully Alfieri’s ideas about the psychology of literary inspiration and the creative process. Finally, Alfieri’s treatment of the natural sublime points to a non-Kantian line of development for the Romantic sublime and sheds light on the complex nature of late-eighteenth-century aesthetic theory.
[Note][Hide Note]Note: Fichte-Studien, vol. 39. See especially the essays by Angelica Nuzzo, “A Question of Method: Transcendental Philosophy, Dialectic, and the Problem of Determination”; Rainer Schäfer, “Kombinationen von Fundamentalismus, Kohärentismus und Skepsis bei Kant, Fichte und Hegel als Antworten auf Probleme gegenwärtiger Epistemologie”; Elena Ficara, “Skeptizismus und die Begründung der Philosophie bei Kant und Hegel”.
Filippaki, Eleni. “Kant on Love, Respect, and Friendship.” Kant and Contemporary Moral Philosophy. Ed. Dietmar H. Heidemann (op cit.). 23-48??. [WC]
Firestone, Chris L. “A Response to Critics of In Defense of Kant’s Religion.” Faith and Philosophy 29.2 (2012): 193-209. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This essay replies to four critics of In Defense of Kant’s Religion (IDKR). In reply to Gordon E. Michalson, Jr., I argue that the best pathway for understanding Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (Religion) is to conduct close textual analysis rather than giving up the art of interpretation or allowing meta-considerations surrounding Kant’s personal and political circumstances to govern one’s interpretation. In response to George di Giovanni, I contend that his critique is dismissive of theologically robust readings of Kant for reasons that have very little to do with what Religion actually asserts. Pamela Sue Anderson’s essay, I argue, reads Kant on God according to an empirically-biased stream of British interpretation which makes Kant’s transcendental philosophy appear foreign to its rationalist heritage. Lastly, in response to Stephen R. Palmquist, I suggest that his reading of Kant’s two experiments is done not only in a vacuum, but also according to a perspectival interpretation of Kant that goes beyond what Kant’s writings actually maintain.
Fischer, Norbert. Die Gnadenlehre als “salto mortale” der Vernunft?:
Natur, Freiheit und Gnade im Spannungsfeld von Augustinus und Kant. Freiburg im Breisgau: Alber, 2012. [368 p.] [WC]
Fonnesu, Luca. Rev. of Kant’s ‘Critique of Practical Reason’: A Critical Guide, edited by Andrews Reath and Jens Timmermann (2010). Rivista di Filosofia 103.1 (2012): 168-70. [PI]
Forman, David. “Kant on Moral Freedom and Moral Slavery.” Kantian Review 17.1 (2012): 1-32. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Kant’s account of the freedom gained through virtue builds on the Socratic tradition. On the Socratic view, when morality is our end, nothing can hinder us from attaining satisfaction: we are self-sufficient and free since moral goodness is (as Kant says) “created by us, hence, is in our power”. But when our end is the fulfilment of sensible desires, our satisfaction requires luck as well as the cooperation of others. For Kant, this means that happiness requires that we get other people to work for our ends; and this requires, in turn, that we gain control over the things other people value so as to have influence over them. If this plan for happiness is not subordinated to morality, then what is most valuable to us will be precisely what others value. This is the root of the ‘passions’ that make us evil and make us slaves whose satisfaction depends on others. But, significantly, this dependence is a moral slavery and, hence, does not signal a loss, or even diminishment of the kind of freedom required for moral responsibility.
——. “Principled and Unprincipled Maxims.” Kant-Studien 103.3 (2012): 318-336. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Kant frequently speaks as if all voluntary actions arise from our maxims as the subjective principles of our practical reason. But, as Michael Albrecht has pointed out, Kant also occasionally speaks as if it is only the rare person of “character” who acts according to principles or maxims. I argue that Kant’s seemingly contradictory claims on this front result from the fact that there are two fundamentally different ways that maxims of action can figure in the deliberation of the agent: an agent can act on a maxim either because it promises agreeable results or because he deems it to be an intrinsically correct principle of action. Kant describes a maxim of the latter sort as “firm” and as indicative of “character” in the honorific sense. If the agent’s commitment to his maxim is instead conditional on its agreeable results, we can say he does not act “on principle” and in that sense does not act on maxims at all: rather than aiming at a set of results because the action that produces them conforms to his maxim, he acts according to his maxim because doing so promises (and only as long as it promises) the results he desires. Such an agent thus lacks the principled maxims of a person of character since his maxims are always for sale to the highest bidder. Kant allows that an evil person can approximate the ideal of a principled indifference to results, but claims that only morally good action can be wholly principled. This is also why maxims of action in conformity with duty can be acquired gradually through habituation whereas an authentically moral maxim must instead arise from a “revolution” in thought.
Formosa, Paul. “From Discipline to Autonomy: Kant’s Theory of Moral Development.” Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary. Eds. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (op cit.). 163-76. [M]
Forschner, Maximilian. “Spolocenstvo vo viere. Poznámsky ku Kantovmu pojmu cirkvi.” [Slovak; “A Community of Faith: Remarks on Kant’s Conception of Church”] Filozofia 67.4 (2012): 303-14. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: The paper is based on the assumption that in Kant’s system of morality is not rooted in religion — just the opposite, the religion is rooted in morality. According to Kant, morality necessarily leads to religion by which he understands the knowledge of all our duties, not only as categorical commands of our own reason but also as commands of God. The author therefore tries to answer the questions arising from this context: why is there the need for faith and religion? And why is there even the need for institutional community, i.e., church? Is the reason of an individual not sufficient enough to recognize our duties? Is the moral feeling achieved by reason of every single man, i.e., feeling of respect before the law, not enough to motivate us to fulfill our duties? How should the church look like in Kant’s view to perform its potentially useful function?
Forschler, Scott. “From Supervenience to ‘Universal Law’: How Kantian Ethics Become Heteronomous.” Kant and Contemporary Moral Philosophy. Ed. Dietmar H. Heidemann (op cit.). 49-68. [WC]
Franco, Paul L. “Are Kant’s Concepts and Methodology Inconsistent with Scientific Change? Constitutivity and the Synthetic Method in Kant.” HOPOS: The International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 2.2 (2012): 321-53. [HUM]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Sympathetic commentators on Kant’s account of physical knowledge agree that while philosophy of science has much to gain from Kant’s notion of constitutive a priori principles, Kant’s conceptual and methodological resources are inconsistent with the possibility of scientific change. In this article, I argue that this received view is lacking since Kant’s claim that a unique set of a priori principles structures our knowledge for all time is not central to his account of the constitutive a priori. Two underemphasized points of Kant’s theory bear this out. First, Kant applies ‘a priori’ widely to include non-truth-evaluable elements of knowledge. As such, Kant primarily understands the necessity that attaches to these elements in light of the constitutive role they play in knowledge rather than in terms of truth for all time. Second, Kant uses two methods to establish the existence of constitutive a priori principles: the analytic and the synthetic. On my interpretation, while scientific change has discredited the analytic method, the synthetic method remains viable. In this way, I offer a new perspective on the ways in which Kant’s theory of the constitutive a priori can ground Neo-Kantian philosophies of science like those of Hans Reichenbach and Michael Friedman.
Fremstedal,Roe. “Kierkegaard’s Double Movement of Faith and Kant’s Moral Faith.” Religious Studies 48.2 (2012): 199-220. [HUM]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: The present article deals with religious faith by comparing the so-called double movement of faith in Kierkegaard to Kant’s moral faith. Kierkegaard’s double movement of faith and Kant’s moral faith can be seen as providing different accounts of religious faith, as well as involving different solutions to the problem of realizing the highest good. The double movement of faith in Fear and Trembling provides an account of the structure of faith that helps us make sense of what Kierkegaard means by religious faith in general, as well as to understand better the relation between philosophy and Christian thinking in Kierkegaard. It is argued that previous scholarship has described the relation between Kierkegaard and Kant in a misleading manner by interpreting Kant as an ethicist and overlooking the role of grace in Kant.
——. “Original Sin and Radical Evil: Kierkegaard and Kant.” Kantian Review 17.2 (2012): 197-225. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: By comparing the theories of evil found in Kant and Kierkegaard, this article aims to shed new light on Kierkegaard, as well as on the historical and conceptual relations between the two philosophers. The author shows that there is considerable overlap between Kant’s doctrine of radical evil and Kierkegaard’s views on guilt and sin and argues that Kierkegaard approved of the doctrine of radical evil. Although Kierkegaard’s distinction between guilt and sin breaks radically with Kant, there are more Kantian elements in Kierkegaard than was shown by earlier scholarship. Finally, Kierkegaard provides an alternative solution to the problem of the universality of guilt, a problem much discussed in the literature on Kant.
Friedman, Michael. “Newton and Kant: Quantity of Matter in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 50.3 (2012): 482-503. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Immanuel Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786) provides metaphysical foundations for the application of mathematics to empirically given nature. The application that Kant primarily has in mind is that achieved in Isaac Newton’s Principia (1687). Thus, Kant’s first chapter, the Phoronomy, concerns the mathematization of speed or velocity, and his fourth chapter, the Phenomenology, concerns the empirical application of the Newtonian notions of true or absolute space, time, and motion. This paper concentrates on Kant’s second and third chapters — the Dynamics and the Mechanics, respectively — and argues that they are best read as providing a transcendental explanation of the conditions for the possibility of applying the (mathematical) concept of quantity of matter to experience. Kant again has in mind the empirical measures of this quantity that Newton fashions in the Principia, and he aims to make clear, in particular, how Newton achieves a universal measure for all bodies whatsoever by projecting the static quantity of terrestrial weight into the heavens by means of the theory of universal gravitation. Kant is not attempting to prove a priori what Newton has established empirically but, rather, to clarify the character of Newton’s mathematization by building Newton’s empirical measures into the very concept of matter that is articulated in the Metaphysical Foundations.
——. “Kant on Geometry and Spatial Intuition.” Synthese 186.1 (2012): 231-55. [HUM]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: I use recent work on Kant and diagrammatic reasoning to develop a reconsideration of central aspects of Kant’s philosophy of geometry and its relation to spatial intuition. In particular, I reconsider in this light the relations between geometrical concepts and their schemata, and the relationship between pure and empirical intuition. I argue that diagrammatic interpretations of Kant’s theory of geometrical intuition can, at best, capture only part of what Kant’s conception involves and that, for example, they cannot explain why Kant takes geometrical constructions in the style of Euclid to provide us with an a priori framework for physical space. I attempt, along the way, to shed new light on the relationship between Kant’s theory of space and the debate between Newton and Leibniz to which he was reacting, and also on the role of geometry and spatial intuition in the transcendental deduction of the categories.
——. “Geometria e Intuição espacial em Kant.” [Kant on Geometry and Spatial Intuition, translated into Portuguese by José Oscar de Almeida and Marques Andrea Faggion] Kant e-Prints 7.1 (2012): 2-32. [pdf] [PW]
——. “Reconsidering the Dynamics of Reason: Response to Ferrari, Mormann, Nordmann, and Uebel.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 43.1 (2012): 47-53. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: I address the points raised by the four commentators by indicating how I have been thinking about extending and expanding my perspective since Dynamics of Reason (2001). This involves reinterpreting the Kantian distinction between understanding and sensibility, and thereby rethinking the relativized a priori. I connect these ideas with experimental contexts and technology, as well as with the wider culture context. I suggest implications for the relationships among science, democracy, and religion — and eventually reconceptualizing Kant’s original Enlightenment project.
——. “The Prolegomena and Natural Science.” Kants Prolegomena: ein kooperativer Kommentar. Eds. Holger Lyre and Oliver Schliemann (op cit.). 299-326??. [WC]
Frierson, Patrick R. “Two Concepts of Universality in Kant’s Moral Theory.” Kant’s Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide. Eds. Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley (op cit.). 57-76. [M]
Garcia, Ernesto V. “A New Look at Kantian Respect for Persons.” Kant and Contemporary Moral Philosophy. Ed. Dietmar H. Heidemann (op cit.). 69-90??. [WC]
García Marzá, Domingo. “Kant’s Principle of Publicity: The Intrinsic Relationship between the Two Formulations.” Kant-Studien 103.1 (2012): 96-113. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Kant’s principle of publicity is now acquiring an increasingly important role within democratic theory, and specifically within the new theories of institutional design. However, the principle has received little attention from classical Kantian scholars, and any consideration is usually limited to the negative formulation. Thus, the critical potential — the potential for social change and transformation that the principle encompasses — is neglected, precisely when it is needed more than ever in the context of today’s increasingly complex and globalised political and economic relations. The aim of the present paper is to offer a new reading of the principle of publicity that can explain the intrinsic relationship between the two formulations of the principle Kant sets out in the second part of the appendix to ‘Zum ewigen Frieden’. I attempt to argue that the two formulations can be interpreted as two necessary steps in the process of institutionalising moral ideas; in other words, as two complementary criteria to explain the meaning of a politics that can be called just. Furthermore, I will attempt to show how in the same text Kant points to a third formulation of the principle related to the generation of trust. I, therefore, put forward an interpretation of the principle that contributes to institutional design both the need for transparency and the requirement of agreement, and that may be empirically tested through the notion of trust.
Gardner, Sebastian. “Schopenhauer’s Contraction of Reason: Clarifying Kant and Undoing German Idealism.” Kantian Review 17.3 (2012): 375-401. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Schopenhauer’s claim that the essence of the world consists in Wille encounters well-known difficulties. Of particular importance is the conflict of this metaphysical claim with his restrictive account of conceptuality. This paper attempts to make sense of Schopenhauer’s position by restoring him to the context of post-Kantian debate, with special attention to the early notebooks and Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. On the reconstruction suggested here, Schopenhauer’s philosophical project should be understood in light of his rejection of post-Kantian metaphilosophy and his opposition to German Idealism.
Garrido, Juan-Manuel. El imperativo de la humanidad: La fundamentación estética de los derechos humanos en Kant. [Spanish] Santiago de Chile: Orjikh Editores, 2012. [91 p.] [WC]
Gartenberg, Zachary Mica. “Intelligibility and Subjectivity in Peirce: A Reading of His ‘New List of Categories’.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 50.4 (2012): 581-610. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: An essay is presented that discusses philosophical views of philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce expressed in his essay “On a New List of Categories,” which is related to Peirce’s reading of the book Critique of Pure Reason, by Immanuel Kant. The author argues against scholar T. L. Short that Peirce is not engaged in a transcendental deduction of categories akin to Kant’s deduction, but is only a kind of metaphysical deduction of fundamental categories.
Giesinger, Johannes. “Kant’s Account of Moral Education.” Educational Philosophy and Theory 44.7 (2012): 775-86. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: While Kant’s pedagogical lectures present an account of moral education, his theory of freedom and morality seems to leave no room for the possibility of an education for freedom and morality. In this paper, it is first shown that Kant’s moral philosophy and his educational philosophy are developed within different theoretical paradigms: whereas the former is situated within a transcendentalist framework, the latter relies on a teleological notion of human nature. The second part of this paper demonstrates that the core ideas of Kant’s moral philosophy are also present in his pedagogy. This means that the problem of moral education must be solved within the transcendentalist framework. It is finally claimed that Kant himself outlines a solution to this problem in his pedagogical lectures.
Gilgen, Peter. “Plurality without Harmony: On Hannah Arendt’s Kantianism.” Philosophical Forum 43.3 (2012): 259-75. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: The article examines political theorist Hannah Arendt’s critiques of German philosopher Immanuel Kant. Particular attention is given to Arendt’s essay “What Is Existential Philosophy?” in which she describes Kant’s historical impact and theories of ontology. Specific works by Kant mentioned in the discussion include Metaphysics of Morals and Critique of Judgment, as well as topics such as political philosophy, English philosopher Onora O’Neill, and the philosophy of common sense.
Giordanetti, Piero. Rivoluzione copernicano-newtoniana e sentimento in Kant. Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2012. [237 p.] [WC]
——. “The Unconscious as Root of Kant’s A Priori Sentimentalism.” Kant’s Philosophy of the Unconscious. Eds. Piero Giordanetti, Riccardo Pozzo, and Marco Sgarbi (op cit.). 77-88. [M]
——, Riccardo Pozzo, and Marco Sgarbi, eds. Kant’s Philosophy of the Unconscious. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2012. [vi, 329 p.] [M]
[Note][Hide Note]Essays:
Patricia Kitcher, Kant’s Unconscious ‘Given’; Dietmar H. Heidemann, The ‘I think’ Must Be Able to Accompany All My Representations: Unconscious Representations and Self-consciousness in Kant; Félix Duque, Illusion and Strategy of Reason; Piero Giordanetti, The Unconscious as Root of Kant’s a priori Sentimentalism; Tanehisa Otabe, Genius as a Chiasm of the Conscious and Unconscious: A History of Ideas Concerning Kantian Aesthetics; Anne Pollok, Kant’s Defeated Counterpart: Moses Mendelssohn on the Beauty, Mechanics, and Death of the Human Soul; Katja Crone, Pre-conceptual Aspects of Self-consciousness in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason; Tommaso Tuppini, Kant, Blows of Tears; Nuria Sánchez Madrid, A Linneaus of Human Nature: The Pragmatic Deduction of Unconscious Thought in Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology; Seung-Kee Lee, Logical Forms, Indeterminacy, and the Subjective Unity of Consciousness in Kant; Dennis Schulting, Non-apperceptive Consciousness; Tom Rockmore, Kant on Unconscious Mental Activity.
Godel, Rainer. “Mediale Strategien.” Klopffechtereien – Missverständnisse – Widersprüche? Methodische und methodologische Perspektiven auf die Kant-Forster-Kontroverse. Eds. Rainer Godel and Gideon Stiening (op cit.). 293-323. [M]
—— and Gideon Stiening. “Die Kunst des akademischen Streitens. Zur Einführung in eine Kontroverse über eine Kontroverse.” Klopffechtereien – Missverständnisse – Widersprüche? Methodische und methodologische Perspektiven auf die Kant-Forster-Kontroverse. Eds. Rainer Godel and Gideon Stiening (op cit.). 7-15. [M]
—— and Gideon Stiening, eds. Klopffechtereien – Missverständnisse – Widersprüche? Methodische und methodologische Perspektiven auf die Kant-Forster-Kontroverse. Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2012. [328 p.] [content] [M]
Godelek, Kamuran. Rev. of Understanding Moral Obligation: Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, by Robert Stern (2011). Metapsychology Online Reviews 16.39 (posted 2012 Sep 25). [online] [M]
Golden, Timothy J. “From Epistemology to Ethics: Theoretical and Practical Reason in Kant and Douglass.” Journal of Religious Ethics 40.4 (2012): 603-28. [HUM]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: The aim of this essay is to provide a philosophical discussion of Frederick Douglass’s thought in relation to Christianity. I expand upon the work of Bill E. Lawson and Frank M. Kirkland — who both argue that there are Kantian features present in Douglass as it relates to his conception of the individual — by arguing that there are similarities between Douglass and Kant not only concerning the relationship between morality and Christianity, but also concerning the nature of the soul. Specifically, I try to show that the moral weakness of slaveholding Christianity that Douglass attacked is found in the ecclesial formation of the slaveholding Christian church; it is a formation that begins with epistemology, but ignores ethics. I conclude, in part, that both Douglass and Kant reject a Cartesian psychological dualism in favor of a conception of the soul that is more attentive to one’s moral development.
Goldman, Avery. Kant and the Subject of Critique: On the Regulative Role of the Psychological Idea. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2012. [249 p.] [WC]
[Note][Hide Note]Contents: Introduction: the circularity of critique — The ideas of reason — The boundary of phenomena and noumena — The designation of the region of experience in the Critique of pure reason — Transcendental reflection: interpreting the amphiboly via §76 of the Critique of Judgment — The paralogisms of pure reason: in search of a regulative principle for transcendental reflection — Transcendental method: the orientation of critique.
Goldman, Loren. “In Defense of Blinders: On Kant, Political Hope, and the Need for Practical Belief.” Political Theory 40.4 (2012): 497-523. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Kant’s progressive philosophy of history is an integral aspect of his critical system, yet it is often ignored or even treated as an embarrassment by contemporary scholars. In this article, I defend Kant and argue for the continuing relevance of his regulative assumption of historical progress. I suggest, furthermore, that the first-person stance of practical belief exemplified in Kant’s conception of hope offers new resources for thinking about the relationship between the ideal and the real in political theory.
Golob, Sacha. “Heidegger on Kant, Time and the ‘Form’ of Intentionality.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy # (2012): #. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Between 1927 and 1936, Martin Heidegger devoted almost one thousand pages of close textual commentary to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. This article aims to shed new light on the relationship between Kant and Heidegger by providing a fresh analysis of two central texts: Heidegger’s 1927/8 lecture course Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and his 1929 monograph Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. I argue that to make sense of Heidegger’s reading of Kant, one must resolve two questions. First, how does Heidegger’s Kant understand the concept of the transcendental? Second, what role does the concept of a horizon play in Heidegger’s reconstruction of the Critique? I answer the first question by drawing on Cassam’s model of a self-directed transcendental argument (‘The role of the transcendental within Heidegger’s Kant’), and the second by examining the relationship between Kant’s doctrine that ‘pure, general logic’ abstracts from all semantic content and Hume's attack on metaphysics (‘The role of the horizon within Heidegger’s Kant’). I close by sketching the implications of my results for Heidegger's own thought (‘From Heidegger's Kant to Sein und Zeit’). Ultimately, I conclude that Heidegger’s commentary on the Critical system is defined, above all, by a single issue: the nature of the ‘form’ of intentionality.
Goubet, Jean-François. Des maîtres philosophes? La fondation de la pédagogie générale par l'Université allemande. Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2012. [565 p.] [contents] [PW]
Gray, Sally Hatch. “Kant’s Race Theory, Forster’s Counter, and the Metaphysics of Color.” Eighteenth Century: Theory & Interpretation 53.4 (2012): 393-412. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: The article discusses the race theory developed by German philosopher Immanuel Kant, especially in his anthropological treatise Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime (German: Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen). Particular focus is given to Kant’s thoughts on aesthetic judgment and the metaphysics of beauty and color and their connection to the ethnological travel writings of German naturalist Georg Forster.
Gressis, Robert. Rev. of The Blackwell Guide to Kant’s Ethics, edited by Thomas E. Hill, Jr. (2009). Journal of Moral Philosophy 9.2 (2012): 302-4. [PI]
——. Rev. of Kant, Religion, and Politics, by James J. DiCenso (2011). Ethics 123.1 (2012): 146-49. [PW]
Griffith, Aaron M. “Perception and the Categories: A Conceptualist Reading of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.” European Journal of Philosophy 20.2 (2012): 193-222. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]
Article first published online: 4 Apr 2010. Abstract: Philosophers interested in Kant’s relevance to contemporary debates over the nature of mental content — notably Robert Hanna and Lucy Allais — have argued that Kant ought to be credited with being the original proponent of the existence of 'nonconceptual content'. However, I think the 'nonconceptualist' interpretations that Hanna and Allais give do not show that Kant allowed for nonconceptual content as they construe it. I argue, on the basis of an analysis of certain sections of the A and B editions of the Transcendental Deduction, for a 'conceptualist' reading of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. My contention is that since Kant’s notion of empirical intuition makes essential reference to the categories, it must be true for him that no empirical intuition can be given in sensibility independently of the understanding and its categories.
Grün, Klaus-Jürgen. Rev. of Kant und der Gottesbegriff: Eine Interpretation, edited by Ernst Horneffer and Klaus Horneffer (2010). Kant-Studien 103.1 (2012): 129-31. [PI]
Guyer, Paul. “Examples of Moral Possibility.” Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary. Eds. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (op cit.). 124-138. [M]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Schopenhauer presents his moral philosophy as diametrically opposed to that of Kant: for him, pure practical reason is an illusion and morality can arise only from the feeling of compassion, while for Kant it cannot be based on such a feeling and can be based only on pure practical reason. But the difference is not as great as Schopenhauer makes it seem, because for him compassion is supposed to arise from metaphysical insight into the unity of all being, thus from pure if theoretical reason, while for Kant pure practical reason works only by effecting a feeling of respect (in the ‘Critical’ works) or by cultivating, i.e. affecting, natural dispositions to moral feeling (in the ‘post-Critical’ works). I argue that Kant’s is the more realistic theory on this point.
