Building a “City of Peace” through Intercommunal Association
Muslim-Christian Relations in Harar, Ethiopia, 1887-2009

Jan Bender Shetler and
Dawit Yehualashet

Jan Bender Shetler is Professor of History at Goshen College, teaching courses in African and world history. Her primary research has been in Tanzania where she has published a number of books and articles, including *Imagining Serengeti: A History of Landscape Memory in Tanzania from Earliest Times to the Present* (Ohio University Press, 2007).

Dawit Yehualaset is an MA student in public administration at Indiana University South Bend and is a graduate of Goshen College in Peace Studies. His other publications include a forthcoming work, also co-written with Shetler, “Studying Inter-Communal Peace in Ethiopia: Christian-Muslim Relations and the Suppression of Violence in Ethiopia, 1991-2005,” which is under review by the *Ethiopian Journal of Religious Studies* for publication, spring 2011.

Despite conditions ripe for violence, Muslims and Christians of Harar, Ethiopia, have built a robust, deeply-rooted culture of peace over the last century. In 2003 UNESCO awarded the City of Peace Prize to Harar, a small city of 99,000 people, also known as the “City of Saints.” It is an ancient center of Muslim learning where a grand mosque, an Orthodox church, and a Catholic church all sit at the center of the walled city. In places like Jerusalem or Ayodha (India), contested religious sites continue to spark violence. Yet when the Christian Ethiopian Empire destroyed the Harar central mosque at the time of conquest in 1887 and built an Orthodox church on top of it, violence was not sparked, in spite of simmering resentment. These tensions might have exploded when the authoritarian communist government fell in 1991, as happened with the breakup of the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia. Diverse populations, particularly where the majority dominates the minority, have greater challenges in building just and peaceful societies. While many have studied situations of ethnic or religious violence, much can be learned by investigating places where
sparks of conflict have not ignited into flames of violence. The city of Harar, with its mix of Muslims and Christians in eastern Ethiopia, is a fascinating place to study peace. Even with heightened tensions between Muslims and Christians, it has remained relatively peaceful since its violent incorporation into the Ethiopian state more than a century ago. The question then is why? How has Harar become a “city of peace” for Muslims and Christians despite characteristics that would predispose it to violence?

Political scientist Ashutosh Varshney’s study of Hindu-Muslim conflict in India compares pairs of “riot-prone” and “peace-prone” cities with similar demographic indicators and provides a useful model for exploring this question. Varshney conveniently uses the terms “intercommunal” for relations between groups within Harar, in this case Muslim and Christian, and “intracommunal” for relations within a single group in Harar, in this case factions of the Muslim or Christian community. Most studies of intercommunal conflict focus on national policy, but by using the city as the unit of analysis, Varshney identifies factors that explain the variation in violence or peace at the local level. Peaceful cities are distinguished by the presence of civic networks or intercommunal associations, such as business clubs, unions, non-profit agencies and neighborhood organizations. These associations bring Muslims and Hindus into everyday interaction for mutually beneficial tasks, giving them the ability to manage the tensions and pressures of partisan agitation. Maintaining peace does not depend on either the denial of strong religious identities or the lack of conflict, but rather on the means to deal with it. Following Varshney’s methodology, our preliminary study (2006) enumerated the incidents of intercommunal violence in Ethiopia since 1991, as reported in newspapers, demonstrating that a similar pairing of cities was not possible because there were no clear cases of cities with intense and sustained violence. We thus decided to look at one city in Ethiopia, one that had the most potential for violence, asking whether civil society networks were the key to maintaining peaceful relations between Muslims and Christians.

Harar presented a useful test case with a strong potential for conflict, indicated by an outbreak of violence in 2001, historical tensions, and contested sacred sites, but which has otherwise maintained peace. The application of Varshney’s thesis attributing peaceful outcomes to strong institutions of civil society at the local level allowed us to analyze both informal and formal intercommunal associations. The data presented here come from two separate research trips to Ethiopia (2007 and 2009), resulting in ninety formal interviews.
from a cross section of gender, ethnicity, class and religion in Harar (see Figure 1 for list of interviews[10]). What we found confirmed that civil society associations that cross religious lines are responsible for this incredible story of hope. Those intercommunal associations, as well as the religious groups themselves, supported the Harari regional government’s efforts to maintain peace, while divisions within Muslim and Christian communities kept them from mobilizing in opposition to one another. Harar’s resilience in the face of violent provocation is the result of everyday people in their everyday lives developing robust formal and informal ties between Muslims and Christians over the last century.

The Historical Context of Harar’s Intercommunal Relations

Harar must be understood within the larger context of Ethiopia where scholars have long noted the historically peaceful interaction of Muslims and Christians. Orthodox Christianity, related to the Egyptian Coptic Church, has been the state religion since the fourth century CE. The Orthodox emperor welcomed the first Islamic refugees, sent by the Prophet Mohammed himself, seeking peace and safety. Ethiopian Muslims soon began to play critical economic roles and formed interdependent relationships within the larger Orthodox society, though remaining a marginalized minority.[11] Jon Abbink writes that Ethiopian Islam and Orthodoxy developed in relationship to one another, within “one ideological-religious framework, rooted in a multi-ethnic Ethiopian culture.”[12]