——. “Passion for Reason: Hume, Kant, and the Motivation for Morality.” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 86.2 (2012): 4-21. [M]
——. “The Prolegomena and the Critique of Pure Reason.” Kants Prolegomena: ein kooperativer Kommentar. Eds. Holger Lyre and Oliver Schliemann (op cit.). 277-98??. [WC]
——. Rev. of Kant-Index, Band 30: Stellenindex und Konkordanz zum Naturrecht Feyerabend: Teilband 1: Einleitung des Naturrechts Feyerabend, edited by Heinrich P. Delfosse, Norbert Hinske, and Gianluca Sadun Bordoni (2010). Ratio Juris: An International Journal of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law 25.1 (2012): 110-16. [PI]
——. Rev. of Kant’s Moral Metaphysics: God, Freedom, and Immortality, edited by Benjamin J. Bruxvoort Lipscomb and James Krueger (2010). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (April 2012, #25). [online] [M]
——. “Freedom as the Foundation of Morality: Kant’s Early Efforts.” Kant’s Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide. Eds. Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley (op cit.). 77-98. [M]
Haag, Johannes. “Auflösung der allgemeinen Frage und Anhang: Die Prüfung der kritischen Philosophie.” Kants Prolegomena: ein kooperativer Kommentar. Eds. Holger Lyre and Oliver Schliemann (op cit.). 255-76??. [WC]
Hahmann, Andree. “Freiheit und Ding as sich.” Kants Prolegomena: ein kooperativer Kommentar. Eds. Holger Lyre and Oliver Schliemann (op cit.). 215-34??. [WC]
Hamm, Christian. “Freedom in Appearance: Notes on Schiller and His Development of Kant’s Aesthetics.” Kant in Brazil. Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 321-36. [M]
Hanna, Robert. “The Kantian’s Revenge: On Forster’s ‘Kant and Skepticism’.” Kantian Review 17.1 (2012): 33-45. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This is a critical study of Michael Forster’s Kant and Skepticism. I begin by briefly summarizing the central argument of the book, chapter by chapter, and by compressing it into a two-part thesis: (1) the primary philosophical motivation behind Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is to respond to radical Pyrrhonian skepticism about human reason, not to Humean skepticism, Cartesian “veil of perception” skepticism, or Berkeleyan skeptical metaphysical phenomenalism, (2) Ultimately, Kant has no philosophically adequate response to Pyrrhonian radical scepticism about human reason when this radical scepticism is applied to the basic assumptions of Kant’s own “reformed metaphysics,” i.e., transcendental idealism. I then develop five critical worries about Forster’s two-part thesis.
Hebbeler, James C. “The Principles of the First Critique.” Review of Metaphysics 65.3 (2012): 555-79. [M]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: In the Critique of Pure Reason Immanuel Kant claims that he is offering, at least in outline, a science of reason grounded on principles. Given Kant’s frequent but diverse use of the term ‘principle’ throughout the work, it is unclear what exactly this term is supposed to signify, whether there are more or less fundamental principles and on what basis, and how the diverse instances of them might form a unified science of theoretical reason. The aim of this paper is to provide answers to these questions by arguing for a theory of Kant’s principles grounded in Kant’s teleological conception of theoretical reason. Such a teleological conception of reason has implications for a proper understanding of the highly disputed metaphysical results of the Critique.
Heck, José Nicolau. “Right and the Duty to Resist, or Progress toward the Better.” Kant in Brazil. Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 189-205. [M]
Heidemann, Dietmar H. “The ‘I think’ Must Be Able to Accompany All My Representations: Unconscious Representations and Self-consciousness in Kant.” Kant’s Philosophy of the Unconscious. Eds. Piero Giordanetti, Riccardo Pozzo, and Marco Sgarbi (op cit.). 37-59. [WC]
——, ed. Kant and Contemporary Moral Philosophy. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012. [163 p.] [WC]
[Note][Hide Note]Note: Kant Yearbook, vol. 4. Contents:
Jochen Bojanowski, Is Kant a Moral Realist?;
Eleni Filippaki, Kant on Love, Respect, and Friendship;
Scott Forschler, From Supervenience to ‘Universal Law’: How Kantian Ethics Become Heteronomous;
Ernesto V. Garcia, A New Look at Kantian Respect for Persons;
Chun-Yip Lowe, Kant’s Social Contract: A New Transcendental Principle in Political Philosophy;
Adrian M. S. Piper, Kant’s Two Solutions to the Free Rider Problem;
Toby Svoboda, Duties Regarding Nature: A Kantian Approach to Environmental Ethics.
Hems, Nigel. See: Banham, Gary, Dennis Schulting, and Nigel Hems, eds.
Henrich, Dieter. “Concerning Kant’s Earliest Ethics: An Attempt at a Reconstruction.” Kant’s Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide. Eds. Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley (op cit.). 13-37. [M]
Herbert, Gary B. “Bringing Morality to Appearances: Kant’s Theory of Education.” Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary. Eds. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (op cit.). 81-93. [M]
Hidalgo, Oliver. Kants Friedensschrift und der Theorienstreit in den Internationalen Beziehungen. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2012. [223 p.] [WC]
Hill, Thomas E. Virtue, Rules, and Justice: Kantian Aspirations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. [vii, 372 p.] [WC]
——. “Practical Reason, the Moral Law, and Choice.” Analytic Philosophy 53.1 (2012): 71-78. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This brief commentary on Stephen’s Engstrom’s The Form of Practical Knowledge: A Study of the Categorical Imperative highlights some of its important and original features and then focuses on how Kant can make sense of common phenomena of moral weakness and intentional wrongdoing. If the will is just practical reason understood as a capacity to exercise efficacious judgment about what is good and the moral law is its principle, then it seems that a will to do wrong must always be a misguided attempt to do right. A mere ‘choice’ not based on a judgment of what is good could not be attributed to an agent’s will. Knowingly and willfully doing wrong seems impossible. Engstrom’s subtle interpretation raises this old problem in a new way.
Hinske, Norbert, Michael Albrecht, Heinrich P. Delfosse, Bernd Straßburg, Jeannine Huster, and Lothar Kreimendahl, eds. Kant-Index, Bd. 36: Stellenindex und Konkordanz zu den "Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte". Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2012. [#, # p.] [WC]
Hirsch, Philipp-Alexander. “Wege zur Freiheit? Offene Fragen der Kantischen Rechtsund politischen Philosophie.” Kant-Studien 103.4 (2012): 494-98. [PW]
Hodgson, Louis-Philippe. “Realizing External Freedom: The Kantian Argument for a World State.” Kant’s Political Theory: Interpretations and Applications. Ed. Elisabeth Ellis (op cit.). 101-34??. [WC]
Höffe, Otfried. Kants Kritik der praktischen Vernunft: eine Philosophie der Freiheit. Munich: C. H. Beck, 2012. [456 p.] [data] [WC]
Hörner, Richard. Hobbes Menschenrechtskonzeption, Kants Idee des Friedens und heutige Menschenrechtsproblematiken. Wörth am Rhein: SCL, 2012. [228 p.] [data] [WC]
Hohendahl, Peter Uwe. “Nature and the Autonomy of Art: Adorno as a Reader of Kant.” Philosophical Forum 43.3 (2012): 247-57. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: The article examines German philosopher Theodor W. Adorno’s views on the work of German philosopher Immanuel Kant. According to the author, Adorno’s early work Dialectic of Enlightenment strongly criticized Kant and his influence on rationalism and fascism. However, the author also analyzes Adorno’s positive assessment of Kant’s approaches to areas such as his epistemology, moral philosophy, and aesthetic theory following World War II.
Honnefelder, Ludger, ed. Kants “Streit der Fakultäten” oder der Ort der Bildung zwischen Lebenswelt und Wissenschaften. Berlin: Berlin University Press, 2012. [373p.] [data] [M]
[Note][Hide Note]Note: See especially the essays by Brandt, Wood, and Dierken.
Hoorn, Tanja van. “Was heißt und zu welchem Ende studiert man Naturgeschichte?” Klopffechtereien – Missverständnisse – Widersprüche? Methodische und methodologische Perspektiven auf die Kant-Forster-Kontroverse. Eds. Rainer Godel and Gideon Stiening (op cit.). 163-77. [M]
Hounsokou, Annie. “‘Exposing the Rogue in Us’: An Exploration of Laughter in the Critique of Judgment.” Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 16.2 (2011): 317-36. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]
Abstract: Kant’s treatment of laughter in section 54 of the Critique of Judgment is intriguing: he places laughter among the arts, but does not deem it serious enough to be a fine art. According to Kant, laughter is an agreeable art, and ministers only to the senses. But when he describes to us what laughter actually does, it turns out that this bodily phenomenon is actually a moral phenomenon akin to the sublime in that it elevates and humbles us at the same time. This paper revisits Kant’s aesthetic themes, shows the distinctive role of laughter in the third Critique, and explores the possibilities of a true reunification of law and freedom through laughter.
Hoesch, Matthias. “Lässt Kants Völkerbund als Mitgliedsstaaten nur Republiken zu?” Kant-Studien 103.1 (2012): 114-25. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: It often seems to be an unquestioned presupposition that Kant’s concept of the federation of states is limited to states with a republican constitution. In this paper, I argue, firstly, that this presupposition is unwarranted and, secondly, that there are further problems as regards the interpretation of Kant’s international law.
Huggler, Jørgen. “Culture and Paradox in Kant’s Philosophy of Education.” Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary. Eds. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (op cit.). 94-106. [M]
Hunter, Ian. “Kant’s Political Thought in the Prussian Enlightenment.” Kant’s Political Theory: Interpretations and Applications. Ed. Elisabeth Ellis (op cit.). 170-207. [WC]
Inwood, Michael. “Heidegger on time.” Contemporary Kantian Metaphysics: New Essays on Time and Space. Eds. Roxana Baiasu, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore (op cit.). 233-52??. [WC]
Ion, Dora. Kant and International Relations Theory: Cosmopolitan Community-Building. Milton Park/New York: Routledge, 2012. [x, 172 p.] [WC]
Jaarsma, P., P. Gelhaus, and S. Welin. “Living the categorical imperative: autistic perspectives on lying and truth telling-between Kant and care ethics.” Medicine, Health Care, and Philosophy 15.3 (2012): 271-77. [MEDLINE]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Lying is a common phenomenon amongst human beings. It seems to play a role in making social interactions run more smoothly. Too much honesty can be regarded as impolite or downright rude. Remarkably, lying is not a common phenomenon amongst normally intelligent human beings who are on the autism spectrum. They appear to be ‘attractively morally innocent’ and seem to have an above average moral conscientious objection against deception. In this paper, the behavior of persons with autism with regard to deception and truthfulness will be discussed in the light of two different ethical theories, illustrated by fragments from autobiographies of persons with autism. A systemizing ‘Kantian’ and an empathizing ‘ethics of care’ perspective reveal insights on high-functioning autism, truthfulness and moral behavior. Both perspectives are problematic from the point of view of a moral agent with autism. High-functioning persons with autism are, generally speaking, strong systemizes and weak empathizers. Particularly, they lack ‘cognitive empathy’ which would allow them to understand the position of the other person. Instead, some tend to invent a set of rules that makes their behavior compatible with the expectations of others. From a Kantian point of view, the autistic tendency to always tell the truth appears praiseworthy and should not be changed, though it creates problems in the social life of persons with autism. From a care ethics perspective, on the other hand, a way should be found to allow the high-functioning persons with autism to respect the feelings and needs of other persons as sometimes overruling the duty of truthfulness. We suggest this may even entail ‘morally educating’ children and adolescents with autism to become socially skilled empathic ‘liars’.
Jacobs, Nathan A. “A Response to Critics of In Defense of Kant’s Religion.” Faith and Philosophy 29.2 (2012): 210-28. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: In this essay, I reply to the above four critics of In Defense of Kant’s Religion (IDKR). In reply to George di Giovanni, I highlight the interpretive differences that divide the authors of IDKR and di Giovanni, and argue that di Giovanni’s atheist reading of Kant does not follow, even granting his premises. In reply to Pamela Sue Anderson, I show that if her reading of Kant is accurate, Kant’s own talk of God becomes empty and contemptible by his own lights, and I then show how her empirical bias prompts a significant misreading of IDKR. In reply to Stephen Palmquist, I expose four fallacious maneuvers in his paper, which comprise the bulk of his essay. And in reply to Michalson, I address a series of minor concerns raised in his essay, and then set the record straight on the motives behind IDKR in general and my own take on Kant’s compatibility (or lack thereof) with Christianity in specific.
Jaeschke, Walter and Andreas Arndt. Die klassische deutsche Philosophie nach Kant: Systeme der reinen Vernunft und ihre Kritik, 1785-1845. Munich: Beck, 2012. [749 p.] [data] [WC]
James, David. “The Role of Evil in Kant’s Liberalism.” Inquiry 55.3 (2012): 239-61. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Carl Schmitt distinguishes between political theories in terms of whether they rest on the anthropological assumption that man is evil by nature or on the anthropological assumption that man is good by nature, and he claims that liberal political theory is based on the latter assumption. Contrary to this claim, I show how Kant’s liberalism is shaped by his theory of the radical evil in human nature, and that his liberalism corresponds to the characterization of liberalism that Schmitt himself offers. My discussion of this issue will be shown to have certain implications with respect to the view that for Kant evil is the product of society. I show that this view is mistaken insofar as it fails to recognize that Kant’s political philosophy implies that human beings require the type of society that best suits their radically evil natures, namely, a commercial one in which the “vices of culture” largely have free play, while the state’s role is limited to that of preventing the antagonisms found in society leading to the mutual destruction of its members.
Janaway, Christopher. “Necessity, Responsibility and Character: Schopenhauer on Freedom of the Will.” Kantian Review 17.3 (2012): 431-57. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This paper gives an account of the argument of Schopenhauer’s essay On the Freedom of the Human Will, drawing also on his other works. Schopenhauer argues that all human actions are causally necessitated, as are all other events in empirical nature, hence there is no freedom in the sense of liberum arbitrium indifferentiae. However, our sense of responsibility or agency (being the ‘doers of our deeds’) is nonetheless unshakeable. To account for this Schopenhauer invokes the Kantian distinction between empirical and intelligible characters. The paper highlights divergences between Schopenhauer and Kant over the intelligible character, which for Schopenhauer can be neither rational nor causal. It raises the questions whether the intelligible character may be redundant to Schopenhauer’s position, and whether it can coherently belong to an individual agent, suggesting that for Schopenhauer a more consistent position would have been to deny freedom of will to the individual.
Jensen, David. “Kant and a Problem of Motivation.” Journal of Value Inquiry 46.1 (2012): 83-96. [HUM]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: The article focuses on the views of philosopher Immanuel Kant on the primary problem of moral philosophy. It highlights the arguments made by Kant in his book Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals on moral philosophy and its primary problem. It also explores the comparison and contradiction of the views of Michael Smith and his arguments in his book The Moral Problem.
John, Eileen. “Beauty, Interest, and Autonomy.” Journal of Aesthetics & Art Criticism 70.2 (2012): 193-202. [HUM]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: The author explores the role of the aesthetic experience in one’s life, focusing on the idea of aesthetic autonomy and how the aesthetic experience affects one’s interactions with others. The author discusses the practice of aesthetic judgment and gives an overview of the ideas of personal autonomy and aesthetic autonomy, drawing on the ideas of philosopher Immanuel Kant as well as the novel “The Bluest Eye” by Toni Morrison. The author draws on Kant and jazz musician John Coltrane’s song “My Favorite Things” in discussing how the aesthetic experience affects sociability.
Johnston, James Scott. “Kant as Moral Psychologist?” Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary. Eds. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (op cit.). 177-92. [M]
Jütten, Timo. “Adorno on Kant, Freedom and Determinism.” European
Journal of Philosophy 20.4 (2012): 548-74. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: In this paper I argue that Adorno’s metacritique of freedom in Negative Dialectics and related texts remains fruitful today. I begin with some background on Adorno’s conception of 'metacritique' and on Kant’s conception of freedom, as I understand it. Next, I discuss Adorno’s analysis of the experiential content of Kantian freedom, according to which Kant has reified the particular social experience of the early modern bourgeoisie in his conception of unconditioned freedom. Adorno argues against this conception of freedom and suggests that freedom is always conditioned by our embodiment and by our social and historical situation. Finally, I turn to Adorno’s criticism of Kant’s discussion of freedom and determinism in the Critique of Pure Reason and argue that while his philosophical argument against Kant fails, his metacritical argument remains suggestive. Scepticism about freedom arises when the standpoint of theoretical reason encroaches upon the standpoint of practical reason and assimilates persons to things.
Kane, John. “Democracy and World Peace: The Kantian Dilemma of United States Foreign Policy.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 66.3 (2012): 292-312. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: When liberal democracies pursue idealistic goals they invite accusations of naivety and impracticality; if they act on strictly realistic premises they are accused of hypocrisy or betrayal of ideals. The author explores the consequences of this idealism–realism dilemma using the example of United States foreign policy and the particular case of Woodrow Wilson and the Covenant of the League of Nations. The author examines its theoretical roots by analysing the work of Immanuel Kant, who laid down the influential moral–political ideal of a democratic peace but posited so stark a theoretical gulf between morality and politics as to make the ideal seem unreachable. Kant tried to show how a world resistant to morality might nevertheless evolve towards one in which moral action had real political effect — a necessary condition, he believed, for an international federation of republics committed to peaceful coexistence. The implausibility of his account reveals the problematic nature of the idealism–realism divide, but also, in its attempt to bridge that divide, points the way towards a genuinely ethical–practical foreign policy founded in political prudence.
Kanygina, Yuliya. Rev. of Self-Improvement: An Essay in Kantian Ethics, by Robert N. Johnson (2011). Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15.5 (2012): 707-08. [PW]
——. Crítica da Razão Pura. Translated into Portuguese by Fernando Costa Mattos. Petrópolis: Ed. Vozes, 2012. [621 p.] [WC]
Prolegomena (1783):
——. Prolegomena. Translated into Dutch by Jabik Veenbaas and Willem Visser. Amsterdam: Boom, 2012. [#, # p.] [WC]
Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785):
——. Fundamentación para una metafísica de las costumbres. Translated into Spanish by Roberto R. Aramayo. Madrid: Alianza, 2012. [256 p.] [WC]
Zum ewigen Frieden (1795):
——. Naar de eeuwige vrede: een filosofisch ontwerp, 2nd expanded edition. Translated into Dutch by Thomas Mertens and Edwin van Elden, preface and annotations by Thomas Mertens. Amsterdam: Boom, 2012. [129 p.] [WC]
“Von der Macht des Gemüths durch den blossen Vorsatz seiner krankhaften Gefühle Meister zu seyn” (1798):
——. “A Draft of Kant’s Reply to Hufeland: Autograph, Transcription, and English Translation.” Transcription by Wolfgang G. Bayerer, translation by Yvonne Unna. Kant-Studien 103.1 (2012): 1-24. [PW]
Misc.:
——. Natural Science, edited by Eric Watkins, translated by Lewis White Beck, Jeffrey B. Edwards, Olaf Reinhardt, Martin Schonfeld, and Eric Watkins. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. [xviii, 802 p.] [M]
[Note][Hide Note]Contents:
1. Thoughts on the true estimation of living forces and assessment of the demonstrations that Leibniz and other scholars of mechanics have made use of in this controversial subject, together with some prefatory considerations pertaining to the force of bodies in general (1746-1749) Translated by Jeffrey B. Edwards and Martin Schönfeld;
2. Examination of the question whether the rotation of the Earth on its axis by which it brings about the alternation of day and night has undergone any change since its origin and how one can be certain of this, which [question] was set by the Royal Academy of Sciences in Berlin as the prize question for the current year (1754) Translated by Olaf Reinhardt;
3. The question, whether the Earth is ageing, considered from a physical point of view (1754) Translated by Olaf Reinhardt;
4. Universal natural history and theory of the heavens or essay on the constitution and the mechanical origin of the whole universe according to Newtonian principles (1755) Translated by Olaf Reinhardt;
5. Succinct exposition of some meditations on fire (1755) Translated by Lewis White Beck;
6. On the causes of earthquakes on the occasion of the calamity that befell the western countries of Europe towards the end of last year (1756) Translated by Olaf Reinhardt;
7. History and natural description of the most noteworthy occurrences of the earthquake that struck a large part of the Earth at the end of the year 1755 (1756) Translated by Olaf Reinhardt;
8. Continued observations on the earthquakes that have been experienced for some time (1756) Translated by Olaf Reinhardt;
9. New notes to explain the theory of the winds, in which, at the same time, he invites attendance at his lectures (1756) Translated by Olaf Reinhardt;
10. Plan and announcement of a series of lectures on physical geography with an appendix containing a brief consideration of the question: whether the West winds in our regions are moist because they travel over a great sea (1757) Translated by Olaf Reinhardt;
11. New doctrine of motion and rest and the conclusions associated with it in the fundamental principles of natural science while at the same time his lectures for this half-year are announced (1758) Translated by Olaf Reinhardt;
12. Review of Silberschlag's work: theory of the fireball that appeared on 23 July 1762 (1764) Translated by Eric Watkins;
13. Notice of Lambert's correspondence (1782) Translated by Eric Watkins;
14. On the volcanoes on the Moon (1785) Translated by Olaf Reinhardt;
15. Something concerning the influence of the Moon on the weather (1794) Translated by Olaf Reinhardt;
16. Physical geography (1802).
——. Kant and the Concept of Race, translated and edited by Jon M. Mikkelsen. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2012. [#, # p.] [WC]
[Note][Hide Note]Contents:
Immanuel Kant, Of the Different Human Races: An Announcement for Lectures in Physical Geography in the Summer Semester 1775;
Immanuel Kant, Of the Different Human Races;
E.A.W. Zimmerman, From Geographical History of Human Beings and the Universally Dispersed Quadrupeds;
Immanuel Kant, Determination of the Concept of a Human Race;
Georg Forster, Something more about the human races;
Immanuel Kant, On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy;
Christoph Meiners, Of the Varieties and Deviate Forms of Negroes;
Christoph Girtanner, From Concerning the Kantian principle in Natural History: An Attempt to Treat this Science Philosophically.
——. Kant zum Vergnügen, edited by Volker Gerhardt. Stuttgart: Reclam, 2012. [182 p.] [WC]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: John Rawls’s account of Kantian constructivism is perhaps his most striking contribution to ethics. In this paper, I examine the relation between Rawls’s constructivism and its foundation in Kantian intuitions. In particular, I focus on the progressive influence on Rawls’s approach of the Kantian intuition that the substance of morality is best understood as constructed by free and equal people under fair conditions. Rawls’s focus on this Kantian intuition, I argue, motivates the focus on social contract that grounds both his accounts of the original position and of reflective equilibrium. Critics, including Onora O’Neill and Larry Krasnoff, object that Rawls’s view distorts various aspects of Kantian moral reasoning. I argue that these objections (i) exaggerate the distinctions between Kant’s and Rawls’s decision procedures and (ii) reflect an unnecessarily constricted view of Kant’s moral thought.
Keller, Sean. “Beauty, Genius, Epigenesis: The Kantian Origins of Contemporary Architecture.” Journal of Architectural Education 65.2 (2012): 42-51. [HUM]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This essay explores parallels between computationally based architecture — here represented by the work of Greg Lynn — and three major themes in the aesthetic theory of Immanuel Kant: aesthetic value (beauty), artistic generation (genius), and natural generation (epigenesis). Further, it interprets architecture’s place within Kant’s aesthetics as antinomic — that is to say, inexorably contradictory — and suggests that this interpretation offers a theoretical basis for the entanglement of computational methods with typological concerns.
Kitcher, Patricia. “Kant’s Unconscious ‘Given’.” Kant’s Philosophy of the Unconscious. Eds. Piero Giordanetti, Riccardo Pozzo, and Marco Sgarbi (op cit.). 5-36. [M]
Klemme, Heiner F. “Die Aufhebung von Humes Zweifel.” Kants Prolegomena: ein kooperativer Kommentar. Eds. Holger Lyre and Oliver Schliemann (op cit.). 169-94??. [WC]
Kloes, Andrew. “Four Calls for Religious Reforms in the 1780s: Urlsperger, Joseph II of Austria, Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Wilhelm II of Prussia.” European Journal of Theology 21.2 (2012): 148-55. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: The religious life of German-speaking Europe became increasingly variegated during the second half of the eighteenth century. This fact may be observed through the writings of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Karl Heinrich Bogatzky, Hermann Samuel Reimarus, August Wilhelm Friedrich and Friedrich Freiherr von Hardenberg. The changes were the result of an important shift in European culture: in this period the foundation of religion and what was necessary to constitute religious legitimacy was shifting from the will of sovereigns to the consensus beliefs of the peoples. This second phenomenon may be observed through four different calls for religious reforms that were made between 1780 and 1788 by Joseph II, the ruler of the Habsburg domains in Central Europe and the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire; Friedrich Wilhelm II, the king of Prussia; Immanuel Kant, the professor of logic and metaphysics at the world’s second oldest Protestant university; and Johann August Urlsperger, a Lutheran pastor and one of the few German corresponding members of the London-based Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. Their different calls for reform illustrate this trend as well as how religious consensus in German society began to fragment and reform around multiple expressions of belief and unbelief.
Kolisang, Caroline. See: Falduto, Antonino, Caroline Kolisang, and Gabriel Rivero, eds.
Kong, Camillia. “The Normative Source of Kantian Hypothetical Imperatives.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20.5 (2012): 661-90. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This paper offers a critique of Christine Korsgaard’s interpretation of Kantian instrumental reason. Korsgaard understands Kantian hypothetical imperatives to share a common normative source with the categorical imperative – namely self-legislating, human rational agency. However, her reading of Kantian hypothetical imperatives is problematic for three reasons. Firstly, Korsgaard’s agent-centred approach renders incoherent Kant’s analytic-synthetic division. Secondly, by minimising the dualistic framework of Kant’s practical philosophy the dialectical character of practical rationality is lost: norms of instrumental reasoning therefore become confused with those of moral reasoning. Thirdly, this in turn curtails the distinct critical authority of pure practical rationality over instrumental choice. The paper argues that we need to understand the normativity of instrumental rationality through the lens of Kant’s dualisms. An alternative interpretation is offered which highlights how the norms of hypothetical imperatives appeal to standards of theoretical cognition and practical efficiency rather than the self-legislative demands of pure practical reason.
Kopper, Joachim. Einbildungskraft, Glaube und ontologischer Gottesbeweis: die Gottesfrage in philosophischer Besinnung. Freiburg im Breisgau: Alber, 2012. [284 p.] [WC]
Kossler, Matthias. “The ‘Perfected System of Criticism’: Schopenhauer's Initial Disagreements with Kant.” Kantian Review 17.3 (2012): 459-78. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: “I would like to know who of my contemporaries should be more competent in Kantian philosophy than me.” (Schopenhauer in a letter to Rosenkranz and Schubert, 1837).
In this paper the attempt is made to show how Schopenhauer’s critique of Kant leads from initial disagreements to a fundamental modification, even a new formation, of the Kantian concepts of understanding, reason, imagination, perception, idea and thing-in-itself. The starting point and the core of his critique is the demand for the appreciation of intuitive knowledge which is apart from and independent of reason. The intuitive knowledge goes back to images and its highest form is aesthetic contemplation. Without a participation of concepts it is sufficient to explain objective reality. Particularly on the basis of Schopenhauer’s critical examination of Kant’s schematism it can be shown that his alternative conception of an image-based objectivity of experience is to be taken seriously, even if the way he presents it sometimes gives the impression of a mere misunderstanding of Kant’s theory of cognition.
Krouglov, Alexei N. Kant i kantovskaia filosofiia v russkoi khudozhestvennoi literature. Moscow: Kanon+, 2012. [479 p.] [WC]
——. “‘Mein Leben gleicht einem Roman …’: Kants Schüler Friedrich August Hahnrieder und seine Geschichte.” Kant-Studien 103.2 (2012): 242-53. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: The life story of Kant’s student F. A. Hahnrieder (1765/6–1829) provides us with new examples of the application of the categorical imperative. Kant has given his opinion about that. The biography of Hahnrieder suggests that Kant has not always insisted on the uniqueness of the interpretation of the categorical imperative. He has also admitted other, “paradoxical”, “unusual”, but not “fantastic” interpretations. Kant has even respected a radical interpretation of the categorical imperative. On the base of the archive data, numerous mistakes about Hahnrieder were corrected in biographies of Kant and in the Akademie-Ausgabe.
Kuehn, Manfred. “Kant on Education, Anthropology, and Ethics.” Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary. Eds. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (op cit.). 55-68. [M]
——. “Von der Grenzbestimmung der reinen Vernunft.” Kants Prolegomena: ein kooperativer Kommentar. Eds. Holger Lyre and Oliver Schliemann (op cit.). 235-54??. [WC]
Kuhn, Kristina. “Zur Bedenklichkeit des Marginalen: Kant und die Reisebeschreibung.” Klopffechtereien – Missverständnisse – Widersprüche? Methodische und methodologische Perspektiven auf die Kant-Forster-Kontroverse. Eds. Rainer Godel and Gideon Stiening (op cit.). 245-70. [M]
Lafont, Cristina. “Agreement and Consent in Kant and Habermas: Can Kantian Constructivism be Fruitful for Democratic Theory?” Philosophical Forum 43.3 (2012): 277-95. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: An essay is presented in which the author discusses the impact of German philosopher Immanuel Kant’s philosophy on moral theory. According to the author, Kant’s theories have formed what is known as “Kantian constructivism“ and influenced the work of philosophers such as John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas. Particular attention is given to the philosophy behind the concepts of agreement and consent and their application to areas such as law enforcement, justice, and politics.
Lambert, Gregg. “Kant’s Bastards: Deleuze and Lyotard.” Philosophical Forum 43.3 (2012): 345-56. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: The article examines the inheritance of theories in philosophy. Particular attention is given to French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Jean-François Lyotard, who the author states break this trend through introducing new concepts of approaching historical texts that attempt to avoid philosophical tradition. Interpretations of German philosopher Immanuel Kant’s work Critique of Judgment by both Deleuze and Lyotard are discussed as modernized versions of Kantian views of aesthetics.
Landim, Raúl. “Predicative Judgments and Existential Judgments: Apropos Kant’s Critique of the Cartesian Ontological Argument.” Kant in Brazil. Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 81-97. [M]
Landy, David. Rev. of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: An Introduction and Interpretation, by James R. O’Shea (2012). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (July 2012, #4). [online] [M]
Landy, Margo. Rev. of Perfecting Virtue: New Essays on Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics, edited by Lawrence Jost and Julian Wuerth (2011). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (June 2012, #42). [online] [M]
Langan, Jeffrey. The Influence of the French Revolution on the Lives and Thought of John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Edmund Burke, Mary Wollstonecraft, Immanuel Kant, and Pius Vi: The End of Conservatism. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen, 2012. [180 p.] [PI]
Langbehn, Claus. Vom Selbstbewusstsein zum Selbstverständnis: Kant und die Philosophie der Wahrnehmung. Paderborn: Mentis, 2012. [363 p.] [WC]
Lapointe, Sandra. “Is Logic Formal? Bolzano, Kant, and the Kantian Logicians.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 85.1 (2012): 11-32. [HUM]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: In the wake of Kant, logicians seemed to have adhered to the idea that what is distinctive of logic is its “formality”. In the paper, I discuss the distinction Kant draws between formality and generality of logic and argue that he ultimately conflates the two notions. I argue further that Kant’s views on the formality of logic rest on a series of non trivial assumptions concerning the nature of cognition. I document the way in which these assumptions were received in his successors. In the second part of the paper I focus on Bolzano’s criticism of the Kantian position and his redefinition of the notion of form. I argue that while what contemporary, post-Tarskian philosophers generally understand as the formality of logic ought to be traced back to Bolzano there are also important differences between the two positions.
Laursen, John Christian. “Freedom of the Press, and Book Piracy.” Kant’s Political Theory: Interpretations and Applications. Ed. Elisabeth Ellis (op cit.). 225-38??. [WC]
——. Rev. of Imperfect Cosmopolis: Studies in the History of International Legal Theory and Cosmopolitan Ideas, by Georg Cavallar (2011). Kantian Review 17.3 (2012): 516-19. [PW]
LaVaque-Manty, Mika. “Kant on Education.” Kant’s Political Theory: Interpretations and Applications. Ed. Elisabeth Ellis (op cit.). 208-24??. [WC]
Lee, Seung-Kee. “Self-Determination and the Categories of Freedom in Kant’s Moral Philosophy.” Kant-Studien 103.3 (2012): 337-50. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Kant speaks of our capacity to be “self-determining […] in certain […] laws holding firm a priori” (KrV, B 430). Here the “laws” refer to the categories of freedom introduced in KpV. The categories of freedom, then, are necessary for self-determination. I first explain how Kant employs the notion of determination in his theoretical philosophy. I then explain how the notion is utilized also in his practical philosophy, particularly in connection to the act of determining the forms of willing that make morality possible. I conclude by answering the question, Why are the categories of freedom necessary for self-determination? Understanding why the categories of freedom are required for self-determination will also help clarify the nature and function of Kant’s categories of freedom, which have puzzled many scholars.
——. “Logical Forms, Indeterminacy, and the Subjective Unity of Consciousness in Kant.” Kant’s Philosophy of the Unconscious. Eds. Piero Giordanetti, Riccardo Pozzo, and Marco Sgarbi (op cit.). 233-70. [M]
Leech, Jessica. “Kant’s Modalities of Judgment.” European Journal of Philosophy 20.2 (2012): 260-84. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]
Article first published online: 4 Apr 2010. Abstract: This paper proposes a way to understand Kant’s modalities of judgment — problematic, assertoric, and apodeictic — in terms of the location of a judgment in an inference. Other interpretations have tended to understand these modalities of judgment in terms of one or other conventional notion of modality. For example, Mattey (1986) argues that we should take them to be connected to notions of epistemic or doxastic modality. I shall argue that this is wrong, and that these kinds of interpretation of the modality of judgments cannot be reconciled with a key claim made by Kant, namely, that the modality of a judgment does not contribute to its content, and has nothing to do with the matter that is judged. I offer an alternative interpretation based upon Kant’s explicating these modalities in terms of the location of a judgment in an inference, whereby the modality of a judgment is determined by the role a judgment plays in a given course of reasoning. If I am right, then Kant in fact presents an intriguing thesis pertaining to the inferential status and potential of all our judgments.
Leichtweis, Ursula. Vom Bezug der Kunst zur Natur bei Kant, Schelling und Goethe. Kassel: Kassel University Press, 2012. [300 p.] [WC]
[Note][Hide Note]Note: Originally presented as the Ph.D dissertation (Kassel, 2011).
Lemanski, Jens. “Die Königin der Revolution. Zur Rettung und Erhaltung der Kopernikanischen Wende.” Kant-Studien 103-4 (2012): 448-71. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: The paper distinguishes three interpretations of Kant’s so called ‘Copernican Revolution’: an epistemological, a hermeneutical and a scientific-theoretical or methodological one. It is argued that the ‘scientific-theoretical reading’ can be based on new historical evidence. Kant borrowed the metaphors ‘army of stars’ (‘Sternenheer’) and ‘spectator’ (‘Zuschauer’) from Johann Heinrich Lambert and used them in a context similar to Lambert’s. This suggests that Kant’s formula “first thoughts of Copernicus” (“den ersten Gedanken des Copernicus”) refers, again following Lambert, to the first 9 chapters of Copernicus’ De revolutionibus, which contain a change from inductive geocentrism to deductive heliocentrism. This interpretation is itself no revolution: Johann Baptist Schad claimed in 1800 that metaphysics must be regarded as a deductive rather than an inductive science. Kant explicitly agreed.
Lequan, Mai. Rev. of Le souverain bien chez Kant, by Laurent Gallois (2008). Kant-Studien 103.1 (2012): 126-29. [PI]
Librett, Jeffrey S. “Aesthetics in Deconstruction: Derrida’s Reception of Kant’s Critique.” Philosophical Forum 43.3 (2012): 327-44. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: The article looks at French philosopher Jacques Derrida’s analysis of German philosopher Immanuel Kant. It focuses on Derrida’s essays “The Parergon” and “Economimesis” that concern Kant’s book Critique of Judgement, with particular attention to theories of reflexive judgment, aesthetics, and teleology. Other topics discussed include the philosophy of reason, autonomy, and art.
Liu, Yu. “Celebrating Both Singularity and Commonality: The Exemplary Originality of the Kantian Genius.” International Philosophical Quarterly 52.1 (2012): 99-116. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Kant’s notion of genius and the related idea of exemplary originality in the Critique of Judgment have been read by Paul Guyer and Timothy Gould as implying a zero-sum game in which all creative artists are willy-nilly patricidal in relation to their predecessors and suicidal in relation to their successors. By way of challenging this interesting but ultimately repugnant reading, and especially its modernist and postmodernist frame of reference, this essay takes a close look at Kant’s sustained interest in the monumental change of English garden design in the early eighteenth century and at the provocative implication of this hitherto generally overlooked interest for a radically different reading of Kant’s thoughts on the exemplary originality of genius.
Lofts, S. G. Rev. of The Origins of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms: Kant, Hegel, and Cassirer, by Donald Phillip Verene (2011). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (October 2012, #2). [online] [M]
Løvlie, Lars. “Kant’s Invitation to Educational Thinking.” Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary. Eds. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (op cit.). 107-23. [M]
Longuenesse, Béatrice. “Kant’s ‘I’in ‘I Ought To’ and Freud’s Superego.” Aristotelian Society 86 suppl. (2012): 19-39. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: There are striking structural similarities between Freud’s ego and Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception, which for Kant grounds our use of ‘I’ in ‘I think’. There are also striking similarities between Freud’s superego and Kant’s account of the mental structure that grounds our use of ‘I’ in the moral ‘I ought to’. The paper explores these similarities on three main points: the conflict of motivations internal to the mind, the relation between discursive and pre-discursive representation of moral motivation, and the unconscious character of moral motivation. The suggestion is that Freud offers resources for a naturalized account (an account in terms of the causal development of empirical human beings) of just those features of our moral motivation that, according to Kant, seem to make it least amenable to a naturalistic explanation. How much of a revision of Kant’s analysis of moral justification is thereby entailed is beyond the purview of the paper.
Loose, Donald, ed. The sublime and its teleology: Kant, German idealism, phenomenology. Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2012. [vi, 230 p.] [WC]
[Note][Hide Note]Contents:
Donald Loose, Introduction: The Kantian Sublime and Its Aftermath;
Herman van Erp, The Genuine Sublime: Kant on the Sublimity of Moral Consciousness;
Birgit Recki, Kant's Aesthetics of Morals;
Donald Loose, The Dynamic Sublime as the Pivoting Point between Nature and Freedom in Kant;
Arthur Kok, Sublimity, Freedom, and Necessity in the Philosophy of Kant;
Christian Krijnen, Teleology in Kant's Philosophy of Culture and History: A Problem for the Architectonic of Reason;
Paul Cobben, The Lord and the Sublime: Free Life's Transcendence of Finitude;
Jacob Rogozinski, The Sublime Monster;
Simon Critchley, The Tragical Sublime;
Frans van Peperstraten, The Sublime and the Limits of Metaphysics;
Ruud Welten, Melville's `Sublime Uneventfulness'. Toward a Phenomenology of the Sublime.
Loparic, Zeljko. “The Fundamental Problem of Kant’s Juridical Semantics.” Kant in Brazil. Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 206-35. [M]
Lorenz, Hilmar. Kants lutherische Fundamentaltheologie:
systematischer Kommentar zu Kants "Kanon der reinen Vernunft". Berlin: Lit, 2012. [366 p.] [WC]
Louden, Robert B. “‘Not a Slow Reform, but a Swift Revolution’: Kant and Basedow on the Need to Transform Education.” Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary. Eds. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (op cit.). 39-54. [M]
——. “National Character via the Beautiful and Sublime?” Kant’s Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide. Eds. Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley (op cit.). 198-216. [M]
——. Rev. of Kant’s Theory of Virtue: The Value of Autocracy, by Anne Margaret Baxley (2010). Journal of the History of Philosophy 50.1 (2012): 142-43. [M][online][Amazon.com]
——. Rev. of Self-Improvement: An Essay in Kantian Ethics, by Robert N. Johnson (2011). Ethics 122.4 (2012): 811-15. [PW]
——. Rev. of Perfecting Virtue: New Essays on Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics, edited by Lawrence Jost and Julian Wuerth (2011). Kantian Review 17.1 (2012): 161-66. [PW]
——. Rev. of Kant und die Wissenschaften vom Menschen, by Thomas Sturm (2009). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (June 2012, #20). [online] [M]
Lowe, Chun-Yip. “Kant’s Social Contract: A New Transcendental Principle in Political Philosophy.” Kant and Contemporary Moral Philosophy. Ed. Dietmar H. Heidemann (op cit.). 91-112??. [WC]
Luft, Sebastian. Rev. of Kant and Phenomenology, by Tom Rockmore (2011). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (July 2012, #42). [online][M]
Lundestad, Øystein. Rev. of Kant’s Doctrine of Right: A Commentary, by B. Sharon Byrd and Joachim Hruschka (2010). Kantian Review 17.1 (2012): 166-71. [PI]
Lutterbeck, Klaus-Gert. “Normativität des Faktischen? Integrale Wissenschaft vom Menschen und ihre Folgen.” Klopffechtereien – Missverständnisse – Widersprüche? Methodische und methodologische Perspektiven auf die Kant-Forster-Kontroverse. Eds. Rainer Godel and Gideon Stiening (op cit.). 97-117. [M]
Lyre, Holger. “Inkongruente Gegenstücke und Idealismus-Vorwurf.” Kants Prolegomena: ein kooperativer Kommentar. Eds. Holger Lyre and Oliver Schliemann (op cit.). 85-102??. [WC]
—— and Oliver Schliemann, eds. Kants Prolegomena: Ein kooperativer Kommentar. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2012. [352 p.] [contents] [WC]
Macleod, Colin. Rev. of Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian Foundations of Justice as Fairness, by Robert S. Taylor (2011). Philosophy in Review 32.2 (2012): 149-50. [pdf] [PW]
Mahoozi, Reza. “A Critique of the Epistemological Nature and Scope of Philosophical Concepts in Kant’s Philosophy from the Viewpoint of the Transcendent Philosophy.” [Farsi] Kheradname-ye Sadra Journal 17.2 (2012): 73-88. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: According to Kant, in order to gain experience, as a necessary and universal knowledge of entities and nature, we need several philosophical and, sometimes, logical concepts which, based on Hume’s analyses, are not rooted in experience. This problem prompted Kant to consider the origin of these concepts in the mind and explain their ontological nature as content-free forms and patterns which grant knowledge only if they acquire their content from pure and empirical intuitions. This approach has initially resulted in limiting man’s knowledge to the realm of experience. Besides, in the acquisition of this knowledge, the activity of the mind leads to a kind of idealism and denying the realistic aspects of knowledge. The present paper, after clarifying the epistemological scope of philosophical concepts in Kant’s philosophy and analyzing the resulting philosophical consequences, intends to demonstrate the falsity of this standpoint based on the analyses of the transcendent philosophy from the whatness and quality of the acquisition of knowledge, in general, and philosophical concepts (secondary philosophical intelligible), in particular.
Makkreel, Rudolf A. “Relating Aesthetic and Sociable Feelings to Moral and Participatory Feelings: Reassessing Kant on Sympathy and Honor.” Kant’s Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide. Eds. Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley (op cit.). 101-15. [M]
Maly, Sebastian. Kant über die symbolische Erkenntnis Gottes. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2012. [xiv, 461 p.] [M]
Maliks, Reidar. Rev. of Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship, by Pauline Kleingeld (2011). Metaphilosophy 43.5 (2012): 714-18. [HUM]
Malpas, Jeff and Günter Zöller. “Reading Kant topographically: From critical philosophy to empirical geography.” Contemporary Kantian Metaphysics: New Essays on Time and Space. Eds. Roxana Baiasu, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore (op cit.). 146-68??. [WC]
Marey, Macarena. “Sobre la indeterminación ética del procedimiento kantiano de universalización y su relación con el principio supremo de la doctrina de la virtud.” [Spanish] Studi Kantiani 24 (2011): 49-72. [PW]
Mariña, Jacqueline. Rev. of Kant, Religion, and Politics, by James J. Dicenso (2011). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (May 2012, #26). [online] [M]
Marra, Jennifer. Rev. of The Kantian Aesthetic: From Knowledge to the Avantgarde, by Paul Crowther (2010). Review of Metaphysics 66.1 (2012): 138-40. [M]
Matthias, Michael B. Rev. of Kantian Thinking about Military Ethics, by J. Carl Ficarrotta (year). Political Studies Review 10.1 (2012): 89. [PW]
Mavouangui, David. La philosophie de Kant et l'éducation, with an introductio by Abel Kouvouama. Paris: l'Harmattan, 2012. [232 p.] [WC]
McCarty, Richard. “The Right to Lie: Kantian Ethics and the Inquiring Murderer.” American Philosophical Quarterly 49.4 (2012): 331-44??. [PW]
McClelland, Tom. “In Defense of Kantian Humility.” Thought 1.1 (2012): 62-70. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Kantian Humility (KH) holds that the intrinsic properties of objects are unknowable for agents such as ourselves. Categorial properties, such as being an object, present a potential threat to KH. Cowling (2010) argues that knowing KH to be true requires knowledge of categorial properties. However, if such properties are shown to be intrinsic properties, then KH is committed to their being unknowable. I defend KH by presenting three alternative responses to this challenge. First, that categorial properties are not properties in the sense relevant to KH. Second, that if they are properties, they are not intrinsic properties. Third, that if they are intrinsic properties, KH is not committed to their being unknowable. I also show how these responses can be applied to a related objection to KH offered by Moore (2001).
McTavish, Chris Henry. Rev. of Anthropology, History & Education, by Immanuel Kant, edited and translated by Robert B. Louden and Günter Zöller (2007). Philosophy in Review 32.2 (2012): 108-10. [pdf] [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Since the initial reception of the ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ transcendental idealism has been perceived and criticized as a form of subjective idealism regarding space, time, and the objects within them, despite Kant’s protestations to the contrary. In recent years, some commentators have attempted to counter this interpretation by presenting transcendental idealism as a primarily epistemological doctrine rather than a metaphysical one. Others have insisted on the metaphysical character of transcendental idealism. Within these debates, Kant’s rejection of ontology (of the kind exemplified by Wolff and Baumgarten) has received comparatively little treatment, although it is often acknowledged. The present essay seeks to contribute to the secondary literature on Kant by offering an analysis of this claim and elaborating its consequences for transcendental idealism. This will take the form of a critical examination of transcendental idealism’s supposed ontological agnosticism — that is, its disavowal of any ontological claims. The overall conclusion is that Kant’s rejection of ontology is deeply problematic, and to such an extent that it may be necessary to reconsider the possibilities of defending transcendental idealism as a purely epistemological, nonontological doctrine.
Michalson, Jr., Gordon E. “In Defense of Not Defending Kant’s Religion.” Faith and Philosophy 29.2 (2012): 181-92. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This essay underscores the significant contribution Firestone and Jacobs make through the very thorough way their book surveys the wide range of recent scholarship bearing on Kant’s Religion. The essay then argues, however, that the complex scaffolding designed to summarize and categorize the varied responses to Kant has the effect of muting the authors’ own very bold interpretive stance. This point is particularly true with respect to their account of the compatibility of Kant’s Religion with the Christian tradition. In addition, the essay suggests that the judicial metaphor of “defense” is overplayed, forcing certain interpretations of Kant into potentially misleading positions for the sake of the interpretive scheme.
Mieszkowski, Jan. Rev. of Looking Away: Phenomenality and Dissatisfaction, Kant to Adorno, by Rei Terada (2009). Comparative Literature Studies 49.3 (2012): 469-72. [MUSE]
Mihina, Frantisek. “Kant and Peirce.” [Slovak] Filozofia 67.3 (2012): 181-94. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Charles S. Peirce saw I. Kant as his direct predecessor. In his projects of scientific philosophy or scientific metaphysics he drew upon Kant’s intellectual legacy. The architectonics of Peirce’s philosophy is closely connected with Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Yet, Peirce could preserve the autonomy of his own reasoning. The paper offers an analysis of Kant’s multifold influence upon Peirce’s philosophy.
Miller, Richard W. “Rawls and Global Justice: A Dispute over a Kantian Legacy.” Philosophical Forum 43.3 (2012): 297-309. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: An essay is presented that looks at American philosopher John Rawls’ theory of global justice and the influence of German philosopher Immanuel Kant. The author is critical of Rawls’ opponents who argue against his interpretation of Kant and claim that Rawls does not adequately consider political duties concerning transnational help and economic interdependence when designing a global justice system. Other topics covered include cosmopolitanism, commerce, and poverty.
Mohr, Georg. “Urteilstheoretische Vorklärung zum Metaphysikbegriff.” Kants Prolegomena: ein kooperativer Kommentar. Eds. Holger Lyre and Oliver Schliemann (op cit.). 31-60??. [WC]
Moore, A. W. “Bird on Kant’s mathematical antinomies.” Contemporary Kantian Metaphysics: New Essays on Time and Space. Eds. Roxana Baiasu, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore (op cit.). 197-206??. [WC]
——. See: Baiasu, Roxana, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore.
——. See: Baiasu, Roxana, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore, eds.
Moore, John Allphin. See: Pubantz, Jerry and John Allphin Moore.
Moran, Kate A. Community and Progress in Kant’s Moral Philosophy. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2012. [x, 264 p.] [PI]
Moran, Richard. “Kant, Proust, and the Appeal of Beauty.” Inquiry 38.2 (2012): 298-329. [PI]
Mortera, Emanuele Levi. “Stewart, Kant, and the Reworking of Common Sense.” History of European Ideas 38.1 (2012): 122-42. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Dugald Stewart was the first metaphysician of any significance in Britain who attempted to take account of Kantian philosophy, although his analysis appears generally dismissive. Traditionally this has been imputed to Stewart’s poor understanding of Kant and to his efforts to defend the orthodoxy of common sense. This paper argues that, notwithstanding Stewart’s reading, Kant’s philosophy helped him in a reconsideration and reassessment of common-sense philosophy. In his mature works — the Philosophical Essays (1810), the second volume of the Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind (1814), and the second part of his historical dissertation (1815-1821) — Stewart’s analysis of Kantian philosophy is far from being uniform. In the first two works, he takes a cautious approach to transcendentalism, showing some interest in the challenge it might represent for common sense; in the last, he turns to rash criticism. This change may appear confusing and inconsistent unless considered in the light of a precise ‘nationalistic’ strategy. In fact, once Stewart had taken from Kantian philosophy what he deemed useful for his own aims, he eventually dismissed it in order to show that his reworked version of common sense was the most original and most consistent outcome of the whole Anglo-Scottish philosophical tradition.
Motta, Giuseppe. Die Postulate des empirischen Denkens überhaupt: KrV A 218-235/B 265-287: ein kritischer Kommentar. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2012. [ix, 332 p.] [M]
[Note][Hide Note]Note: Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte, 170; a lightly expanded version of his Ph.D. dissertation (Universität-Trier, 2011).
Munzel, G. Felicitas. Kant’s Conception of Pedagogy: Toward Education for Freedom. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2012. [468 p.] [contents] [WC]
[Note][Hide Note]Contents: Part 1. Historic and philosophic context: eighteenth-century conceptions of education, Enlightenment, and human self-understanding -- 1. The eighteenth-century as a pedagogical age -- 2. Texts and movements: consequences of human self-understanding for conceptions of education -- Part 2. Attempt at a pedagogical instauration -- 3. Kant's idea of education -- 4. Formal transcendental principles for education for inner freedom: condition for and critical counterpart to external freedom -- 5. Toward material principles fulfilling formal conditions for education for freedom: philosophy as paideia and the liberal arts -- Epilogue: relevance for today.
——. “Relative Goodness and Ambivalence of Human Traits: Reflections in Light of Kant’s Pedagogical Concerns.” Kant’s Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide. Eds. Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley (op cit.). 165-84. [M]
Nachtomy, Ohad. “Leibniz and Kant on Possibility and Existence.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20.5 (2012): 953-72. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This paper examines the Leibnizian background to Kant’s critique of the ontological argument. I present Kant’s claim that existence is not a real predicate, already formulated in his pre-critical essay of 1763, as a generalization of Leibniz’s reasoning regarding the existence of created things. The first section studies Leibniz’s equivocations on the notion of existence and shows that he employs two distinct notions of existence — one for God and another for created substances. The second section examines Kant’s position in his early paper of 1763. My claim is that Kant’s view of existence in 1763, namely that it is not a predicate, is strongly related to the logical notion of possibility, formulated by Leibniz and accepted by Kant.
Nasu, Seigen. 闇への論理 : カントからシェリングへ / Yami eno ronri : kanto kara sheringu e. [Japanese; “From Kant to Schelling: Logic to Darkness”] Tokyo: Kōjinsha, 2012. [259 p.] [WC]
Neal, Robert J. M. “Kant’s Ideality of Genius.” Kant-Studien 103.3 (2012): 351-60. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: To say that a work of fine art is beautiful because it has been produced by a genius introduces a determinate concept precluding a judgment of the work’s beauty by way of a pure judgment of taste. What Kant in fact proposes is that we judge a work to be the product of genius as a consequence of our judgment of its beauty. As Kant explains in KU §58, when we judge the beautiful in fine art it is the indeterminacy of the mode of mental activity in which aesthetic ideas arise which permits us to interpret idealistically the purposiveness in the work, on which account we regard it as the product of genius. This article examines in particular KU §50 concerning the combination of genius and taste, and the puzzling assertion in KU §51 that all beauty is the expression of aesthetic ideas.
Nerurkar, Michael. Amphibolie der Reflexionsbegriffe und transzendentale Reflexion: das Amphibolie-Kapitel in Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2012. [194 p.] [WC]
Ng, Julia. “Kant’s Theory of Experience at the End of the War: Scholem and Benjamin Read Cohen — A Commentary.” MLN 127.3 (2012): 462-84. [MUSE]
Nisbet, H. B. Rev. of Essays on Kant, Schelling, and German Aesthetics, by Henry Crabb Robinson, edited by James Vigus (2010). Modern Language Review 107.3 (2012): 970-71. [HUM]
Nizhnikov, Sergey Anatolievich. “On the Specific Traits of Russian Kantianism.” Filozofia 67.3 (2012): 254-61. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: The paper focuses on the influence of I. Kant and German classical philosophy on Russian philosophical thought. It deals with the challenge of “returns to Kant” in Russian philosophical culture. Kant’s philosophy stimulates the field of the metaphysics of faith. The paper shows that in their confrontation with German classical thought, and especially with Kant’s philosophy, Russian philosophers have various aims and use various methodologies and languages. Further, it shows Kant’s philosophical legacy from two different points of view represented by two philosophical magazines — ‘Logos’ and ‘Way’. The paper also explains the importance of the notions of Kantianism and neo-Kantianism in Russian philosophical thought from the 1850s up to the present day. Attention is paid in particular to A. I. Vvedensky and his understanding of the relationship between faith and reason as well as his confrontation with the philosophy of I. Kant.
Northoff, Georg. Das disziplinlose Gehirn - was nun, Herr Kant?
auf den Spuren unseres Bewusstseins mit der Neurophilosophie. Munich: Irisiana, 2012. [312 p.] [WC]
Northoff, Georg. “Immanuel Kant’s Mind and the Brain’s Resting State.” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16.7 (2012): 356-59. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: The early philosopher Immanuel Kant suggested that the mind’s intrinsic features are intimately linked to the extrinsic stimuli of the environment it processes. Currently, the field faces an analogous problem with regard to the brain. Kant’s ideas may provide novel insights into how the brain’s intrinsic features must be so that they can be linked to the neural processing of extrinsic stimuli to enable the latter’s association with consciousness and self.
Nour, Soraya. “Cosmopolitanism: Kant and Kantian Themes in International Relations.” Kant in Brazil. Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 246-70. [M]
O’Connell, Eoin. “Happiness Proportioned to Virtue: Kant and the Highest Good.” Kantian Review 17.2 (2012): 257-79. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This paper considers two contenders for the title of highest good in Kant's theory of practical reason: happiness proportioned to virtue and the maximization of happiness and virtue. I defend the ‘proportionality thesis’ against criticisms made by Andrews Reath and others, and show how it resolves a dualism between prudential and moral practical reasoning. By distinguishing between the highest good as a principle of evaluation and an object of agency, I conclude that the maximization of happiness and virtue is a corollary of the instantiation of the proportionality thesis.
Oehler-Klein, Sigrid. “Kontext und Bedeutung des wissenschaftlichen Arguments in Georg Forsters Kant-Kritik.” Klopffechtereien – Missverständnisse – Widersprüche? Methodische und methodologische Perspektiven auf die Kant-Forster-Kontroverse. Eds. Rainer Godel and Gideon Stiening (op cit.). 135-62. [M]
Ohreen, David E. and Roger A. Petry. “Imperfect duties and Corporate Philanthropy: A Kantian Approach.” Journal of Business Ethics 106.3 (2012): .367-81 [PsychINFO]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Nonprofit organizations play a crucial role in society. Unfortunately, many such organizations are chronically underfunded and struggle to meet their objectives. These facts have significant implications for corporate philanthropy and Kant’s notion of imperfect duties. Under the concept of imperfect duties, businesses would have wide discretion regarding which charities receive donations, how much money to give, and when such donations take place. A perceived problem with imperfect duties is that they can lead to moral laxity; that is, a failure on the part of businesses to fulfill their financial obligations to nonprofit organizations. This article argues the problem of moral laxity rests on a misinterpretation of Kantian ethics and, therefore, is really not a problem at all. As such, we argue corporate philanthropy while an imperfect duty should be interpreted more akin to perfect duties and, as a consequence, moral laxity does not arise for those corporations committed to acting on the basis of the moral law. More specifically, firms have duty-based obligations on the basis of benevolence, and as good corporate citizens, to help fund non-profit organizations.
Olen, Peter. Rev. of Self, Language, and World: Problems from Kant, Sellars, and Rosenberg, edited by James R. O'Shea and Eric M. Rubenstein (2010). International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20.2 (2012): 303-7. [PI]
O’Neill, Onora. “Kant and the Social Contract Tradition.” Kant’s Political Theory: Interpretations and Applications. Ed. Elisabeth Ellis (op cit.). 25-41??. [WC]
Onnasch, Ernst-Otto. “Das Manuskript von Kants Brief an Kiesewetter vom 13. Oktober 1797.” Kant-Studien 103.2 (2012): 237-41. []
O’Shea, James R. Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: An Introduction and Interpretation. Durham, England: Acumen, 2012. [236 p.] [WC] [review]
Ostaric, Lara. “Kant on the Normativity of Creative Production.” Kantian Review 17.1 (2012): 75-107. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: In this essay, I argue that a genius’ creation consists of a special unity of free human activity and nature, whereby ‘nature’ signifies not just another aspect of, but rather something that transcends, creative subjectivity. This interpretation of a genius’ creative process throws a new light on a special normative status of a genius’ rule, i.e., its originality and exemplarity. With respect to the former, I demonstrate that because the organizing principle of the works of genius remains inscrutable to our limited human understanding, a work of genius appears to the observer’s limited cognitive capacities as undetermined and, hence, as contingent and original. With respect to the latter, I show how a genius must evolve within the context of her own tradition and how this ‘humbleness’ of a genius still allows for a multiplicity of coexistent schools or genres with their own distinct standards of excellence.
Otabe, Tanehisa. “Genius as a Chiasm of the Conscious and Unconscious: A History of Ideas Concerning Kantian Aesthetics.” Kant’s Philosophy of the Unconscious. Eds. Piero Giordanetti, Riccardo Pozzo, and Marco Sgarbi (op cit.). 89-101. [M]
Overgaard, Søren. See: Zahavi, Dan and Søren Overgaard.
Owen, David. “Symposium on Ripstein’s Force and Freedom: Introduction.” European Journal of Philosophy 20.3 (2012): 447-49. [PW]Amazon.com
[Note][Hide Note]
See the articles by Laura Valentini, Andrea Sangiovanni, Miriam Ronzoni, Garrath Williams, and a reply by Arthur Ripstein. Abstract: This introduction provides a very brief sketch of the fundamental claims of Arthur Ripstein’s Force and Freedom before locating the criticisms of his interlocutors in relation to those claims. Valentini and Sangiovanni are situated as critics of the Kantian frame, while Ronzoni and Williams are critics situated within that frame.
Palmquist, Stephen R. “Cross-Examination of In Defense of Kant’s Religion.” Faith and Philosophy 29.2 (2012): 170-80. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This article extends the metaphorical trial posed by the authors of In Defense of Kant’s Religion by cross-examining them with two challenges. The first challenge is for the authors to clarify their claim that they are the first interpreters to present “a holistic and linear interpretation” of Kant’s Religion that portrays it as containing a “transcendental analysis” of religious concepts, given that several of the past interpreters whose works they survey in Part 1 conduct a similar type of analysis. The second is to compare the assumption pervading Part 2 of their book, that Kant conducts his first “experiment” in the first three Pieces and the second experiment in the Fourth Piece of Religion, with the previously defended view that the two experiments are weaved throughout all four Pieces. After observing several dangers this assumption poses for affirmative interpreters of Kant’s philosophy of religion, I conclude by showing how the authors’ problem-driven hermeneutic led them to downplay various portions of Kant’s text.
Papadaki, Lina. “Abortion and Kant’s Formula of Humanity.” HumanaMente: Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (2012): 145-65. [pdf] [M]
Parsons, Charles. From Kant to Husserl: Selected Essays. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012. [xiv, 242 p.] [WC]
Pasternack, Lawrence. “Kant on the Debt of Sin.” Faith and Philosophy 29.1 (2012): 30-52. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Kant follows Christian tradition by asserting that humanity is sinful by nature, that our sinful nature burdens us with an infinite debt to God, and that it is possible for us to undergo a moral transformation that liberates us from sin and from its debt. Most of the secondary literature has focused on either Kant’s account of sin or our liberation from it. Far less attention has been paid to the debt in particular. The purpose of this paper is to explore the nature of this debt, why Kant regards it as infinite, and what becomes of it for those who undergo a moral transformation.
Paulson, Stanley L. Rev. of Neo-Kantianism in Contemporary Philosophy, edited by Rudolf A. Makkreel and Sebastian Luft (2010). European Journal of Philosophy 20.3 (2012): 507-12. [PW]
Peres, Daniel Tourinho. “Right, History, and Practical Schematism.” Kant in Brazil. Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 236-45. [M]
Perez, Daniel Omar and Juan Adolfo Bonaccini. “Two Centuries of Kantian Studies in Brazil.” Kant in Brazil. Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 14-25. [M]
——. See: Rauscher, Frederick and Daniel Omar Perez, eds.
Peterson, Jonathan. Rev. of Kant and Applied Ethics: The Uses and Limits of Kant’s Practical Philosophy, by Matthew C. Altman (2011). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (June 2012, #30). [online] [M]
Pettoello, Renato. “‘De nobis ipsis silemus’: Sulla morte di Immanuel Kant.” [Italian] Rivista di Storia della Filosofia 67.1 (2012): 203-13. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: The description of Immanuel Kant’s last days and of the phrenological and craniometric studies of his skull gives the author the opportunity to discuss the philosophical validity of biographies and more in general to re-examine the vexata quaestio of the relationship between philosophy and history of philosophy. Here the author supports the thesis that, for the most part, any reference to the biographies of philosophers is essentially of no use — their works have to be judged as such, independently of whoever wrote them and also to a large extent of the historical context — and that there is the need to get back to a philosophical history of philosophy, while still maintaining the very rigorous approach to which the history of philosophy has accustomed us in the last few decades.
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: In this paper I propose an interpretation of Karl Jaspers’s project of metaphysics as a form of post-neo-Kantianism. Jaspers makes Kantian philosophy one of the most important starting points of his own philosophical thinking. But, like Nicolai Hartmann and Martin Heidegger, he rejects the neo-Kantian epistemological interpretation of Kant’s philosophy. Neo-Kantians claimed that Kant rejected metaphysics and wished to set up the theory of cognition as a new philosophia prima. In opposition to this, Jaspers emphasizes the metaphysical sense of Kant’s philosophy. Moreover, in his project of the philosophy of the ‘Umgreifenden’ he gives a positive meaning to transcendental physiology, the part of metaphysics which, according to the common reading of Kant, was definitely rejected by him.
Pimenta, Pedro. “Reading the Appendix to Kant’s Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment.” Kant in Brazil. Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 337-47. [M]
Pinkard, Terry. Rev. of The Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy: A Systematic Reconstruction, by Eckart Förster (2011). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (September 2012, #26). [online] [M]
Piper, Adrian M. S. “Kant’s Two Solutions to the Free Rider Problem.” Kant and Contemporary Moral Philosophy. Ed. Dietmar H. Heidemann (op cit.). 113-142??. [WC]
Pissis, Jannis. Kants transzendentale Dialektik: Zu ihrer systematischen Bedeutung. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2012. [x, 233 p.] [M]
[Note][Hide Note]Note: Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte 169; lightly revised version of the Ph.D. dissertation (Freie Universität Berlin, 2010).
Pogge, Thomas W. “Is Kant’s Rechtslehre a ‘Comprehensive Liberalism’?” Kant’s Political Theory: Interpretations and Applications. Ed. Elisabeth Ellis (op cit.). 74-100??. [WC]
Pollok, Anne. “Kant’s Defeated Counterpart: Moses Mendelssohn on the Beauty, Mechanics, and Death of the Human Soul.” Kant’s Philosophy of the Unconscious. Eds. Piero Giordanetti, Riccardo Pozzo, and Marco Sgarbi (op cit.). 103-30. [M]
Pollok, Konstantin. “Wie sind Erfahrungsurteile möglich?” Kants Prolegomena: ein kooperativer Kommentar. Eds. Holger Lyre and Oliver Schliemann (op cit.). 103-26??. [WC]
Polka, Brayton. “The Metaphysics of Thinking Necessary Existence: Kant and the Ontological Argument.” European Legacy 17.5 (2011): 583-91. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: I argue in my paper that, when the “twofold standpoint,” in terms of which Kant undertakes to set metaphysics upon the revolutionary path of critical reason, is truly assessed, we discover that the fundamental distinction that he makes between subject and object, between thinking (together with desiring and willing) and knowing, between thinking the thing in itself and knowing objects of possible experience, or between freedom and nature, recapitulates the ontological argument demonstrating the necessary relationship between thought and existence.
Poole, Randall A. “Religious Toleration, Freedom of Conscience, and Russian Liberalism.” Kritika: Explorations in Russian & Eurasian History 13.3 (2012): 611-34. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: The essay explores the influence of 17th-century proponent of religious toleration and founder of Rhode Island Roger Williams and 18th-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant on early 20th-century Russian imperial thoughts on religion and liberalism. Topics considered include Russian philosophers Petr Struve and Pavel Novgorodtsev, the October 17, 1905 Manifesto signed by Tsar Nicholas II, liberalism, and freedom of conscience.
Pozzo, Riccardo. See: Giordanetti, Piero, Riccardo Pozzo, and Marco Sgarbi, eds.
Pradelle, Dominique. Par-delà la révolution copernicienne: sujet transcendantal et facultés chez Kant et Husserl. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2012. [407 p.] [WC]
Pringe, Hernán. “The fiction of the affecting object in Hans Vaihinger's philosophy.” Studi Kantiani 24 (2011): 105-20. [PW]
Proulx, Jeremy Paul. Rev. of Kant’s Concept of Genius: Its Origin and Function in the Third Critique, by Paul W. Bruno (2010). British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20.3 (2012): 633-36. [PW]
Pubantz, Jerry and John Allphin Moore. Is There a Global Right to Democracy? A philosophical analysis of peacekeeping and nation building. Lewiston, NY: Mellen, 2012. [#, # p.] [WC]
[Note][Hide Note]Contents: The evolution of the international organization-nation-state relationship -- The philosophical basis for international organizations' promotion of democracy: Kant, his acolytes and challengers -- Rights: plural definitions -- International organizations and the promotion of democracy -- Challenges to the realization of a global right to democracy -- Citizenship and the global right to democracy: cosmopolitan hope and evolution.
Rabaté, Jean-Michel. “Beckett’s Three Critiques: Kant’s Bathos and the Irish Chandos.” Modernism / modernity 18.4 (2012): 699-719. [M]
Rand, Sebastian. “Apriority, Metaphysics, and Empirical Content in Kant’s Theory of Matter.” Kantian Review 17.1 (2012): 109-34. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This paper addresses problems associated with the role of the empirical concept of matter in Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, offering an interpretation emphasizing two points consistently neglected in the secondary literature: the distinction between logical and real essence, and Kant’s claim that motion must be represented in pure intuition by static geometrical figures. I conclude that special metaphysics cannot achieve its stated and systematically justified goal of discovering the real essence of matter, but that Kant requires this failure for his larger philosophical presentation of the dialectic that ‘irremediably attaches to human reason’ (A298/B354).
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: In Critique of Pure Reason, Kant explains his critical method “as an experiment” in metaphysics. The aim of that “experiment” is to establish “an entire revolution” in philosophical thinking, which was initiated by the Copernican revolution in cosmology in order to find the secure path, and its possibility application to metaphysics. Kant’s aim in Critique of Pure Reason is to rescue metaphysics from a “blind groping” by undertaking a revolution in metaphysics as Copernicus has brought to cosmology. Kant’s Copernican turn consists in the assertion that the possibility of knowledge requires that “the objects must conform to our cognition.” From Kant’s view, we can know only what we “construct,” “make,” or “produce” as a necessary condition of knowledge, but we cannot know the mind-independent external world, i.e., the world which is independent of us. Kant’s epistemological constructivism is the central point to his Copernican revolution.
Rathke, Kurt-Dietrich. Der Begriff Person bei Kant und neurologische Erkenntnisse: moralisches Gesetz und Freiheit, Uberlegungen aus einer rechtswissenschaftlichen Sicht. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012. [87 p.] [WC]
Rauscher, Frederick. “Introduction.” Kant in Brazil. Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 1-13. [M]
——. “The Second Step of the B-Deduction.” European Journal of Philosophy [Posted online: 4 Apr 2012]. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This paper offers a new interpretation of Kant’s puzzling claim that the B-Deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason should be considered as having two main steps. Previous commentators have tended to agree in general on the first step as arguing for the necessity of the categories for possible experience, but disagree on what the second step is and whether Kant even needs a second step. I argue that the two parts of the B-Deduction correspond to the two aspects of a priori cognition: necessity and universality. The bulk of the paper consists of support for the second step, the universality of the categories. I show that Kant’s arguments in the second half of the B-Deduction aim to define the scope of that universality for possible experience by considering the possibilities of divine intellectual intuition, of non-human kinds of sensible intuition, and of apperception of the self. In these ways Kant delimits the boundaries of the applicability of the categories and excludes any other possible experience for human beings.
——. Rev. of Stellenindex und Konkordanz zum ‘Naturrecht Feyerabend’: Einleitung des ‘Naturrechts Feyerabend’, edited by Heinrich P. Delfosse, Norbert Hinske and Gianluca Sadun Bordoni (2010). Kantian Review 17.2 (2012): 357-65. [PW]
—— and Daniel Omar Perez, eds. Kant in Brazil. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2012. [xii, 375 p.] [M]
[Note][Hide Note]Note: (from the editors) Kant in Brazil is a collected volume of essays conceived at the 2005 International Kant Congress in Sao Paulo as a way to make accessible to Anglophone Kant scholars some of the best work on Kant produced by Brazilian scholars. Contents:
Frederick Rauscher, Introduction;
Daniel Omar Perez and Juan Adolfo Bonaccini, Two Centuries of Kantian Studies in Brazil;
Guido Antônio de Almeida, Self-Consciousness and Objective Knowledge in the Transcendental Deduction of the Critique of Pure Reason;
João Carlos Brum Torres, Intuitive Knowledge and De Re Thought;
Raúl Landim, Predicative Judgments and Existential Judgments: Apropos Kant’s Critique of the Cartesian Ontological Argument;
Valerio Rohden, An Experiment with Practical Reason;
Darlei Dall’Agnol, On the Faktum of Reason;
Guido Antônio de Almeida, Critique, Deduction, and the Fact of Reason;
Julio Esteves, The Noncircular Deduction of the Categorical Imperative in Groundwork III;
Ricardo Ribeiro Terra, The Distinction between Right and Ethics in Kant’s Philosophy;
José Nicolau Heck, Right and the Duty to Resist, or Progress toward the Better;
Zeljko Loparic, The Fundamental Problem of Kant’s Juridical Semantics;
Daniel Tourinho Peres, Right, History, and Practical Schematism;
Soraya Nour, Cosmopolitanism: Kant and Kantian Themes in International Relations;
Maria de Lourdes Borges, A Typology of Love in Kant’s Philosophy;
Valerio Rohden, The Meaning of the Term Gemüt in Kant;
Ricardo Ribeiro Terra, Between Prescriptive Poetics and Philosophical Aesthetics;
Pedro Costa Rego, The Purposiveness of Taste: An Essay on the Role of Zweckmässigkeit in Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgment;
Christian Hamm, Freedom in Appearance: Notes on Schiller and His Development of Kant’s Aesthetics;
Pedro Pimenta, Reading the Appendix to Kant’s Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment;
Joãosinho Beckenkamp, Symbolization in Kant’s Critical Philosophy.
Rayman, Joshua. Kant on Sublimity and Morality. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2012. [xvi, 216 p.] [WC]
Reath, Andrews. Rev. of Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide, edited by Lara Denis (2010). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (month 2012, #). [online] [M]
Reçber, Mehmet Sait. “Religion after Enlightenment: The Case for Islam.” Islam & Christian-Muslim Relations 23.3 (2012): 305-14. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This article analyses from an Islamic viewpoint the Enlightenment call to take up the intellectual and moral responsibility of using one's reason and understanding in religious matters. The first and second sections present a critical examination of the ideas of reason and justification advanced by Enlightenment philosophers such as Kant, and a counter-development of these ideas after the Enlightenment as exemplified in MacIntyre’s thought. Having concluded that both of these approaches are untenable for a variety of reasons, the final section argues that a meta-epistemological perspective stipulated by Islam can both square with the original call of the Enlightenment and shed light on further discussion of various issues such as reason, religion and revelation.
Reisert, Joseph R. “Kant and Rousseau on Moral Education.” Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary. Eds. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (op cit.). 12-25. [M]
Renker, Jan. Markt und Gerechtigkeit: Untersuchungen zum Selbstverständnis des Bürgers im Ausgang von Rawls, Kant und Hegel . Würzburg: Ergon-Verlag, 2012. [306 p.] [contents] [WC]
Ribeiro Terra, Ricardo. “The Distinction between Right and Ethics in Kant’s Philosophy.” Kant in Brazil. Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 173-88. [M]
Ripstein, Arthur. “Form and Matter in Kantian Political Philosophy: A Reply.” European Journal of Philosophy 20.3 (2012): 487-96. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This paper responds briefly to four reviews of Force and Freedom. Valentini and Sangiovanni criticize what they see as the excessive formalism of the Kantian enterprise, contending that the Kantian project is circular, because it defines rights and freedom together, and that this circularity renders it unable to say anything determinate about appropriate restrictions and permissions. I show that the appearance of circularity arises from a misconstrual of the Kantian idea of a right. Properly understood, Kantian rights are partially indeterminate, but not in a way that causes problems for the account. Ronzoni and Williams seek to broaden the reach of public right, arguing that Kant's abstract approach overlooks pressing questions of social and political life, (Ronzoni) and that public right should allow for democratic deliberation about purposes that go beyond the requirement that a state provide a rightful condition for its members (Williams). I argue that the Kantian view makes room for these factors, but that each must be understood in relation to the formal constraints of right.
——. “Kant and the Circumstances of Justice.” Kant’s Political Theory: Interpretations and Applications. Ed. Elisabeth Ellis (op cit.). 42-73??. [WC]
Rivero, Gabriel. See: Falduto, Antonino, Caroline Kolisang, and Gabriel Rivero, eds.
Robinson, Daniel N. How is nature possible? Kant’s project in the First critique. London/New York: Continuum, 2012. [xii, 200 p.] [WC]
[Note][Hide Note]Contents: Preliminaries — The larger context: Germany and the enlightenment — The possibility of metaphysics — The pure intuitions and the analogies of experience — Idealisms and their refutation — Concepts — Judgment — Whose experience?: the self and outer sense — The discipline of reason: paralogisms, antinomies, and freedom.
Rockmore, Tom. Rev. of Continental Idealism: Leibniz to Nietzsche, by Paul Redding (2009). Philosophy in Review 32.1 (2012): 48-50. [pdf] [PW]
——. “Kant on Unconscious Mental Activity.” Kant’s Philosophy of the Unconscious. Eds. Piero Giordanetti, Riccardo Pozzo, and Marco Sgarbi (op cit.). 305-326. [M]
Rodríguez, Manuel Sánchez. “Logica naturalis, Healthy Understanding and the Reflecting Power of Judgment in Kant’s Philosophy.” Kant-Studien 103.2 (2012): 188-206. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: The aim of this article is to explore the origin of the difficulty of founding the reflecting power of judgment as Kant outlines it in the Preface of the third Critique. Although a foundation for this faculty was only established in 1790, we must interpret it as a critical solution to an old problem, which Kant had already recognized around 1770. Through his comprehension of the meaning of healthy understanding and native wit he already confirms the impossibility of determining the correctness of our judging activity from the use of rules. This approach of the problem must be understood in the context of the controversy about the concept ‘logica naturalis’ in the Leibniz-Wolffian aesthetics and logic. In close conjunction with this tradition, Kant already tries to offer an elucidation of the question of judging through the aesthetics.
Rohden, Valerio. “An Experiment with Practical Reason.” Kant in Brazil. Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 98-108. [M]
——. “The Meaning of the Term Gemüt in Kant.” Kant in Brazil. Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 283-94. [M]
Rohloff, Waldemar. “Kant’s Argument from the Applicability of Geometry.” Kant Studies Online (2012): 23-50; posted April 2, 2012. [pdf] [M]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: In this paper I develop a reading of Kant’s argument from geometry based on distinguishing the roles of pure versus applied geometry. Once these roles are properly distinguished, I argue that the argument from geometry is not susceptible to the problems concerning the development and applications of non-Euclidean geometry, which are often thought to undermine the argument.
——. “From Ordinary Language to Definition in Kant and Bolzano.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 85.1 (2012): 131-49. [HUM]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: In this paper I discuss Kant’s and Bolzano’s differing perspectives on ordinary natural language. I argue that Kant does not see ordinary language as providing semantically organized content and that, as a result, Kant does not believe that ordinary language is sufficiently well-developed to support philosophical analysis and definition. By contrast, for Bolzano, the content given in ordinary language are richly structured entities he calls ‘propositions in themselves’. This contrast in views is used to explain Bolzano’s criticism of Kant’s belief that definition is impossible for philosophical concepts. It is also used to explain Bolzano’s criticism of Kant’s methods of exposition of philosophical concepts.
Rohs, Peter. Rev. of Wie ist Freiheit möglich? Eine Untersuchung über das Lösungspotential zum Determinismusproblem in Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft, by Stefan Gerlach (2010.) Kant-Studien 103.1 (2012): 131-36. [PI]
Rolf, Sibylle. “Humanity as an Object of Respect: Immanuel Kant’s Anthropological Approach and the Foundation of Morality.” Heythrop Journal 53.4 (2012): 594-605. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: The article deals with Kant’s understanding of personhood and autonomy. It highlights the connection of autonomy and human dignity within Kant’s appreciation of morality, and indicates how his distinction between the empirical and transcendental spheres enables Kant to extend dignity even to humans who are not actually autonomous. Turning to contemporary approaches within ethics that refer to Kant but omit this transcendental framework, it defends the necessity of a trans-empirical frame within the Kantian system and hints at consequences for bioethics. It concludes that Kant works with neither an absolutist notion of freedom in terms of solipsistic autarky, nor an empirical freedom and autonomy that begin and end at certain points of time.
Rojka, Lubos. Rev. of La nascita dell’ateismo: Dai clandestini a Kant, by Stefano Curci (2011). Gregorianum 93.1 (2012): 204-5. [PI]
Ronzoni, Miriam. “Politics and the Contingent: A Plea For A More Embedded Account of Freedom as Independence.” European Journal of Philosophy 20.3 (2012): 470-78. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This contribution defends Ripstein’s attempt to reconstruct Kant’s political philosophy as entirely and consistently grounded on the idea of people’s innate right to freedom as independence, in particular with respect to charges of circularity raised by other contributors to this symposium. However, it also argues that, if the concept of freedom as independence is to provide a foundation for a full-blown account of political justice, a richer interpretation of it should be provided. In other words, we must be willing to make controversial and empirically informed claims about what counts as a threat to our freedom as independence under specific circumstances. We must have a more embedded account of freedom as independence, one that engages with the contingencies of politics and of the human condition.
Rorty, Amélie and James Schmidt, eds. Kant’s “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim”: A Critical Guide. city: publisher, 2012. [#, # p.] [WC]
Rosenkoetter, Timothy. “Kant and Bolzano on the Singularity of Intuitions.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 85.1 (2012): 89-129. [HUM]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Kant and Bolzano agree that intuitions are non-accidentally singular, but each offers more than one explanation of why this is the case. One model, exemplified by Bolzano’s explication of intuitions as “this”-representations, posits a type of representation which is such that it can only have one object. A very different explanation, prominent in Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic, has recourse to the fact that certain classes of objects (spaces and times) can have only one instance, and argues on this basis that some representations with those contents are singular. This paper surveys various versions of these two explanations and uses each philosopher’s answers to shed light on the other’s.
Roth, Klas. “Freedom and Autonomy in Knowledge-Based Societies.” Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary. Eds. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (op cit.). 214-25. [M]
——. “Education and a progressive orientation towards a cosmopolitan society.” Ethics and Education 7.1 (2012): 59-73. [PsychINFO]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Robin Barrow claims in his ‘Moral education’s modest agenda’ that ‘the task of moral education is to develop understanding, at the lowest level, of the expectations of society and, at the highest level, of the nature of morality… [that is, that moral education] should go on to develop understanding, not of a particular social code, but of the nature of morality—of the principles that provide the framework within which practical decisions have to be made’ [Barrow, R. 2006. Moral education’s modest agenda. Ethics and Education 1, no. 1: 3–13.]. Barrow’s words are noteworthy not only because he sets out to define the ‘modest’ agenda of moral education in terms of principles, but also because he asserts that education is important for teaching students to understand morality in such terms. However, even though he is arguing that understanding morality is important in terms of principles, he says little about their function or status, or how we cultivate ourselves so that we act in agreement with and are motivated by the principles of practical reason. In this article I therefore discuss two distinctive features of human beings and offer a Kantian notion of morality as a response to Barrow’s development of an understanding of morality in terms of principles. I argue that the principles Kant suggests are constitutive of action, and that we both develop our understanding and also value our humanity when we act in agreement with and are motivated by the suggested principles, and cultivate our predispositions (technical, pragmatic and moral). Moreover, I argue that we reach the goal of ‘a progressive organization of citizens of the earth into and toward the species as a system that is cosmopolitically united’ [Kant, I. 2006b. Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view. Trans. Robert B. Louden. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.] when we, inter alia, value our humanity and comply with the principles of practical reason, in practice.
—— and Chris W. Surprenant, eds. Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary. New York: Routledge, 2012. [xxiv, 233 p.] [M] [review]
[Note][Hide Note]Contents: Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant, “Introduction: The highest good — the moral endeavor of education; Chris W. Surprenant, “Kant’s Contribution to Moral Education”; Joseph R. Reisert, “Kant and Rousseau on Moral Education”; Phillip Scuderi, “Rousseau, Kant, and the Pedagogy of Deception”; Robert B. Louden, “‘Not a slow reform, but a swift revolution’: Kant and Basedow on the Need to Transform Education”; Manfred Kuehn, “Kant on Education, Anthropology, and Ethics”; Richard Velkley, “Educating through Perplexity: Kant and the German Enlightenment”; Gary B. Herbert, “Bringing Morality to Appearances: Kant’s Theory of Education”; Jørgen Huggler, “Culture and Paradox in Kant’s Philosophy of Education”; Lars Løvlie, “Kant’s Invitation to Educational Thinking”; Paul Guyer, “Examples of Moral Possibility”; Richard Dean, “Moral Education and the Ideal of Humanity”; Alix Cohen, “Enabling the Realization of Humanity: the Anthropological Dimension of Education”; Paul Formosa, “From Discipline to Autonomy: Kant’s Theory of Moral Development”; James Scott Johnston, “Kant as Moral Psychologist?”; Susan Meld Shell, “Kant on the Humanities”; Klas Roth, “Freedom and Autonomy in Knowledge-Based Societies”.
Rumore, Paola. “Logica e metodo. La presenza di Georg Friedrich Meier nella Disciplina della ragion pura.” [Italian] Studi Kantiani 24 (2011): 93-104. [PW]
——. Rev. of Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten: ein intellektuelles Porträt Studien zur Metaphysik und Ethik von Kants Leitautor, by Clemens Schwaiger (2011). Rivista di Filosofia 103.1 (2012): 173-75. [PI]
Russell, Francey. “Unity and Synthesis in the Ego Ideal: Reading Freud’s Concept through Kant’s Philosophy.” American Imago 69.3 (2012): 353-83. [HUM]
Sage, N. W. “Original Acquisition and Unilateralism: Kant, Hegel, and Corrective Justice.” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 25.1 (2012): 119-36. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: In an original acquisition of property, a person acquires an unowned object by taking control of it. Contemporary Kantians claim this is problematic because the acquirer ‘unilaterally’ imposes new obligations on others — contrary to Kant’s requirement that no person’s action constrain others’ freedom. This article rejects Kantians’ proposed solutions to the ‘unilateralism’ problem (which involve the creation of a ‘civil condition’ of public legal institutions). In any event, it argues, from a Kantian standpoint there is no problem in the first place: original acquisition does not constrain others’ ‘freedom’ in the Kantian sense of that term. This explains why Hegel, whose account of property otherwise resembles Kant’s, saw no problem. It also means property is explicable in terms of corrective justice, rather than distributive justice.
Salikov, Alexey. “Kants Projekt des ewigen Friedens im Kontext der modernen Politik.” Kant-Studien 103.3 (2012): 377-79. [PW]
Sánchez Madrid, Nuria. “A Linneaus of Human Nature: The Pragmatic Deduction of Unconscious Thought in Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology.” Kant’s Philosophy of the Unconscious. Eds. Piero Giordanetti, Riccardo Pozzo, and Marco Sgarbi (op cit.). 177-232. [M]
Sangiovanni, Andrea. “Can the Innate Right to Freedom Alone Ground a System of Public and Private Rights?” European Journal of Philosophy 20.3 (2012): 460-69. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: The state regulates the way in which social power is exercised. It sometimes permits, enables, constrains, forbids how we may touch others, make offers, draw up contracts, use, alter, possess and destroy things that matter to people, manipulate, induce weakness of the will, coerce, engage in physical force, persuade, selectively divulge information, lie, enchant, coax, convince, ... In each of these cases, we (sometimes unintentionally) get others to act in ways that serve our interests. Which such exercises of power should the state forbid? Which should it permit? An intuitively appealing way to answer this question is, with Ripstein and Kant, to point to the role of freedom: exercises of social power can be legitimately prohibited when (and only when) they restrict people’s freedom. But this raises a further question: How do we identify when such exercises of power make people unfree in the relevant sense? Ripstein, in defending Kant, draws a crucial distinction between actions that subject others’ wills to our choices (and which it would therefore be presumptively legitimate for the state to forbid) and actions that merely affect the contexts in which others act (and which it would therefore be presumptively illegitimate for the state to forbid). I query that distinction, and argue that the idea of independence cannot bear, on its own, the weight it is expected to bear within the Kantian framework.
Sardinha, Diogo. “Le Kant de Foucault, une lecture téléologique de l’anthropologie.” Kant-Studien 103.3 (2012): 361-69. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Foucault’s main thesis in his Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology is that the meaning of Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View can only be entirely grasped in the light of certain notes concerning the human being, assembled in the Opus Postumum. He asserts that the discourses held on human beings in the Anthropology and the introduction to the Logic are temporary – though necessary – moments in the transition from the critical to the transcendental philosophy: the latter is the accomplishment of Kantian philosophy, to which the former was only a Propädeutik. In this paper I call this a ‘teleological reading’ of the Anthropology, one which certainly has the merit of integrating this book in the evolution of Kant’s thought, but which can also be misleading, since it rarely considers the book Anthropology in itself. Hence, Foucault carries out what is more of a study of ‘Kant’s philosophy from an anthropological point of view’ rather than a study of the Anthropology. In the end, I also indicate the way in which this method enables us to distinguish his philosophical position both from Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant and from Sartre’s humanism.
Saunders, Joe. Rev. of Kantian Deeds, by Henrikk Jøker Bjerre (2010). Kantian Review 17.3 (2012): 513-16. [PW][contents][Amazon.com]
Schadow, Steffi. Achtung für das Gesetz:
Moral und Motivation bei Kant. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012. [#, # p.] [WC]
[Note][Hide Note]Note: Kant-Studien Ergänzungshefte, vol. 171; originally the author’s Ph.D dissertation (Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt-am-Main, 2009).
Scheuerman, William E. “Realism and the Kantian Tradition: A Revisionist Account.” International Relations 26.4 (2012): 453-77. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: In contemporary international political theory, ‘Cosmopolitanism’ is typically juxtaposed to ‘Realism’, with many varieties of the former building on Kantian moral and political ideals, and the latter presumably rejecting Kant and his aspiration for far-reaching global reform. In agreement with a growing body of scholarship that seeks to challenge conventional views of Realism, this essay attends to the surprisingly complex views of the Kantian legacy (including Hans Kelsen, perhaps the most important neo-Kantian international thinker in the last century) within its ranks. Not all Realists have been unambiguously critical of Kant, and when in fact they have criticized him, they have done so for many different reasons. First-generation Realists (e.g. E. H. Carr, John Herz, Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, Frederick Schuman and Georg Schwarzenberger) offered an ambivalent reading of Kantianism consistent with their endorsement of the ultimate desirability of major alterations to the global status quo, whereas second-generation Realists (i.e. Henry Kissinger and Kenneth Waltz) tended to read Kant so as to transform him into a forerunner of their own anti-reformist and institutionally conservative versions of Realism. An examination of Realism’s rendezvous with Kantianism not only helps draw a more differentiated portrayal of Realism than is still found in much scholarship, but it also helps us understand how Realism dramatically changed within a relatively short space of time during the immediate postwar decades. It also points to some important potential starting points for a more fruitful exchange between Cosmopolitans and Realists.
Schliemann, Oliver. “Die Aufgabe einer Grundlegung der Metaphysik.” Kants Prolegomena: ein kooperativer Kommentar. Eds. Holger Lyre and Oliver Schliemann (op cit.). 11-30??. [WC]
——. See: Lyre, Holger and Oliver Schliemann, eds.
Schoelandt, Chad Van. Rev. of Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian Foundations of Justice as Fairness, by Robert S. Taylor (year). Journal of Value Inquiry 46.1 (2012): 123-29. [PW]
Schönecker, Dieter. “Once Again: What is the ‘First Proposition’ in Kant’s Groundwork? Some Refinements, a New Proposal, and a Reply to Henry Allison.” Kantian Review 17.2 (2012): 281-96. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Discussing the concept of duty in Groundwork 1, Kant refers to a ‘second proposition’ and a ‘third proposition’, the latter being a ‘Folgerung aus beiden vorigen’. However, Kant does not identify what the ‘first proposition’ is. In this paper, I will argue that the first proposition is this: An action from duty is an action from respect for the moral law. I defend this claim against a critique put forward by Allison according to which ‘respect’ is a concept that is not, and could not be, introduced in paragraphs 9–13 of Groundwork 1. Further, I will argue that the first proposition as I understand it can also be reconstructed as the conclusion (‘Folgerung’) of a deductive argument proper; however, I will also discuss the option that ‘Folgerung’ could be understood as a corollary rather than a conclusion. Finally, Allison's own interpretation will be criticized.
——. “Kants Grundlegung über den bösen Willen. Eine kommentarische Interpretation von GMS .” Studi Kantiani 24 (2011): 73-92. [PW]
——. Rev. of Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary, by Henry E. Allison (2011). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (April 2012, #3). [online][M]
Scholem, Gershom. “On Kant.” Translated by Julia Ng MLN 127.3 (2012): 443-46. [MUSE]
Schüssler, Rudolf. “Kant und die Kasuistik: Fragen zur Tugenglehre.” Kant-Studien 103.1 (2012): 70-95. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: With the casuistic questions in the Doctrine of Virtue Kant seems finally to accept, as some commentators believe, that duties allow for case-wise exceptions or at least mitigation in practice. We will show that this is a misinterpretation. The casuistic questions of the “doctrine of virtue” are no casuistry in the Kantian sense of the term. Kant never uses the terms “casuistic question” and “casuistry” interchangeably. His understanding of casuistry as a rule-directed activity shows a good understanding of the high casuistry of the baroque era. Kant admits that there is room for casuistry in the “doctrine of virtue”, but he does not practice casuistry there. His casuistic questions merely serve didactic purposes, testing whether readers have really understood the strictness of the moral law or the meaning of moral terms. The casuistic questions of the “doctrine of virtue” are not meant to provide the fine tuning of moral action that Kant associates with casuistry.
Schulting, Dennis. Kant’s Deduction and Apperception: Explaining the Categories. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. [#, # p.] [WC]
[Note][Hide Note]Contents: Introduction: the Categories and Apperception -- The 'Herz' Question -- The Quid Juris -- The Master Argument -- The Unity in Thought. On the Guiding Thread -- Apperception and the Categories of Modality -- Apperception and the Categories of Relation -- Apperception and the Categories of Quality -- Apperception and the Categories of Quantity -- From Apperception to Objectivity.
——. “Kant, Non-Conceptual Content and the ‘Second Step’ of the B-Deduction.” Kant Studies Online (2012): 51-92; posted May 28, 2012. [pdf] [M]
——. “Non-apperceptive Consciousness.” Kant’s Philosophy of the Unconscious. Eds. Piero Giordanetti, Riccardo Pozzo, and Marco Sgarbi (op cit.). 271-303. [M]
——. See: Banham, Gary, Dennis Schulting, and Nigel Hems, eds.
Schulzke, Marcus. “Kant’s Categorical Imperative, the Value of Respect, and the Treatment of Women.” Journal of Military Ethics 11.1 (2012): 26-41. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This paper explores the relevance of Kant’s categorical imperative to military ethics and the solution it suggests for improving the treatment of women in the military. The second formulation of the categorical imperative makes universal respect for humanity a moral requirement by asserting that one must always treat other people as means in themselves and never as merely means to an end. This principle is a promising guide for military ethics and can be reconciled with the acts of violence required by war. This paper argues that it can also regulate soldiers’ relations to each other and that it may contribute to reorienting military culture in a way that overcomes the biases against female military personnel.
Scuderi, Phillip. “Rousseau, Kant, and the Pedagogy of Deception.” Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary. Eds. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (op cit.). 26-38. [M]
Seagrave, S. Adam. Rev. of Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian Foundations of Justice as Fairness, by Robert S. Taylor (2011). American Political Thought 1.1 (2012): 173-76??. [PW]
Sedgwick, Sally S. Hegel’s Critique of Kant: From Dichotomy to Identity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. [xii, 194 p.] [WC]
[Note][Hide Note]Contents: Introduction — Intuitive versus discursive forms of understanding in Kant’s critical philosophy — Organic unity as the ‘true unity’ of the intuitive intellect — Hegel on the ‘subjectivity’ of Kant’s idealism — Hegel on the transcendental deduction of the first critique — Subjectivity as part of an original identity — The question-begging nature of Kantian critique: Kant on the arguments of the Antinomies.
Sedová, Tatiana. “Kant a novokantovstvo — bádenská a marburská škola.” [Slovak] Filozofia 67.1 (2012): 89-91. [HUM]
[Note][Hide Note]Contents: Introduction: the problem of spontaneity in Kant — History: spontaneity from Leibniz to Kant — Metaphysics: spontaneity and the problem of the unconditioned — Logic: spontaneity and the problem of knowledge — Ethics: spontaneity and the problem of acting — Aesthetics and biology: spontaneity and the problems of feeling and life — Anthropology: spontaneity and the problem of human nature — Conclusion.
——. “Introduction.” Kant’s Philosophy of the Unconscious. Eds. Piero Giordanetti, Riccardo Pozzo, and Marco Sgarbi (op cit.). 1-3. [M]
——. Rev. of Kant and Phenomenology, by Tom Rockmore (2010). Rivista di Filosofia 103.1 (2012): 171-73. [PI]
——. Rev. of Mente, cerebro y antropología en Kant, by Pedro Jesús Teruel (2008). Rivista di Filosofia 103.1 (2012): 178-80. [PI]
——. See: Giordanetti, Piero, Riccardo Pozzo, and Marco Sgarbi, eds.
Shabel, Lisa. “Zu Kants Frage ‘Wie ist reine Mathematik möglich?’.” Kants Prolegomena: ein kooperativer Kommentar. Eds. Holger Lyre and Oliver Schliemann (op cit.). 61-84??. [WC]
Shapshay, Sandra. “Schopenhauer’s Transformation of the Kantian Sublime.” Kantian Review 17.3 (2012): 479-511. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Schopenhauer singles out Kant’s theory of the sublime for high praise, calling it ‘by far the most excellent thing in the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement’, yet, in his main discussion of the sublime, he ridicules Kant’s explanation as being in the grip of scholastic metaphysics. My first aim in this paper is to sort out Schopenhauer’s apparently conflicted appraisal of Kant's theory of the sublime. Next, based on his Nachlaß, close readings of published texts and especially of his account of the experience of tragic drama, I offer a reconstruction of Schopenhauer’s theory of the sublime which understands it – against prevailing scholarly views – as a transformation of rather than as a real departure from the Kantian explanation. Finally, I suggest that my interpretation of Schopenhauer’s theory of the sublime has far-reaching consequences for a proper understanding of his views on freedom.
Sharp, Robert. “The Dangers of Euthanasia and Dementia: How Kantian Thinking Might be Used to Support Non‐voluntary Euthanasia in Cases of Extreme Dementia.” Bioethics 26.5 (2012): 231-35. [PsycINFO]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Some writers have argued that a Kantian approach to ethics can be used to justify suicide in cases of extreme dementia, where a patient lacks the rationality required of Kantian moral agents. I worry that this line of thinking may lead to the more extreme claim that euthanasia is a proper Kantian response to severe dementia (and similar afflictions). Such morally treacherous thinking seems to be directly implied by the arguments that lead Dennis Cooley and similar writers to claim that Kant might support suicide. If rationality is the only factor in valuing a human life, then the loss of that rationality (however such loss might be defined) would allow us to use essentially utilitarian thinking in order to support non-voluntary euthanasia, since the patients themselves would no longer be moral agents that demand respect.
Shaw, Christopher David. On Exceeding Determination and the Ideal of Reason: Immanuel Kant, William Desmond and the Noumenological Principle. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012. [viii, 136 p.] [WC]
Shell, Susan. “Kant on the Humanities.” Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary. Eds. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (op cit.). 193-213. [M]
——. Rev. of Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship, by Pauline Kleingeld (2011). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (August 2012, #17). [online][M]
—— and Richard Velkley. “Introduction: Kant as Youthful Observer and Legislator.” Kant’s Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide. Eds. Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley (op cit.). 1-9. [M]
—— and Richard Velkley, eds. Kant’s Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. [xv, 286 p.] [contents] [M]
[Note][Hide Note]Contents: Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley, “Introduction: Kant as Youthful Observer and Legislator”; 1. Dieter Henrich, “Concerning Kant’s Earliest Ethics: An Attempt at Reconstruction”; 2. Corey W. Dyck, “Chimerical Ethics and Fluttering Moralists: Baumgarten’s Influence on Kant’s Moral Theory in the Observations and Remarks”; 3. Patrick R. Frierson, “Two Concepts of Universality in Kant’s Moral Theory”; 4. Paul Guyer, “Freedom as the Foundation of Morality: Kant’s Early Efforts”; 5. Rudolf A. Makkreel, “Relating Aesthetic and Sociable Feelings to Moral and Participatory Feelings: Reassessing Kant on Sympathy and Honor”; 6. Robert R. Clewis, “Kant’s Distinction between True and False Sublimity”; 7. Alix Cohen, “Kant’s ‘Curious Catalogue of Human Frailties’ and the Great Portrait of Nature”; 8. G. Felicitas Munzel, “Relative Goodness and Ambivalence of Human Traits: Reflections in Light of Kant’s Pedagogical Concerns”; 9. Reinhard Brandt, “Kant as Rebel against the Social Order”; 10. Robert B. Louden, “National Character via the Beautiful and Sublime?”; 11. Peter Fenves, “Absent an Even Finer Feeling: A Commentary on the Opening of Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime”; 12. John H. Zammito, “The Pursuit of Science as Decadence in Kant’s Remarks in Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime”; 13. Karl Ameriks, “Kant, Human Nature, and History after Rousseau”.
Silber, John. Kant’s Ethics: The Good, Freedom, and the Will, with a preface by Manfred Kuehn. Boston: de Gruyter, 2012. [xiv, 363 p.] [WC]
[Note][Hide Note]Contents: The context of Kant's ethics -- The Copernican revolution in ethics : the good reexamined -- Kant's doctrine of will -- The moral good and the natural good -- The highest good as the material object of moral volition -- The highest good as immanent and as transcendent -- The moral task : the embodiment of the highest good -- Kant's procedural formalism, or, the role of judgment in Kant's procedural formalism -- The role of judgment in the embodiment of the highest good -- Summary and assessment -- Appendix. Kant at Auschwitz.
Sloan, Phillip R. “How Was Teleology Eliminated in Early Molecular Biology?” Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43.1 (2012): 140-51. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This paper approaches the issue of the status of teleological reasoning in contemporary biology through a historical examination of events of the 1930s that surrounded Niels Bohr’s efforts to introduce ‘complementarity’ into biological discussions. The paper examines responses of three theoretical physicists in response to Bohr — Ernst Pascual Jordan (1902-80), Erwin Schrödinger (1887-1961), and Max Delbrück (1906-81). It is claimed that none of these physicists sufficiently understood Bohr’s ‘critical’ teleological arguments, which are traced to the lineage of Kant and Harald Høffding and their respective resolutions of the antinomy of teleological judgment. The positions of these four historical actors are discussed in terms of Ernst Mayr’s distinction of ‘teleological,’ ‘teleomatic,’ and ‘teleonomic’ explanations. A return to some of the views articulated by Bohr, and behind him, to Høffding and Kant, is claimed to provide a framework for reintroducing a ‘critical’ teleology into biological discussions. (edited)
Soboleva, Maja. “Der Begriff der Tatsache in der Kant-Forster-Kontroverse.” Klopffechtereien – Missverständnisse – Widersprüche? Methodische und methodologische Perspektiven auf die Kant-Forster-Kontroverse. Eds. Rainer Godel and Gideon Stiening (op cit.). 119-32. [M]
Stabel, Jürgen. “Der Begriff der Gleichzeitigkeit bei Kant und Einstein.” Kant-Studien 103.1 (2012): 47-69. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: In this paper, compatibility between Kant’s comprehension of space and time and that of the SRT is shown. First, a derivation of the decisive transformations of Lorentz is given based on Kant’s comprehension of space and time. Second, it is demonstrated, following a discussion of Kant’s third analogy, that the different notions of simultaneity, as formulated by Kant and Einstein, are indeed fully compatible (in contrast to published literature). It is shown that Kant’s notion of simultaneity does unfold to the notion of spacelikeness (Minkowski space theory). The paper concludes that an empirical comprehension of time in a Euclidean space, compatible to Kant’s transcendental concept of space and time, can only be given by the space-time relationships of the SRT.
Stang, Nicholas F. “A Kantian Reply to Bolzano’s Critique of Kant’s Analytic-Synthetic Distinction.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 85.1 (2012): 33-61. [HUM]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: One of Bolzano’s objections to Kant’s way of drawing the analytic-synthetic distinction is that it only applies to judgments within a narrow range of syntactic forms, namely, universal affirmative judgments. According to Bolzano, Kant cannot account for judgments of other syntactic forms that, intuitively, are analytic. A recent paper by Ian Proops also attributes to Kant the view that analytic judgments beyond a limited range of syntactic forms are impossible. I argue that, correctly understood, Kant’s conception of analyticity allows for analytic judgments of a wider range of syntactic forms.
——. “Kant on Complete Determination and Infinite Judgement.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20.6 (2012): 1117-39. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: In the Transcendental Ideal Kant discusses the principle of complete determination: for every object and every predicate A, the object is either determinately A or not-A. He claims this principle is synthetic, but it appears to follow from the principle of excluded middle, which is analytic. He also makes a puzzling claim in support of its syntheticity: that it represents individual objects as deriving their possibility from the whole of possibility. This raises a puzzle about why Kant regarded it as synthetic, and what his explanatory claim means. I argue that the principle of complete determination does not follow from the principle of excluded middle because the externally negated or ‘negative’ judgement ‘Not (S is P)’ does not entail the internally negated or ‘infinite’ judgement ‘S is not-P.’ Kant’s puzzling explanatory claim means that empirical objects are determined by the content of the totality of experience. This entails that empirical objects are completely determinate if and only if the totality of experience has a completely determinate content. I argue that it is not a priori whether experience has such a completely determinate content and thus not analytic that objects obey the principle of complete determination.
Stanley, Timothy. “Barth after Kant?” Modern Theology 28.3 (2012): 423-45. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Barth consistently comments on Kant’s importance for his early thought in his autobiographical sketches, letters, and even more explicitly in his 1930 lectures on Kant in his Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century. Interestingly, however, little attention has been paid to these latter lectures on Protestant history in the secondary literature. In part, this oversight has been due to the manner in which Barth’s theology has been thought to overcome Kant’s influence much earlier on in his intellectual development. Hence, although commentators such as Merold Westphal, Simon Fisher and Bruce McCormack have developed keen interest in Kant’s influence upon Barth’s early work, even engaging Barth’s Neo-Kantian context in great detail, my contention is that Barth’s later interpretation of Kant is crucial to his intellectual development, and gives further insight into Barth’s legacy for contemporary theology today. My aim in what follows is to refigure the relationship between Barth’s early appropriation and critique of Kant, and the more onto-theological issues at stake in his later Protestant history lectures. In so doing, we can begin to discern in Barth, not an abandonment or disregard for the metaphysical questions of being, but rather, the call to face them all the more rigorously.
Stephenson, Andrew. Rev. of Kant’s Theory of the Self, by Arthur Melnick (2009). European Journal of Philosophy 20.1 (2012): 187-92. [pdf] [PI][Amazon.com]
Sterba, James. Rev. of Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian Foundations of Justice as Fairness, by Robert S. Taylor (2011). Review of Metaphysics 66.1 (2012): 172-73. [M]
Stern, Robert. Understanding Moral Obligation: Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. [xiv, 277 p.] [WC]
——. “A Reply to My Critics.” Inquiry 55.6 (2012): 622-54. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: In this paper, I respond to three commentators on my book Understanding Moral Obligation: Kant, Hegel Kierkegaard. Anne Margaret Baxley focuses on my treatment of Kant, Dean Moyar on my treatment of Hegel, and William Bristow on my treatment of Kierkegaard. In this reply, I try to show how the critical points that they raise can be addressed.
Stevenson, Leslie. “Thinking of everything? Kant speaks to Stephen Hawking.” Contemporary Kantian Metaphysics: New Essays on Time and Space. Eds. Roxana Baiasu, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore (op cit.). #-#. [WC]
Stiening, Gideon. “‘[E]s gibt gar keine verschiedenen Arten von Menschen.’ Systematizität und historische Semantik am Beispiel der Kant-Forster-Kontroverse über den Begriff der Menschenrasse.” Klopffechtereien – Missverständnisse – Widersprüche? Methodische und methodologische Perspektiven auf die Kant-Forster-Kontroverse. Eds. Rainer Godel and Gideon Stiening (op cit.). 19-53. [M]
——. See: Godel, Rainer and Gideon Stiening
——. See: Godel, Rainer and Gideon Stiening, eds.
Straßburg, Bernd, ed. Kant-Index, Bd. 36: Sect. 3, Indices zum Corpus der vorkritischen Schriften ; 36,1, Stellenindex und Konkordanz zu den "Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte": Teilbd. 1, Einleitung, Hauptindex und Konkordanz (A - F). Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2012. [lv, 362 p.] [WC]
——. Kant-Index, Bd. 36: Sect. 3, Indices zum Corpus der vorkritischen Schriften; 36,2, Stellenindex und Konkordanz zu den "Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte": Teilbd. 2, Konkordanz (G - Z) und Sonderindices. city: publisher, 2012. [viii, 365-790 p.] [WC]
Streubel, Thorsten. “Was ist der Mensch? – Das Gehirn-Geist-Problem aus kantischer Sicht Plädoyer für eine transzendentale Anthropologie.” Kant-Studien 103.3 (2012): 370-76. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: It is the aim of the following considerations to use Kantian epistemology to advance the current debate about the relation between mind and brain. First of all the naturalistic assumption that all mental phenomena are based on neuronal processes is called into question. Secondly it is shown (by discussing the philosophical conclusions of Gerhard Roth’s book The Brain and its Reality) that naturalism leads necessarily to an absurd constructivism that is very similar to Kant’s transcendental position, but which conflicts with naturalism’s empirical premise. In spite of the progress in brain research Kant’s transcendental approach is still a promising attempt to treat philosophical problems, especially the problem about the relation between mind, brain and world.
Sturm, Thomas. “What’s Philosophical about Kant’s Philosophy of the Human Sciences?” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 43.1 (2012): 203-7. [PI]
Surprenant, Chris W. “Kant’s Contribution to Moral Education.” Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary. Eds. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (op cit.). 1-11. [M]
——, ed. See: Roth, Klas and Chris W. Surprenant, eds.
Svoboda, Toby. “Duties Regarding Nature: A Kantian Approach to Environmental Ethics.” Kant and Contemporary Moral Philosophy. Ed. Dietmar H. Heidemann (op cit.). 143-164??. [WC]
Szyrwinska, Anna. “In Search of Elements of Pietistic Doctrine in Kant’s Ethics.” [Polish] Kwartalnik Filozoficzny 40.1 (2012): 5-23. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: The inquiry regarding the role that pietistic theology played in the development of Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy should be a significant part of an examination of the evolution of Kant’s philosophical ideas. However, the identification of pietistic influences in Kant’s ethics may be problematic, for it takes place not only on a historical-biographical level, but also on the level of pure philosophical and semantical analysis. Moreover, there are a number of stereotypes about the topic that the researcher must face. The paper presents the method and process of analyzing Kant’s reception of pietistic ideas.
Tampio, Nicholas. Kantian Courage: advancing the enlightenment in contemporary political theory. New York: Fordham University Press, 2012. [xii, 255 p.] [WC]
Tao, Yue. 道德形而上学 : 牟宗三與康德之间 / Dao de xing er shang xue: Mou Zongsan yu Kangde zhi jian. Beijing: Zhongguo she hui ke xue chu ban she, 2012. [277 p.] [WC]
Täschner, Anna. Mensch und Staat bei Immanuel Kant: zu den anthropologischen Grundlagen seiner politischen Theorie. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2012. [252 p.] [WC]
Taylor, Robert S. “The Progress of Absolutism in Kant’s Essay ‘What is Enlightenment?’.” Kant’s Political Theory: Interpretations and Applications. Ed. Elisabeth Ellis (op cit.). 135-49. [WC]
Tenenbaum, Sergio. “The Idea of Freedom and Moral Cognition in Groundwork III.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84.3 (2012): 555-89. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Kant’s views on the relation between freedom and moral law seem to undergo a major, unannounced shift. In the third section of the Groundwork, Kant seems to be using the fact that we must act under the idea of freedom as a foundation for the moral law. However, in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant claims that our awareness of our freedom depends on our awareness of the moral law. I argue that the apparent conflict between the two texts depends on a reading of the opening paragraphs of Groundwork III, and on an interpretation of Kant’s claim that we “act under the idea of freedom”, that is implausible on textual and on philosophical grounds. I then present an alternative interpretation of what Kant means by “acting under the idea of freedom” and of the opening paragraphs of Groundwork III. I argue that the only substantive conclusion of these paragraphs is that no theoretical proof of freedom is necessary. Moreover I argue that although these paragraphs raise concerns about the validity of the moral law, these concerns and Kant’s answers to them, do not give rise to any significant conflict with his views in the Critique of Practical Reason.
Terra, Ricardo Ribeiro. “Between Prescriptive Poetics and Philosophical Aesthetics.” Kant in Brazil. Eds. Frederick Rauscher and Daniel Omar Perez (op cit.). 295-304. [M]
Tester, Steven. Rev. of Kant und die Beweußtseinstheorien des 18. Jahrhunderts, by Falk Wunderlich (2005). Philosophical Forum 43.3 (2012): 357-58. [PI]
Teufel, Thomas. “What Is the Problem of Teleology in Kant’s Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment?” SATS 12.2 (2012): 198-236. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: In his teleological antinomy in the Dialectic of the Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment, Kant presents two competing views of the explanatory power of causal mechanism for a science of origins. Kant expresses both the positive (thesis) view and the negative (antithesis) view in the guise of merely regulative principles for the reflecting power of judgment. The regulativity of these principles is usually taken to entail: i. Kant's demotion of causal mechanism to an explanatory principle of heuristic, merely subjectively necessary status; ii. the possibility of mechanically inexplicable phenomena in nature. I argue that neither consequence ensues. Kant in both thesis and antithesis of his teleological antinomy is as firmly committed to the universal necessity of judging natural origins mechanistically as he ever was and would be. Accordingly, Kant is fully committed to the mechanical explicability of all causal processes (including organic processes) in nature. At issue in the antinomy is, instead, the universal sufficiency of judging natural origins mechanistically.
——. “What Does Kant Mean by ‘Power of Judgement’ in his Critique of the Power of Judgement.” Kantian Review 17.2 (2012): 297-326. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: The notion of ‘power of judgement’ in the title of Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgement is commonly taken to refer to a cognitive power inclusive of both determining judgement and reflecting judgement. I argue, first, that this seemingly innocuous view is in conflict both with the textual fact that Kant attempts a Critical justification of the reflecting power of judgement – only – and with the systematic impossibility of a transcendentally grounded determining power of judgement. The conventional response to these difficulties is to point out that, Kant’s systematic ambitions in the third Critique notwithstanding, reflection, qua concept-forming synthesis, is too closely tied to determination to be a cognitive power in its own right. I argue, second, that this response is question-begging, since the notion of reflection it employs is not only not one central to the third Critique but one antecedently tied to the understanding. I argue, third, that Kant’s discussion, in the pivotal §§76–7, of our cognitive relation to sensible particularity addresses an epistemic problem present (but not raised) in the Critique of Pure Reason. This is the problem of the synthesizability, qua absolute unity, of unsynthesized intuitions. Solving this problem requires Critical justification of a principle of reflection. It follows that Kant’s systematic ambitions in the third Critique are appropriate. Given the problem Kant seeks to address, he must offer what he takes himself to be offering: a Critique of the (Reflecting) Power of Judgement.
Theis, Robert. La raison et son Dieu: étude sur la théologie kantienne. Paris: J. Vrin, 2012. [318 p.] [WC]
Tilkorn, Anne, ed. Motivationen für das Selbst: Kant und Spinoza im Vergleich . Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2012. [155 p.] [WC]
Tolley, Clinton. “The Generality of Kant's Transcendental Logic.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 50.3 (2012): 417-46. [M]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: In this paper I suggest a new interpretation of the relations of inherence, causation and conception in Spinoza. I discuss the views of Don Garrett on this issue and argue against Della Rocca’s recent suggestion that a strict endorsement of the PSR leads necessarily to the identification of the relations of inherence, causation and conception. I argue that (1) Spinoza never endorsed this identity, and (2) that Della Rocca’s suggestion could not be considered as a legitimate reconstruction or friendly amendment to Spinoza’s system because it creates several severe and irresolvable problems in the system.
In the first part of the paper, I present the considerations and arguments that motivated Don Garrett’s and Della Rocca’s interpretations. In the second part, I present and examine several problems that result from Della Rocca’s reading. In the third and final part, I (1) present my own view on the relation among inherence, causation, and conception; (2) offer a new interpretation of the conceived through relation in Spinoza; and finally, (3) defend and justify the presence of (non-arbitrary) bifurcations at the very center of Spinoza’s system.
——. “Bolzano and Kant on the Nature of Logic.” History & Philosophy of Logic 33.4 (2012): 307-27. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Here I revisit Bolzano’s criticisms of Kant on the nature of logic. I argue that while Bolzano is correct in taking Kant to conceive of the traditional logic as a science of the activity of thinking rather than the content of thought, he is wrong to charge Kant with a failure to identify and examine this content itself within logic as such. This neglects Kant’s own insistence that traditional logic does not exhaust logic as such, since it must be supplemented by a transcendental logic that will in fact study nothing other than thought’s content. Once this feature of Kant’s views is brought to light, a much deeper accord emerges between the two thinkers than has hitherto been appreciated, on both the nature of the content that is at issue in logic and the sense of logic’s generality and formality.
Tomida, Yasuhiko. Locke, Berkeley, Kant: from a naturalistic point of view. Hildesheim: Olms, 2012. [xv, 220 p.] [WC]
Trozak, Aleksej. Rev. of Immanuel Kant: Traktate: Rezensionen: Briefe, edited by Leonard A. Kalinnikov (2009). Kant-Studien 103.1 (2012): 136-37. [PI]
Tuppini, Tommaso. “Kant, Blows of Tear.” Kant’s Philosophy of the Unconscious. Eds. Piero Giordanetti, Riccardo Pozzo, and Marco Sgarbi (op cit.). 147-75. [M]
Underwood, Lori J. Rev. of Kant: The Three Critiques, by Andrew Ward (2006). Teaching Philosophy 35.1 (2012): 108-11. [PI]
Unna, Yvonne. “A Draft of Kant’s Reply to Hufeland: Key Questions of Kant’s Dietetics and the Problem of Its Systematic Place in His Philosophy.” Kant-Studien 103.3 (2012): 271-91. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: The article provides an introduction to an autograph draft of a letter on dietetics Kant wrote to the physician Christoph Wilhelm Hufeland and uses it as a springboard for the critical discussion of Kant’s dietetics as well as its systematic place in his philosophy. The final draft of Kant’s letter to Hufeland became the third part of The Conflict of the Faculties. The article argues that Kant (1) assigns dietetics, understood as the regulation of the traditional nonnaturals, to philosophy and not to medicine; (2) that he regards moral health as the basis for physical health; and (3) that his view of the systematic place of dietetics in his philosophy is inconsistent.
Valagussa, Francesco. L’arte del genio: note sulla terza critica. [Italian] Milan: Mimesis, 2012. [158 p.] [contents] [WC]
Valdez, Edgar J. “Kant’s A Priori Intuition of Space Independent of Postulates.” Kantian Review 17.1 (2012): 135-60. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Defences of Kant’s foundations of geometry fall short if they are unable to equally ground Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries. Thus, Kant’s account must be separated from geometrical postulates. I argue that characterizing space as the form of outer intuition must be independent of postulates. Geometrical postulates are then expressions of particular spatializing activities made possible by the ‘a priori’ intuition of space. While Amit Hagar contends that this is to speak of noumena, I argue that a Kantian account of space as the form of outer attention-directing remains seated in the subject.
——. Rev. of Rethinking Kant, vols. 1 and 2 edited by Pablo Muchnik (2008/2010). Kantian Review 17.3 (2012): 521-27. [PW]
Valdez, Inés. “Perpetual What? Injury, Sovereignty and a Cosmopolitan View of Immigration.” Political Studies 60.1 (2012): 95-114. [HUM]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Can Kantian cosmopolitanism contribute to normative approaches to immigration? Kant developed the universal right to hospitality in the context of late eighteenth-century colonialism. He claimed that non-European countries had a sovereign right over their territory and the conditions of foreigners’ visits. This sovereign prerogative limited visitors’ right to hospitality. The interconnected and complementary system of right he devised is influential today, but this article argues that maintaining the complementarity of the three realms involves reconsidering its application to contemporary immigration. It situates Kant’s Perpetual Peace within the context of debates about conquest and colonialism and argues that Kant’s strict conception of sovereignty is justified by his concern in maintaining a realm of sovereignty that is complementary with cosmopolitanism and his prioritization of mutual agreements in each of the realms, particularly in a context of international power asymmetry. In Kant’s time, European powers appropriated cosmopolitan discourses to defend their right to visit other countries and it was necessary to strengthen non-Europeans’ sovereign claims. The strength and hostility of the visitors made limited hospitality and strong sovereignty act in tandem to keep away conquerors, expanding cosmopolitanism. Today, individuals from poor countries migrate to wealthier ones where they are subject to a sovereign authority that excludes them. Sovereignty and cosmopolitanism no longer work complementarily, but rather strengthen powerful state actors vis-à-vis non-citizens subject to unilateral rule. Maintaining the pre-eminence of the right to freedom, the article suggests that only through the creation of ‘cosmopolitan spaces’ of politics can we reproduce today the complementarity that Kant envisioned. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Valentini, Laura. “Kant, Ripstein and the Circle of Freedom: A Critical Note.” European Journal of Philosophy 20.3 (2012): 450-59. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Much contemporary political philosophy claims to be Kant-inspired, but its aims and method differ from Kant’s own. In his recent book, Force and Freedom, Arthur Ripstein advocates a more orthodox Kantian outlook, presenting it as superior to dominant (Kant-inspired) views. The most striking feature of this outlook is its attempt to ground the whole of political morality in one right: the right to freedom, understood as the right to be independent of others’ choices. Is Ripstein’s Kantian project successful? In this research note I argue that it is not. First, I suggest that Ripstein’s notion of freedom is viciously circular. It is meant to ground all rights, but in fact it presupposes an account of those rights. Second, I show that — independently of its inability to ground a whole political morality — such a moralized understanding of freedom is normatively unappealing.
Valentini, Tommaso. “La filosofia politica di Kant: Chiliasmo filosofico e diritto cosmopolitico.” [Italian] Acta Philosophica: Pontificia Universita della Santa Croce 21.1 (2012): 101-24. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This paper deals with Kant’s view of a “philosophical chiliasmus”, by which it is to be understood the political hope of a perpetual peace between the world’s states. In his philosophical and political writings, Kant shows how this peace can be achieved through diplomatic means, trying to define the original concept of a “cosmopolitical right” (Weltbürgerrecht). This paper aims at highlighting the modernity of Kant’s political perspective, which has been renewed and developed in the twentieth century by many philosophers and jurists as Hans Kelsen and John Rawls.
Vandenabeel, Bart. “Aesthetic Disinterestedness in Kant and Schopenhauer.” Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics 49.1 (2012): 45-70. [HUM]
——. “Beauty, Disinterested Pleasure, and Universal Communicability: Kant’s Response to Burke.” Kant-Studien 103.2 (2012): 207-33. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Although Kant (wrongly) holds that the universal communicability of aesthetic judgments logically follows from the disinterested character of the pleasure upon which they are based, Kant’s emphasis on the a priori validity of judgments of beauty can be viewed as a rebuttal of the kind of empiricist arguments that Burke offers to justify the social nature of the experience of beauty. I argue that the requirement of universal communicability is not a mere addition to the requirement of universal validity and is far more relevant to an adequate characterisation of the beautiful than has customarily been assumed. I further argue that the ‘exemplary necessity’ of pure judgments of taste, if understood correctly, reveals beauty’s primordial social significance, enabling us to become alive to a profound universal solidarity among aesthetic subjects.
Van de Vijver, Gertrudis. “Friends of Wisdom?” Foundations of Science 17.1 (2012): 5-7. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This commentary addresses the question of the meaning of critique in relation to objectivism or dogmatism. Inspired by Kant’s critical philosophy and Husserl’s phenomenology, it defines the first in terms of conditionality, the second in terms of oppositionality. It works out an application on the basis of Salthe’s (Found Sci 15 4(6):357-367, 2010a) paper on development and evolution, where competition is criticized in oppositional, more than in conditional terms.
Van Eekert, Geert. “De wet in het verkeerde daglicht gesteld: Kant over deugd, autocratie en de hang naar het kwaad.” [Dutch] Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 74.1(2012): 65-101. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: In Metaphysical Principles of Virtue (1797) Kant wants to demonstrate how human beings should put the moral law into practice in their individual lives. This article intends to contribute to the research on the picture of human nature Kant had in mind while defining virtue and specifying the duties of virtue. First of all, it is shown that this picture is not only more refined than is generally assumed, but also compatible with Kant’s theory of radical evil that was developed in the first part of Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone (1793). With the exception of one footnote, however, Kant seems to pass over that theory without comment in Metaphysical Principles of Virtue. He even seems to assume time and again that the enemy of virtue is the human being’s sensuous nature, while according to the first part of Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone sensuous nature contains too little to provide a ground of moral evil. Does Kant’s 1793 theory of evil play no part anymore in his 1797 theory of virtue? In the remainder of this article I want to argue from two different angles that this is too rash a conclusion. First of all, I will criticize Anne Baxley’s objections to the way in which Kant, while introducing the concept of autocracy, distinguishes between human beings and finite holy beings. I will argue that this distinction, despite Baxley’s comments, does make sense if it is associated with Kant’s theory of radical evil. Secondly, I want to show why it appears to be so difficult from a Kantian perspective to confront the human being’s propensity to evil in a direct manner.
Vanzo, Alberto. “Kant on Experiment.” Rationis Defensor: Essays in Honour of Colin Cheyne. Ed. James Maclaurin (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012). 75-96. [WC]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This paper illustrates Immanuel Kant’s views on the role of experiments in natural science, focusing on their relations with hypotheses, laws of nature, and the heuristic principles of scientific enquiry. Kant’s views are contrasted with the philosophy of experiment that was first sketched by Francis Bacon and later developed by Robert Boyle and Robert Hooke.
Kant holds that experiments are always designed and carried out in the light of hypotheses. Hypotheses are derived from experience on the basis of a set of heuristic principles. The function of experiments is testing hypotheses in order to either reject them as false, or else to transform them into empirical laws of nature. To this end, we must integrate the hypotheses that are confirmed by experiments with the a priori principles which are the foundations of natural science.
Compared with Bacon, Boyle, and Hooke, Kant has elaborate views on the one hand, on how our theoretical and pre-theoretical assumptions bear on experimental practice, and on the other hand, on how the results of experimental activity can be integrated with theories to advance our knowledge of nature. However, Kant overstates the dependence of experiments on theories.
——. “Kant on Truth-Aptness.” History & Philosophy of Logic 33.2 (2012): 109-26. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Many scholars claimed that, according to Immanuel Kant, some judgements lack a truth-value: analytic judgements, judgements about items of which humans cannot have experience, judgements of perception, and non-assertoric judgements. However, no one has undertaken an extensive examination of the textual evidence for those claims. Based on an analysis of Kant’s texts, I argue that: (1) according to Kant, only judgements of perception are not truth-apt. All other judgements are truth-apt, including analytic judgements and judgements about items of which humans cannot have experience. (2) Kant sometimes states that truth-apt judgements are actual bearers of truth or falsity only when they are taken to state what is actually the case. Kant calls these judgements assertoric. Other texts ascribe truth and falsity to judgements, regardless of whether they are assertoric. Kant’s views on truth-aptness raise challenges for correspondentist and coherentist interpretations of Kant’s theory of truth; they rule out the identification of Kant’s crucial notion of objective validity with truth-aptness; and they imply that Kant was not a verificationist about truth or meaning.
Varden, Helga. “A Kantian Critique of the Care Tradition: Family Law and Systemic Justice.” Kantian Review 17.2 (2012): 327-56. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Liberal theories of justice have been rightly criticized for two things by care theorists. First, they have failed to deal with private care relations’ inherent (inter)dependency, asymmetry and particularity. Second, they have been shown unable properly to address the asymmetry and dependency constitutive of care workers’ and care-receivers’ systemic conditions. I apply Kant’s theory of right to show that current care theories unfortunately reproduce similar problems because they also argue on the assumption that good care requires only virtuous private individuals. Giving up this assumption enables us to solve the problems regarding both private care relations and systemic injustice.
Velkley, Richard. “Educating through Perplexity: Kant and the German Enlightenment.” Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary. Eds. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (op cit.). 69-80. [M]
——. See: Shell, Susan Meld and Richard Velkley.
——. See: Shell, Susan Meld and Richard Velkley, eds.
Vorderobermeier, Konrad. Sinnlichkeit und Verstand: zur transzendentallogischen Entfaltung des Gegenstandsbezugs bei Kant. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2012. [x, 308 p.] [WC]
[Note][Hide Note]Note: Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie, vol. 110.
Walsh, Sean Drysdale. “Kant’s Theory of Right as Aristotelian Phronesis.” International Philosophical Quarterly 52.2 (2012): 227-46. [HUM]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Many philosophers believe that a moral theory, given all the relevant facts, should be able to determine what is morally right and wrong. It is commonly argued that Aristotle’s ethical theory suffers from a fatal flaw: it places responsibility for determining right and wrong with the virtuous agent who has phronesis rather than with the theory itself. It is also commonly argued that Immanuel Kant’s ethical theory does provide a concept of right that is capable of determining fight and wrong in specific cases. I argue, however, that Kant never gives a determinate moral theory of fight. Rather, I argue that Kant’s moral theory is similar in many ways to that of Aristotle, in that it still holds that a moral agent with phronesis, rather than the theory, determines what is right. Kant’s practical philosophy was not so much meant to tell us fight and wrong as to prevent bad moral theory from corrupting our moral common sense, and it is our moral common sense that determines fight and wrong naturally.
Ware, Owen. Rev. of Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary, edited by Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (2012). The Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (March 2012, #19). [online] [M]
Watkins, Eric. “Kant, Sellars, and the Myth of the Given.” Philosophical Forum 43.3 (2012): 311-26. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: The article compares the philosophical views of American philosopher Wilfrid Sellars and South African philosopher John McDowell to those of German philosopher Immanuel Kant. Specific attention is placed on the “myth of the given,” a concept from Sellars that deals with sense data and criticizes the theory that knowledge of what is perceived is independent of the conceptual processes which create perception. Other topics covered include sensations, cognition, and epistemology.
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: We should understand the concept of self-legislation that is central to Kant’s moral philosophy not in terms of the enactment of statute, but in terms of the way in which judges make law, by setting down and refining precedent through particular judgements. This paper presents a descriptive model of agency based on self-legislation so understood, and argues that we can read Kant’s normative ethics as based on this view of agency. It is intended to contribute to contemporary debates in moral psychology and to exegetical discussion of Kant.
Wee, Cecilia. “Descartes’s Ontological Proof of God’s Existence.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20.1 (2012): 23-40. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This paper argues that an examination of the ontology that underpins Descartes’s ‘Fifth Meditation’ ontological proof of God’s existence will contribute to a better understanding of the nature and structure of the proof. Attention to the Cartesian meditator’s development of this ontology in earlier meditations also makes clear why this proof could not have been asserted before the ‘Fifth Meditation’. Finally, it is argued that Kant’s objections against the ontological proof have no force against Descartes’s particular version of the proof.
Wenzel, Christian Helmut. “Do Negative Judgments of Taste Have a priori Grounds in Kant?” Kant-Studien 103.4 (2012): 472-93. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: When contrasting something with its opposite, such as positive numbers with negative numbers, repulsion with attraction, good and evil, beauty and ugliness, Kant sometimes says the latter are not merely cases of negation or privation of the former, but that they have their own, independent grounds. But do negative judgments of taste really have a priori grounds? There are two kinds of negative judgments of taste: “This is not beautiful” and “This is ugly”. Can they be a priori judgments? Or are they always impure and without a priori basis? In this essay, I will argue that they can be pure a priori judgments. I will give detailed analyses of examples involving part-whole relationships, objects of art, and aesthetic ideas. In addition, detailed discussions of opposing interpretations will be offered.
Werle, Dirk. “Problemgeschichte und Konstellationsforschung.” Klopffechtereien – Missverständnisse – Widersprüche? Methodische und methodologische Perspektiven auf die Kant-Forster-Kontroverse. Eds. Rainer Godel and Gideon Stiening (op cit.). 271-91. [M]
Wesche, Tilo. “Moral und Glück: Hoffnung bei Kant und Adorno.” Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 60.1 (2012): 49-71. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Kant and Adorno alike have assumed that hope plays a central role in the relation between ethics and happiness. After comparing some of their different interpretations of hope, this paper traces the philosophical account of the concept of hope which Kant and Adorno, however, agree on. They both see hope as essential for bridging the gulf between normativity and realities. Hope, they argue, features a weaker doxastic state than belief but a stronger one than wishful thinking. For Kant, the question, “what may I hope?” is part of the interests of human reason. By modifying this conception of hope, Adorno advocates a notion of hope, which accounts for a critique of religion and metaphysics.
White, Eric. Rev. of Kant’s Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties, by Gilles Deleuze, transl. by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (1985). European Legacy 17.4 (2012): 572. [HUM]
Willaschek, Marcus. “The Non-Derivability of Kantian Right from the Categorical Imperative: A Response to Nance.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20.4 (2012): 557-64. [HUM]
Wille, Matthias. Transzendentaler Antirealismus: Grundlagen einer Erkenntnistheorie ohne Wissenstranszendenz. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2012. [xiv, 665 p.] [WC]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie, vol. 106.
Willat, Edward. Kant, Deleuze, and Architectonics. New York: Continuum, 2012. [xi, 174 p.] [WC]
Williams, Garrath. “Between Ethics and Right: Kantian Politics and Democratic Purposes.” European Journal of Philosophy 20.3 (2012): 479-86. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Force and Freedom insists that, “Freedom, understood as independence of another person’s choice, is [all] that matters.” In this paper I suggest that this premise leads Ripstein to an instrumentalization of democracy that neglects a properly public and collective notion of freedom. The paper first criticizes Ripstein’s key argument against any extension of public purposes beyond the upholding of persons’ “independence of others’ choice.” More constructively, the paper then suggests that a space of public freedom is opened up when people deliberate in order to form and pursue democratic purposes. Citizens may act together to promote ends that they think are worthwhile, without dominating one another or restricting individual freedom.
—— and Ruth Chadwick. “Responsibilities for Healthcare: Kantian Reflections.” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 21.2 (2012): 155-65. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This paper explores some ways in which Immanuel Kant’s ethical theory can be brought to bear on professional and health-care ethics. Health-care professionals are not mere individuals acting upon their own ends. Rather, their principles of action must be defined in terms of participation in a cooperative endeavor. This generates complex questions as to how well their roles mesh with one another and whether they comprise a well-formed collective agent. We argue that Kant’s ethics therefore, and perhaps surprisingly, requires us to consider the institutions, procedures, and politics that decide who should play what part in a complex collective enterprise. Likewise, professional responsibility involves — alongside a readiness to play one’s individual part — a concern for these collective aspects of health care.
Williams, Howard. Kant and the End of War: A Critique of Just War Theory. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. [vi, 204 p.] [WC]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: An exploration of Immanuel Kant’s account of war and the controversies that have arisen from its interpretation. This book brings the ideas of Kant’s critical philosophy to bear on one of the leading political and legal questions of our age: under what circumstances, if any, is recourse to war legally and morally justifiable? Kant stands almost unchallenged as one of the major thinkers of the European Enlightenment. This issue was strikingly brought to the fore by the 2003 war in Iraq. The book critiques the tradition of just war thinking and suggests how international law and international relations can be viewed from an alternative perspective that aims at a more pacific system of states. Instead of seeing the theory of just war as providing a stabilizing context within which international politics can be carried out, Williams argues that the theory contributes to the current unstable international condition. The just war tradition is not the silver lining in a generally dark horizon but rather an integral feature of the dark horizon of current world politics. Kant was one of the first and most profound thinkers to moot this understanding of just war reasoning and his work remains a crucial starting point for a critical theory of war today.
Williams, Jessica J. “How Conceptually Guided Are Kantian Intuitions?” History of Philosophy Quarterly 29.1 (2012): 57-78. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: The distinction Kant draws between the faculties of sensibility and understanding and the representations associated with them, intuitions and concepts, has been a point of interest to several contemporary philosophers engaged in the debate over the possibility of nonconceptual mental content. John McDowell has offered a strong conceptualist interpretation of Kantian intuitions, while Lucy Allais and Robert Hanna have used Kantian intuitions as the model for nonconceptual mental content. In this paper, I will argue that the interpretations offered by McDowell, Hanna, and Allais are problematic insofar as they either overlook or misconstrue crucial aspects of Kant’s account of cognition, including the role of the imagination in the synthesis of intuitions and its relationship to the understanding, and the distinction between the categories and empirical concepts.
Wilson, Daniel. Rev. of The Kantian Aesthetic: From Knowledge to the Avant-Garde, by Paul Crowther (2010). Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90.3 (2012): 616. [PW]
Wilson, Jeffrey L. Rev. of Historical Dictionary of Kant and Kantianism, by Helmut Holzhey and Vilem Mudroch (2005). Journal of the History of Philosophy 50.2 (2012): 300-01. [M]
Wilson, Holly L. Rev. of Kant’s Theory of Evil: An Essay on the Dangers of Self-love and the Aprioricity of History, by Pablo Muchnik (2009). Journal of the History of Philosophy 50.3 (2012): 462-63. [M]
Wolff, Michael. “Die Analyse der Erfahrung in Kants .” Kants Prolegomena: ein kooperativer Kommentar. Eds. Holger Lyre and Oliver Schliemann (op cit.). 127-68??. [WC]
Wood, Allen W. “Recht und Universität bei Kant.” Kants “Streit der Fakultäten” oder der Ort der Bildung zwischen Lebenswelt und Wissenschaften. Ed. Ludger Honnefelder (op cit.). 66-88. [M]
Wunderlich, Falk. “Philosophiegeschichte, Ideengeschichte und das Verhältnis von Philosophie und Wissenschaften im 18. Jahrhundert.” Klopffechtereien – Missverständnisse – Widersprüche? Methodische und methodologische Perspektiven auf die Kant-Forster-Kontroverse. Eds. Rainer Godel and Gideon Stiening (op cit.). 211-23. [M]
Zahavi, Dan. Rev. of Kant and Phenomenology, by Tom Rockmore (year). TLS (29 Jun 2012): 28. [HUM]
—— and Søren Overgaard. “Time, Space and Body in Bergson, Heidegger and Husserl.” Contemporary Kantian Metaphysics: New Essays on Time and Space. Eds. Roxana Baiasu, Graham Bird, and A. W. Moore (op cit.). 270-98??. [WC]
Zammito, John H. “The Lenoir Thesis Revisited: Blumenbach and Kant.” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43.1 (2012): 120-32. [PI]
[Note][Hide Note]
Abstract: Timothy Lenoir launched the historical study of German life science at the end of the 18th century with the claim that J. F. Blumenbach’s approach was shaped by his reception of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant: a ‘teleomechanism’ that adopted a strictly ‘regulative’ approach to the character of organisms. It now appears that Lenoir was wrong about Blumenbach’s understanding of Kant, for Blumenbach’s Bildungstrieb entailed an actual empirical claim. Moreover, he had worked out the decisive contours of his theory and he had exerted his maximal influence on the so-called ‘Göttingen School’ before 1795, when Lenoir posits the main influence of Kant’s thought took hold. This has crucial significance for the historical reconstruction of the German life sciences in the period. The Lenoir thesis can no longer serve as the point of departure for that reconstruction.
——. “The Pursuit of Science as Decadence in Kant’s Remarks in ‘Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime’.” Kant’s Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide. Eds. Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley (op cit.). 234-46. [M]
——. “The Forster-Kant Controversy: The rovocations of Interdisciplinarity.” Klopffechtereien – Missverständnisse – Widersprüche? Methodische und methodologische Perspektiven auf die Kant-Forster-Kontroverse. Eds. Rainer Godel and Gideon Stiening (op cit.). 225-43. [M]
Zinkin, Melissa. “Kant and the Pleasure of ‘Mere Reflection’.” Inquiry 55.5 (2012): 433-53. [HUM]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant refers to the pleasure that we feel when judging that an object is beautiful as the pleasure of “mere reflection”. Yet Kant never makes explicit what exactly is the relationship between the activity of “mere reflection” and the feeling of pleasure. I discuss several contemporary accounts of the pleasure of taste and argue that none of them is fully accurate, since, in each case, they leave open the possibility that one can reflect without having a feeling of pleasure, and hence allow a possible skepticism of taste. I then present my own account, which can better explain why Kant thinks that when one reflects one must also have a feeling of pleasure. My view, which emphasizes the role of attention in Kant, depicts well what we do when we judge something to be beautiful. It can also suggest a way to explain the relation between judgments of taste and moral feeling, and begin to show how the faculty of feeling fills a gap in the system of our cognitive faculties.
——. “Kant on Negative Magnitudes.” Kant-Studien 103.4 (2012): 397-414. [PW]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Kant’s 1763 essay, Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy, is one of the least discussed of all his pre-critical writings. When it is referred to, it is usually just to note a few passages that anticipate Kant’s later, Critical philosophy. I argue that instead of understanding these early anticipations of the Critical philosophy as separable from Kant’s discussion of negative magnitudes, we should take their origin in Kant’s investigation of negative magnitudes to be of central importance, since it can help us to understand aspects of Kant’s Critical view of cognition where negative magnitudes still play a role. I argue that negative magnitudes suggest to Kant a kind of cognitive activity that is neither the spontaneity of discursive thought nor the receptivity of the senses. Rather it is an “effort” of the mind, of which we are conscious through a feeling. I show that Kant’s early views about negative magnitudes are retained in his Critical philosophy.
Zöller, Günter. See: Malpas, Jeff and Günter Zöller.
Zuanazzi, Giovanni. Rev. of Il male radicale in Kant, by Karl Jaspers, transl. by Roberto Celada Ballanti (2011). Acta Philosophica: Pontificia Universita della Santa Croce 21.1 (2012): 192-95. [PI]
Zupancic, Alenka. Ethics of the Real: Kant and Lacan. London: Verso, 2012. [288 p.] [WC]
Zurzban, Robert, Peter DeScioli, and Daniel Fein. “Hamilton vs. Kant: Pitting Adaptations for Altruism against Adaptations for Moral Judgment.” Evolution and Human Behavior 33.4 (2012): 323-33. [PsychINFO]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Prominent evolutionary theories of morality maintain that the adaptations that underlie moral judgment and behavior function, at least in part, to deliver benefits (or prevent harm) to others. These explanations are based on the theories of kin selection and reciprocal altruism, and they predict that moral systems are designed to maximize Hamiltonian inclusive fitness. In sharp contrast, however, moral judgment often appears Kantian and rule-based. To reconcile this apparent discrepancy, some theorists have claimed that Kantian moral rules result from mechanisms that implement simple heuristics for maximizing welfare. To test this idea, we conducted a set of studies in which subjects (N = 1290) decided whether they would kill one person to save five others, varying the relationship of the subject with the others involved (strangers, friends, brothers). Are participants more likely to observe the Kantian rule against killing in decisions about brothers and friends, rather than strangers? We found the reverse. Subjects reported greater willingness to kill a brother or friend than a stranger (in order to save five others of the same type). These results suggest that the rule-based structure of moral cognition is not explained by kin selection, reciprocity, or other altruism theories.
Bhardwaj, Kiran. Kant’s Moral Philosophy and the Role of the Highest Good. Master’s thesis. The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2012. [47 p.] Advisor: Thomas E. Hill, Jr. [PQ]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Described as the union of complete virtue and complete happiness in accordance with such virtue, the concept of the highest good draws together Kant’s account of moral virtue with special features of humans: our need for happiness and hopes for justice. However, the highest good fails to perform its function in Kant’s theory if either of two strong criticisms holds: if it is inconsistent with Kant’s account of moral motivation, or if it is unimportant in moral action. I argue that a historical survey of Kant’s explanation of the highest good shows how improved argumentation in the later works helps Kant to resolve any apparent inconsistency. And while the highest good is not important in everyday moral action, I conclude that we should use it to resolve worries about the futility of moral action. As a result, the highest good has an undeniably central role in Kant’s ethics.
Carr, Cheri Lynne. Deleuze’s Critical Philosophy: The Differential Theory of the Faculties. Ph.D. diss. The University of Memphis, 2012. [203 p.] Advisor: Mary Beth Mader. [PQ]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This dissertation argues that a sustained treatment of Gilles Deleuze’s relationship to Immanuel Kant is essential to a refined understanding of Deleuze’s thought in his seminal work, Difference and Repetition (1968). Five years before writing Difference and Repetition Deleuze published Kant’s Critical Philosophy (1963), a short but comprehensive survey of Kant’s work that introduced within the general triadic structure of Kant’s critiques a more finely-grained structure oriented around the concept of faculties or capacities of thought. Kant’s Critical Philosophy sees Deleuze using Kant’s recurrent descriptions of the relationships between the faculties of thought as an organizing principle to reveal the unity of Kant’s practice of critique as it developed toward realizing its own standard of immanence. Deleuze’s charge that Kant ultimately betrays this standard due his unwillingness to question the claims of morality itself is the catalyst for Deleuze’s thinking in Difference and Repetition. There, Deleuze produces a differential theory of faculties through a revision and recuperation of Kant’s doctrine of faculties, but without explicitly linking it to a new critical practice. This dissertation brings to light the new critical practice implicit in Deleuze’s thought by comparing the doctrine of faculties from Kant’s Critical Philosophy with the differential theory of faculties from Difference and Repetition. What it shows is that in Difference and Repetition Deleuze carries out his own “critique of reason”, an immanent critique that is not satisfied to remain at the level of the a priori conditions of experience but seeks to account for experience’s genesis. Deleuze’s critique contests the claims of morality at the heart of Kant’s conservatism by developing a non-psychologistic theory of faculties as relations of power, by exposing the non-rational basis of rationality through a genetic analysis of “common sense”, and by forcing thought to internalize how powerless it is to attain absolute moral insight. The methodological correlations drawn between Kant’s Critical Philosophy and Difference and Repetition allow the dissertation to conclude by raising important questions about the extent to which Deleuze’s critique breaks with its Kantian antecedent, particularly as regards its practical commitments.
Diehl, Catharine Elizabeth. The Theory of Intensive Magnitudes in Leibniz and Kant. Ph.D. diss. Princeton University [Comparative Literature], 2012. [353 p.] Advisor: Daniel Heller-Roazen. [PQ]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This dissertation demonstrates the fundamental importance of the problem of intensive magnitudes for Leibniz and Kant. While their work has generated an immense scholarly literature, the systematic role of the concept of intensive magnitude has been neglected. I argue that attending to the problem of degree-valued properties reveals new connections among Leibniz’s and Kant’s metaphysical, epistemological, and aesthetic concerns. I show that they struggle to provide a unified theory of degree-valued properties, drawing on many aspects of their theoretical and practical philosophies. The problem of intensive magnitudes provides a new perspective on the relationship between Leibniz and Kant that reduces it neither to simple continuity nor to discontinuity. In addition, tracing the development of theories of intensive magnitudes shows that standard accounts of the rise of aesthetics in the eighteenth century miss the links between questions of taste and feeling and broader epistemological and metaphysical concerns; these accounts thus fail to appreciate the specific importance of eighteenth-century aesthetic theory for philosophy as a whole. In an introductory chapter, I show that Leibniz’s theory of intensive magnitudes draws on two distinct sources: the discussion of the je ne sais quoi in the seventeenth century and the long tradition of reflection concerning the problem of the intensification and remission of forms. The first chapter argues that Leibniz provides a new account of the individuation of substances on the basis of their intensive magnitudes. In the second I turn to a consideration of Leibniz’s law of continuity — the principle that nature never makes leaps — and demonstrate the way in which this principle grounds Leibniz’s theory of petites perceptions and the je ne sais quoi. Chapter 3 reconstructs Kant’s argument in the Critique of Pure Reason for the a priori principle that the “real” corresponding to sensation has an intensive magnitude. The concluding chapter considers whether representations contained in a single instant are simple and argues that, according to Kant’s account in the Analytic of the Sublime, the instant is not a constituent of objective cognition but arises from the feeling of limitation.
Farkas, Sarah Elizabeth. Uniting Right and Duty: Hegel’s Critical Appropriation of Kant’s “Metaphysics of Morals”. Ph.D. diss. Boston University, 2012. [152 p.] Advisor: C. Allen Speight. [PQ]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Both Kant and Hegel were concerned with the possibility of unifying the notions of right and duty within an overarching ethical theory. Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals (MdS ) is a paradigmatic example of a failed attempt at this kind of unification. Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (PR ), it is argued, both inherits and overcomes the problems inherent in Kant’s work. This dissertation, with its emphasis on the importance of connecting right and duty in a systematic ethics, provides a new critique of the MdS and an account of the PR as putting forth an ethics that corresponds to the actual motivational structure of moral agents. Chapter One demonstrates that Kant’s attempt to unify the concepts of right and duty in the MdS fails. It is argued here that Kant grounds the concept of right within his moral framework and thus absorbs right entirely into his ethics. Chapter Two addresses early Hegelian sources that seriously engage Kant’s MdS . Emphasis is placed upon the way in which the concern of Hegel’s project in the PR , the unification of right and duty, is present in his earliest work and the fact that the narrative that Hegel puts forth is a direct reading of and response to Kant’s MdS . Chapter Three treats the realms of abstract right and morality that Hegel constructs in the PR with a focus on how Hegel both appropriates the structure of MdS and levels an implicit critique at Kant. This chapter pays special attention to the way in which Hegel ensures the distinction between right and morality while binding them together inextricably. Chapter Four concludes that what can be gained through Hegel’s successful integration of right and duty lies in his “right of subjective satisfaction,” the right of the subject to find her satisfaction in whatever action she may be obligated to perform. In this way, right and duty become united within the subject, and as a result she has a right to identify with her actions in order to truly consider herself a free agent.
Haber, Ana. Ethics of Tragic Heroism: Moral Autonomy as Lawgiving Rebellion in Kant, Hegel and Kafka. Ph.D. diss. State University of New York at Binghamton [Comparative Literature], 2012. [399 p.] Advisor: William Haver. [PQ]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This dissertation aims to prove that Kant’s notion of autonomy and Hegel’s notion of spirituality have nothing to do with common-minded pragmatism or bourgeois-consumerist reasonableness. They are both founded upon the premise that what is most uniquely, distinctly and authentically particular in each particularity, lives in deepest communion with what is most universal about human race as a whole. One acquires the meaning of this deep communion only through a pitiless, autonomous questioning of all given contents of justice inscribed in right, morals, habits, politics, religion or economics that are externally proclaimed to be valid. Upon this merciless questioning, one reaches the zero-point of absolute uncertainty regarding the very notions of good, right and justice. This depletes universality from its hefty, imperative sturdiness and lets particularity live in desperate fluctuation from one ground of incertitude to another. When particularity dares to accept that universality is irremediably empty — that no god or external authority will ever come to authoritatively fill it with content — she can become moral, lawgiving particularity. She then realizes that the determination of the content of good is the sole responsibility of her particular action, of her own deep engagement with the universal as idea and the universal as the entirety of the social, public sphere. Externalization of authentic, unique particularity through action is the only true universality that human beings are capable of. Particularity which is able to achieve this is the age-old Slave’s Desire for recognition which, through the nameless throbbing of anxiety, keeps plaguing the public sphere so long as there are rights that remain unrecognized. Kafka’s writing is imbued with the here described rationality of Desire. Unlike Kant and Hegel, Kafka is extremely pessimistic about the prospect of implementing Desire into the social sphere. He correctly perceives that in our time, Desire is sacrificed for the sake of extolling the irrationality of caprices and whims into the definitive yardsticks of human freedom. Desire (with capital “D”), as the ground of rational volition, loses the battle with the irrationality of desires, drives and inclinations, for the latter are inscribed in the ever-growing mass mentality.
Heftler, Scott. Kant’s Analytic-Geometric Revolution: Ostensive Judgement As Algebraic Time-State Relation in the Critique of Pure Reason. Ph.D. diss. University ot Texas, Austin, 2012. [# p.] Advisor: Kathleen Higgins. []
Hoffmann, Thomas. Zum Problem eines Bewusstseins bei Tieren am Paradigma der kantischen Theorie des Bewusstseins. Ph.D. diss. Universität-Trier, 2012. [174 p.] Advisor: Bernd Dörflinger and Michael Albrecht. [M]
Huseyinzadegan, Dilek. Politics, History, Critique: An Interpretation of Kant's Political Philosophy in Light of His Critical-Regulative Method. Ph.D. diss. DePaul University, 2012. [258 p.] Advisor: Avery Goldman. [PQ]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: My dissertation offers the following three benefits with regard to a renewed interpretation of Kant’s political philosophy:
1)I will demonstrate that Kant’s essays on history and politics are not dogmatic, unimportant, or of minor significance, but employ a critical principle of teleology, following on the critical-regulative method developed in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Judgement.
2) Such a holistic and systematic reading of Kant’s historico-political writings will reveal that Kant’s political philosophy cannot be construed as a mere extension of his moral theory. There is a distinction between how Kant theoretically justifies his normative assumptions about history and politics and how he posits teleogical practical goals based on theses assumptions. Thus, I will question whether we can read any of Kant’s historico-political writings in unambiguously moral terms. In addition, I will show that cosmopolitanism, and idea that is often considered to be the centerpiece of these short writing, is not the only legacy of Kant’s political thought.
3) Finally, I will show that by means of his critical-regulative method Kant is able to reflect on his own historical circumstances with a view to propose a teleological universal history, and a political theory based on such a philosophy of history. Thus, a regulative teleological understanding of his own socio-historical reality is crucial to Kant’s political philosophy. This suggests that a philosophy of history is always already pragmatic in orientation and that for Kant there is a close relationship between history and politics. Thus, Kant’s political thought builds on this critical-teleological account of history, and finds its confirmation in such a regulative ground.
In short, in this project as a whole I uncover the contemporary legacy of Kant’s philosophy of history and political theory through a close analysis of what I label his critical-regulative method. I argue that Kant’s often ignored writing on history and politics are closely connected to this method that he develops in his three Critiques; thus these minor writings are not dogmatic or insignificant but squarely fit in with his critical system. Then I show that his critical-regulative method has implications for Kant’s contemporary political legacy.
Jankowiak, Timothy P. Sensation and Intentionality in Kant’s Theory of Empirical Cognition. Ph.D. diss. University of California, San Diego, 2012. [340 p.] Advisor: Eric Watkins. [summary][PQ]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: The core project of this dissertation is twofold. First, it provides a reconstruction of Kant's theory of how sensation contributes to the cognition of physical objects in the spatiotemporal world. It is first shown how sensation acquires a representational function through its relation to the mental states that Kant labels "intuitions." In intuitions, a posteriori sensations are combined with the a priori representation of space to produce nonconceptual representations of sensory qualities arrayed in space. These intuitions yield our most basic representations of objects in the world. Then it is shown how the data given in sensory intuitions allows for the application of some of our most basic conceptual representations of these objects, most importantly the concepts of "reality" and "actuality." We can represent something as real because sensations allow us to determine the "intensity" of an object's physical density and sensible qualities. We can represent an object as actual when the representation of that object coheres with the rest of our sensory representations of the natural world. Second, it is argued that a careful analysis of the "intentionality" of our sensory representations reveals the ontological status of the objects of cognition to be quite minimal. The empirical objects we represent in experience, Kant thinks, have no existence beyond their being what is articulated by the representational contents of intentionally–directed mental states. This, it is argued, is the proper understanding of Kantian idealism, and it is shown that this interpretation is maximally consistent with Kant's relevant writings on the issue. These two projects are by no means distinct, for Kant argues that intentional relations to empirical objects are possible only because of the a posteriori matter given in sensation. The most novel contribution of the project lies in showing how Kant's theory of the ontological status of appearances can be understood as a consequence of his theory of how sensations make possible our intentionally-directed empirical representations.
Kahn, Samuel. The Intersection of Right and Good in Kant's Metaphysics of Morals. Ph.D. diss. Stanford University, 2012. [# p.] Advisor: Allen W. Wood. []
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: My dissertation focuses on the ways that erroneous beliefs contributing to conclusions about what we morally ought to do can and cannot be legitimately employed within a Kantian context. I approach this issue through questions about Kant's theory of conscience and the role of conscience in moral decision-making. According to the standard reading of Kant's ethics, there is a single set of objectively correct duties for all agents. On my reading, by way of contrast, an agent's duties are determined to some extent by his/her beliefs about the world. In other words, I give a defense of a kind of limited pluralism within Kant's ethics. I do this by arguing for three main claims. First, I argue (in chapters 1 and 2) that in Kant's ethics agents with similar core values but different beliefs about how the world works will arrive at very different (but nonetheless reasonable) conclusions about what they ought to do in particular situations. Second, I argue (in chapters 3 and 4) that according to Kant an agent who acts according to his/her conscience is behaving permissibly. And third, I argue (in chapters 5 and 6) that for Kant juridical duties are fundamentally different from ethical duties, so an ethical pluralism could be represented in a single (Kantian) state despite the fact that there are limits as to what counts as reasonable. In this way, I hope to show that even within Kant's system of objective value, because agents might have different beliefs about how the world works, there is no determinable set of judgments for a set of circumstances that exists independently of those agents' beliefs and intentions. To put this another way (to bring out where I diverge from the now-standard reading of Kant's ethics), I am arguing that the results of Kant's moral standard, the Categorical Imperative (CI), are radically underdetermined without information about an agent's beliefs about how the world works. One can determine whether something is permissible for an ideal agent (with only true beliefs); one can determine whether something is permissible for some given, fallible agent; but one cannot determine whether something is permissible simpliciter, for it is indeterminate. In slogan form, the underlying idea of this is that for Kant permissibility does not exist in a vacuum. We can make judgments about permissibility only for a given context, and part of that context includes information about an agent and his/her beliefs about how the world works.
Kohl, Markus. Kant on Freedom, Nature, and Normativity. Ph.D. diss. University of California, Berkeley, 2012. [# p.] Advisor: Hannah Ginsborg and Jay Wallace. []
Lamborn, Jennifer Lynne. Two Standpoints and the Transcendental Distinction: An Analysis of Kant’s Conception of Freedom. Master’s thesis. University of Wyoming, 2012. [98 p.] Advisor: Ed Sherline. [PQ]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Kant draws two principal distinctions in his critical work: the transcendental distinction of the first Critique, and the two standpoint distinction introduced in the Groundwork. While there are apparent reasons to equate these distinctions, I argue that we must separate them for at least two reasons. First, if we collapse these distinctions, we lose the philosophical resources argued for by Kant in the first Critique, resources that are essential to his theory of freedom. Second, if we separate them, we make conceptual space for an analysis of Kant’s conception of freedom, thereby generating additional philosophical resources. Contra the interpretation of transcendental idealism that equates the standpoint distinction with the transcendental distinction, I argue that Kant’s doctrine of the primacy of practical reason entails that the standpoint of the subject is “integrated.” Additionally, I claim that for Kant, there are two kinds of intelligible cause: the “broad intelligible cause” that grounds the theoretical standpoint and the “narrow intelligible cause” that grounds the practical standpoint. Finally, the account I present offers responses to certain difficulties recognized in Kant’s account of freedom.
Leland, Patrick. Kant and the Semantics of Mental Content (1755-1781). Ph.D. diss. Johns-Hopkins University, 2012. [# p.] Advisor: Eckart Förster. []
Lott, Joshua R. The Rationality of Teleology: Purposiveness and the Concept of the Human in Kant, Rousseau, and Hume. Ph.D. diss. Tulane University, 2012. [288 p.] Advisor: Richard Velkley. [PQ]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: I interpret Kant’s concept of teleology as a reply to both Hume’s criticism of intelligent design, as put forth in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, and to Rousseau’s discovery of the teleological problem of reason. I argue that Kant develops both a superior critique of intelligent design and a superior concept of teleology than that which can be drawn from Hume, since Kant justifies the principle of purposiveness as both rational and necessary a priori. Moreover, I will argue that Kant more thoroughly and more systematically exploits the concept of teleology than did Rousseau. Chapter 1 summarizes Hume’s principles and his critique of intelligent design. Chapter 2 presents Rousseau’s conception of teleology through a reading of his principle of natural goodness. Chapter 3 emphasizes Kant’s conception of reason and the system of nature in his Critique of Pure Reason, suggesting that Kant’s conception of reason as primarily practical suitably rebuts Hume’s instrumental view of reason while extending the implications of Rousseau’s discoveries. Kant’s connection between the autonomy of reason and the pursuit of a teleological system of nature supplies the foundation of Kant’s reply to Hume’s conception of teleology. Chapter 4 establishes that Kant’s deduction of the principle of reflective judgment in the "Introduction to the Critique of Judgment" reveals the teleological principle as subjectively necessary a priori and not merely psychological. Chapter 5 traces the argument of the "Analytic of Teleological Judgment," establishing that Kant’s analysis of teleological judgment exceeds Hume’s both in terms of its content and its usefulness in scientific inquiry. Chapter 6 examines Kant’s resolution to the Antinomy of Teleological Judgment, which culminates in his contrast between the human "discursive intellect" and an "intuitive intellect," suggesting that a teleological principle is only valid for human understanding, reinforcing his conception of teleology. Chapter 7 examines the "Methodology of Teleological Judgment," where Kant identifies human beings as autonomous moral agents as the final purpose of the system of nature. I claim that Kant’s argument fortifies his conception of reason, teleology, and his moral philosophy, providing human beings with more for which to hope than does Hume.
Lu-Adler, Huaping. Kant’s Conception of Logical Extension and Its Implications. Ph.D. diss. University of California, Davis, 2012. [168 p.] Advisor: Henry E. Allison. [PQ]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: It is a received view that Kant’s formal logic (or what he calls “pure general logic”) is thoroughly intensional. On this view, even the notion of logical extension must be understood solely in terms of the concepts that are subordinate to a given concept. I grant that the subordination relation among concepts is an important theme in Kant’s logical doctrine of concepts. But I argue that it is both possible and important to ascribe to Kant an objectual notion of logical extension according to which the extension of a concept is the multitude of objects falling under it. I begin by defending this ascription in response to three reasons that are commonly invoked against it. First, I explain that this ascription is compatible with Kant’s philosophical reflections on the nature and boundary of a formal logic. Second, I show that the objectual notion of extension I ascribe to Kant can be traced back to many of the early modern works of logic with which he was more or less familiar. Third, I argue that such a notion of extension makes perfect sense of a pivotal principle in Kant’s logic, namely the principle that the quantity of a concept’s extension is inversely proportional to that of its intension. In the process, I tease out two important features of the Kantian objectual notion of logical extension in terms of which it markedly differs from the modern one. First, on the modern notion the extension of a concept is the sum of the objects actually falling under it; on the Kantian notion, by contrast, the extension of a concept consists of the multitude of possible objects — not in the metaphysical sense of possibility, though — to which a concept applies in virtue of being a general representation. While the quantity of the former extension is finite, that of the latter is infinite — as is reflected in Kant’s use of a plane-geometrical figure (e.g., circle, square), which is continuum as opposed to discretum, to represent the extension in question. Second, on the modern notion of extension, a concept that signifies exactly one object has a one-member extension; on the Kantian notion, however, such a concept has no extension at all — for a concept is taken to have extension only if it signifies a multitude of things. This feature of logical extension is manifested in Kant’s claim that a singular concept (or a concept in its singular use) can, for lack of extension, be figuratively represented only by a point — as opposed to an extended figure like circle, which is reserved for a general concept (or a concept in its general use). Precisely on account of these two features, the Kantian objectual extension proves vital to Kant’s theory of logical quantification (in universal, particular and singular judgments, respectively) and to his view regarding the formal truth of analytic judgments.
MacDougall, D. Robert. Kant and the Political Context of Contemporary Bioethics. Ph.D. diss. Saint Louis University, 2012. [314 p.] Advisor: Griffin Trotter. [PQ]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This dissertation critically examines the incorporation of normative political philosophy in the contemporary bioethics literature addressing laws and public policies. It is argued that contemporary bioethics literature has substantially neglected to make positive use of normative political philosophy in questions regarding laws and policies, when such use is seemingly strictly necessary. The author defends this thesis by critically examining the use of Kant’s moral philosophy in contemporary bioethics debates about laws and public policies. The author argues that Kant’s moral philosophy is often used in contemporary bioethics debates in a manner at odds with Kant’s own understanding of its relevance for laws and public policies. Kant did not believe that principles suitable for the analysis of the morality of actions could be applied unproblematically to questions of law or public policy. The failure to heed Kant’s careful distinction between moral and political philosophy is characteristic of contemporary neglect of political philosophy in general. After giving an overview of previous incorporation of political philosophy in bioethics literature in general and in Kantian bioethics literature in particular, the author explains the difference between moral and political philosophy as Kant saw it, and develops a reading of Kant’s political philosophy. Kant’s political philosophy is applied to two contemporary bioethics issues. The author argues first that, contrary to the consensus of contemporary Kantians, Kant himself would have supported a market in solid organs, and that this question is necessarily one involving political (and not merely moral) philosophy. Attempts to legally prohibit the sale of kidneys violate innate right, despite the fact that such sales are morally forbidden. Second, it is argued that contemporary notions of autonomy have failed to give a satisfying moral grounding to the legal standards of disclosure governing informed consent. Kant’s political philosophy, by appealing to a united will, clarifies the moral authority of a government to set what is essentially an arbitrary, but normatively necessary, set of standards for disclosure.
Manos, James A. A Critique of Political Self-deception: Kant and Freud at the Edge of Critical Theory. Ph.D. diss. DePaul University, 2012. [# p.] Advisor: Tina Chanter. []
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: In the spirit of Kantian critique this dissertation pursues the enlightenment project of examining the limits of reason and its political ramifications. Beginning from the claim that psychoanalysis is the inheritor of the Kantian project, this dissertation argues the limits of political reason lie beyond the concepts of overcoming and mastery. While traditionally this conversation has been occupied with the concept of ideology, this dissertation draws on the Freudian concept of self-deception. It contends the concept of ideology contains the seeds of its own overcoming, and thus cannot represent the limits of political reason. In contrast to ideology, this dissertation claims the Freudian concept of disavowal indicates the limits of not only rationality, but also political rationality. As such, the political ramifications of a critique focused on the limits of rationality must grapple with the phenomenon of disavowal, a phenomenon that blatantly defies the logic of non-contradiction. This dissertation concludes that this form of critique would demand turning political thought toward historical manifestations that continue to exist but are not recognized, such as the relationship between slavery and prisons as articulated in the 13th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
Ng, Julia Chi Yan. Conditions of Impossibility: Failure and Fictions of Perpetual Peace. Ph.D. diss. Northwestern University, 2012. [334 p.] Advisor: Samuel Weber and Peter D. Fenves. [PQ]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This dissertation identifies and describes the self-consciously impossible character of Kant’s “Towards Perpetual Peace” (1795), which ironically makes possible alternative theories of political agency that do no rely on the presumption that human beings can build a world in which they protect themselves from every conceivable threat. One such alternative theory, I argue, develops in the early work of Walter Benjamin and Gershom Scholem, for whom the perpetual peace project turns into an exploration of the fictions that accompany and precede every determination of possibility imposed by the self-organization of embodied subjectivity. Unsettling the logic that grounds action in the organization of human life, a generally unseen dimension of Kant’s projection of the just society gives rise to theories of human power and divine violence in Benjamin and Scholem that express a concept of life preceding and exceeding what is deemed “possible” for human subjectivity. The impossibility of perpetual peace thus becomes, for them, a promise that the impossible — figured in the science fiction of Paul Scheerbart, above all — cannot be dismissed whenever human organization breaks out of its self-organization’s syndromes. The Introduction examines the duplicity of the word “peace” in context of the military-architectural provenance of the “equilibrium of powers” upon which the idea of perpetual peace is modeled before and after Kant. Chapter One shows that Benjamin revises Kantian “possible experience” to uncover parameters with which our efficacy in the world might not run afoul of freedom’s apparent irreconcilability with nature. Chapter Two shows how Scholem conceives of agency in Jewish life on the basis of the mathematical actual infinite and the extra-European character of Paul Scheerbart’s fictional writings. Chapter Three recounts Benjamin’s and Scholem’s mathematical revision of Hermann Cohen’s Kants Theorie der Erfahrung in demonstration that genuine cosmopolitanism must hold Kant’s concept of space as one but not the only possible formal constitution of perception. Chapter Four elaborates Benjamin’s theory of a non-injurious and thus genuinely cosmopolitical space on the basis of Scheerbart’s and Bruno Taut’s concept of glass as geopolitical sensorium. In the Conclusion, Benjamin’s “Towards the Critique of Violence” is reinterpreted as an indication of the impasse to which any attempt to “execute” perpetual peace must arrive, and as a turn towards a theory of nonhuman agency and the nature of matter absent a viable inheritable theory of potentiality.
Padui, Raoni Pascoal. From the Transcendental to the Ontological: Hegel, Heidegger, and the Legacy of Transcendental Idealism. Ph.D. diss. University, 2012. [306 p.] Advisor: Walter Brogan. [PQ]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: In this dissertation I argue that Hegel and Heidegger can be best understood as engaged in an immanent critique and internal reformulation of Kant’s transcendental idealism. I show that viewing their respective projects from this common ground allows one to understand the divergent paths they take in their attempt to overcome what they see as the overly epistemological and formal aspects of transcendental philosophy. While both turn to an ontological and historical understanding of the transcendental conditions encountered in Kant, Hegel attempts to further complete the critical project of self-grounding and self-determination, while Heidegger tries to show a necessary and constitutive finitude that renders any complete self-determination impossible. I conclude by arguing that the difficulty in accounting for the ontological independence of nature in both Hegel and Heidegger betray the extent to which they are still heirs to the tradition of transcendental idealism.
Pascoe, Jordan. Cosmopolitanism and Colonialism: Marriage, Race, and Kant's Philosophy of Family. Ph.D. diss. City University of New York, 2012. [# p.] Advisor: Sibyl Schwarzenbach. []
Saunders, Bret Jeremy. Descartes's Divided Imagination and Its Legacy in Kant and Hegel. Ph.D. diss. University of Dallas, 2012. [283 p.] Advisor: Dennis L. Sepper. [PQ]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This dissertation traces the contours of the tension between philosophy and its literature as this struggle played out in modern continental "rationalism," which denied the tools of the imagination explicitly yet relied pervasively on rhetoric and metaphor. Filling a significant lacuna in the scholarly literature, the present study of rhetoric and metaphor in Descartes, Kant, and Hegel argues that the great modern philosophers after the "turn to the subject" were torn between establishing a universal, rational foundation for human knowledge and meeting the demands of communication imposed by the historicity of their discourse rhetoric — by rhetoric, ordinary language, and pre-theoretical experience. I call this tension the "divided imagination." By this I mean, more precisely, the tension between the use of the imagination (metaphors, analogies, rhetoric) in scientific practice and philosophical psychologies claiming to distinguish the imagination precisely from "pure reason." "Divided imagination" also designates the oscillation and interplay between two kinds of images , namely, between the "clear and distinct" mathematical imagination and its ordinary, pre-theoretical side — at once more colorful and less acknowledged. The specific emphases and elements "in tension" are somewhat different in each of the philosophers studied. For example, whereas Descartes's mature theory of mind admits the first kind of tension insofar as his account of "pure intellection" uses images, Kant, on the other hand, is characterized more by the second tension: we argue that he does not in fact produce the colorless, structural theory of mind to which he lays claim. Despite these differences, the project traces four main interpretive threads — rhetoric, the method of analysis, philosophical psychology, and "foundational metaphors" — throughout the major works of Descartes, Kant, and Hegel, exploring the ways in which these seminal moderns use metaphor to analyze, demarcate and present the structure of human cognition. I disclose the basic metaphors functioning as an overarching framework for their analyses, but which remained unexamined in themselves. By following the traces of the divided imagination, I argue for and develop an account of modern philosophical poiesis, which modern philosophy was never willing to give of itself.
Shields, Daniel. Aquinas and the Kantian Principle of Treating Persons As Ends in Themselves. Ph.D. diss. The Catholic University of America, 2012. [263 p.] Advisor: Tobias Hoffmann. [pdf] [M]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This dissertation addresses the question of whether and on what terms Aquinas would accept Kant’s principle that one must always treat all persons as ends in themselves, and never merely as means. This question is of considerable interest given the wide contemporary acceptance of Kant’s principle and yet it has, to my knowledge, never received as sustained a consideration as I will give it.
To answer this question I make a distinction between a finis cuius and finis cui. A finis cuius is an end in the sense of a value that is to be attained, and a finis cui is an end in the sense of someone for whom a value is to be attained. Aquinas holds that one must treat persons as ends in both of these senses. Nevertheless, no created person is a supreme finis cui or an ultimate finis cuius.
For Aquinas, God is the end of the natural law and all of the moral life is ordered towards Him. “Love God with all your heart” is the primary precept of the natural law. Aquinas does not mean that the whole moral life is ordered towards one’s own personal
happiness with God. Such a view would involve always using other persons as mere means. Rather, God is to be loved as both the supreme finis cui and the ultimate finis cuius. God offers Himself to man as a common good and must be loved as such. This means that one must love other persons as fellow participants in the common good and as those for whom the common good is intended. This is to say that one must treat his neighbor as a finis cui.
Aquinas further holds that one must love one’s neighbor as oneself, that is to say, with the love of friendship. This requires valuing the other person as a finis cuius — thus wanting to be in community with him — in addition to willing his good as a finis cui. Such love perfects a natural tendency purposefully implanted in man by God and is necessary if the community is to flourish.
Stevenson, Michael Robert. Subjectivity and Selfhood in Kant, Fichte and Heidegger. Ph.D. diss. Columbia University, 2012. [286 p.] Advisor: Frederick Neuhouser. [PQ]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: Kant once said that the “whole field of philosophy” is guided by the fundamental question, “What is the human being?” Kant himself, and even more so his Idealist successors, addressed this question by offering transcendental theories of human subjectivity. My dissertation explores the philosophical development of the Kantian and post-Kantian theories of subjectivity and their relationship to the often neglected theory of selfhood in Heidegger’s Being and Time. After examining the issues in Kant’s theory which were decisive motivating factors for the post-Kantian Idealists — namely the metaphysical status of the apperceptive I and the unity of reason — I explore Fichte’s metaphysics of subjectivity and his attempt to demonstrate the unity and self-sufficiency of reason. Finally, I argue that the early Heidegger’s theory of finite human existence is best understood as an extension of and corrective to the classical Idealist tradition. I attempt to cash out two of Heidegger’s claims: (1) that his own “fundamental ontology” is pre-figured by Kant’s theory of subjectivity, and (2) that the crucial insights in his reading of Kant share much with the Idealists but also “move in the opposite direction” from them. I argue that Heidegger’s theory of selfhood gives an account of the sui generis features of human existence which unifies our theoretical and practical activities while avoiding the stronger Idealist claims regarding the self-sufficiency and self-legitimacy of reason.
Storey, Ian N. The Taste of Politics: Kant’s Theory of Judgment and Belonging in the Modern World. Ph.D. diss. The University of Chicago [Political Science], 2012. [317 p.] Advisor: Patchen Markell. [PQ]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: This dissertation examines the critical role that expressions of judgment play in the everyday negotiation of social and political belonging. In the sociopolitical thought of Immanuel Kant, judgments of taste provided a way of asserting one’s presence and contesting one’s place in society, through a unique kind of claim for status as a judge embedded in those judgments. Through engagements with Hannah Arendt, Martin Heidegger, Jacques Rancière, and others, I argue that Kant’s theory of taste makes possible a radically egalitarian rethinking of some of the most foundational institutional boundary-markers of belonging - including state citizenship, social class, and national identity - by relocating the social bases for political membership.
Tully, Ian Martin. On Greene’s Neuroscientific Challenge to Deontological Ethics. Master’s thesis. University of Colorado at Boulder, 2012. [62 p.] Advisor: Christopher Heathwood. [PQ]
[Note][Hide Note]Abstract: In this paper, I respond to the case against deontological moral theory that Joshua Greene develops in “The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul” and elsewhere. Using empirical data he and colleagues collected on peoples’ judgments in various moral dilemmas, Greene attempts to show that deontology rests on unsound foundations. In brief, he contends that the intuitions used to support deontological theory are undermined because they are responses to a morally irrelevant feature he calls “personalness.” I argue that deontologists can respond to Greene’s arguments by drawing a distinction between “practical” and “theoretical” intuitions. I contend that it is only the former sort of intuitions that are undermined by Greene’s evidence, and that deontological theory can be supported purely on the basis of theoretical intuitions.
Winegar, Reed. The Fate of Kant's Antinomies. Ph.D. diss. University of Pennsylvania, 2012. [# p.] Advisor: Paul Guyer. []
Zhu, Huihui. The Reality of the Ideas of Freedom and Moral Law: Reconsidering the Groundwork of Kant’s Moral Philosophy. Humboldt-Universität, 2012. [215 p.] Advisor: ??. [content] [WC]