Ethiopians in their local communities have long participated in a practical, everyday ethos of religious tolerance and coexistence, in spite of violent political confrontation and instances of forced conversion at the state level. Muslims helped to build an Ethiopian folk culture, largely through the practice of mystic Sufism, the most open, tolerant and flexible form of Islam.[13] A common religious culture, including pilgrimages, shrines, saints and fasting, allowed Muslims and Christians to assert separate identities within a system of mutual understanding, even while experiencing ongoing tensions.[14]

Harar, located at the intersection of the northern Christian highlands and the eastern Muslim lowlands, was the site of some of the earliest Muslim-Christian interactions in Ethiopia. It serves as an early model for the historical development of relatively peaceful intercommunal relations. The founding tradition of the city recounts the story of Saint
Abadir, who came from the Arabian Peninsula, united the warring local peoples and
introduced Islam around 940-950. In the following centuries a number of Muslim city-
states emerged as trade centers on the Haraghe Plateau. Harar, as the capital of the Kingdom
of Adal, served as one of the main links between the Red Sea/Indian Ocean coast and the
Ethiopian highlands. As the strength of these peaceful Islamic trading kingdoms grew, they
began to challenge the Christian empire. In the sixteenth century, the Muslim leader, Imam
Ahmad ibn Ibrahim came close to overtaking the Christian empire in a campaign that lasted
from 1529 to 1543. After Imam Ahmad was killed, and his army destroyed, what was
left of his force retreated to Harar. The Imam’s nephew, and his second in command, Amir
Nur, built the wall around the city in 1567, not from fear of the empire’s retaliation, but
rather because of increased movement of Oromo pastoralists from the south into the region
(1530-40).

Muslims in Harar did not have sustained day-to-day interaction with Christians until 1887,
but as the people of the city began identifying themselves as ethnic Harari, who spoke a
unique Semitic language among surrounding Cushitic-speakers, they laid the foundation for
interdependent relations across communal lines. Harar had become an isolated Emirate
unto itself when non-Muslim Oromo besieged the city, forcing its inhabitants to retreat into
a dense settlement inside the wall. The Oromo finally allowed the city its independence in
return for market privileges as a source of commerce, particularly in salt and cloth. Also,
in order to carry on trade to the port at Zeila, Harari maintained alliances with Somali
“caravan protectors” under the unifying force of Islam. Records from the Emirs’ households
from the seventeenth century on demonstrate numerous alliances with Oromo and other
non-Harari, principally through kinship, including intermarriage and adoptive brotherhood.
The Harari assertion of cultural difference as ge usu, or “people of the city,” allowed
them not only to control trade but also to control the assimilation of others into the city. The
“city people” subsisted by intensive farming, irrigating fields within a few kilometers of the
wall and employing Oromo workers (qottu). Other Oromo in the rural areas grew
wealthy and powerful through their alliances with Harari Emirs, gaining titles and the right
to tax peasants, which allowed for the gradual spread of agriculture and closer ties to the
market. Thus the basic patterns of interdependence were foundational to the city’s
development.

Egyptians conquered Harar in 1875, which gave support to the growing power of Harari
Muslims to dominate long established intercommunal relations and convert the Oromo to Islam. The Egyptians gave Harari rights to rural land by conquest, which the Harari in turn divided out to their Oromo clients. Harari also gained dominance by reviving trade along caravan routes guarded by Egypt, lessening the need for alliances to carry on trade. During this period Oromo in the rural areas of Harar increasingly adopted settled agriculture, paid tribute and converted to Islam through the work of Harari missionaries. As an Historian of Islam, J. Spencer Trimmingham characterizes Harar as having “done more to spread Islam over southern Ethiopia than any other agency.” In spite of these shifts in power, Harari emirs were still forced to make alliances of brotherhood with the powerful Oromo clans for their own safety. Rural Oromo maintained their autonomy and religious traditions until Egyptian rule forced their conversion to Islam and introduced cash crops, which further increased dependence on the city. City demographics demonstrate the mixed nature of the city even at this time with 3,000 Amhara Christians, 5,000 Somali Muslims, a handful of Arab, Turkish, Greek, Indian, Syrian, Italian and Armenian traders, and French missionaries all living among 25,000 Harari Muslims. Harar was then larger than Addis Ababa, the capital of the Ethiopian Empire.

Antagonistic Muslim-Christian relations arose with the conquest of Harar by Christian Emperor Menelik who defeated the Emir’s forces at the battle of Chelenko in 1887. As a symbolic assertion of Ethiopian power, the main mosque was immediately destroyed and the Medhane Alem (Savior of the World) Orthodox Church built in its place at the center of the city. Even today the conquest is bitterly remembered in the red floors of every Harari home, the stripe of red in the blanket given to every bridegroom by his mother-in-law, symbolizing the blood of martyrs, and by the monument to the Martyrs of Chelenko erected in front of the Orthodox Church in the central square at the Ethiopian millennium celebrations in 2008. Ethiopian political rule was equated with Amhara ethnicity and Orthodox Christian religion. In fact, many of the soldiers who fought with Menelik were highland Oromo, known in Harar as “Amhara” because they were Christians and loyalists. Muslims resented the Amhara, who began to move in as administrators and soldiers to build outside the walled city, marginalizing Harari in their own country. These hostile relationships brought about an Islamic revival with more rigid expectations about dress, drink, and intermarriage. With Menelik’s conquest, Islam became an ideology of resistance that encouraged the mass conversion of the majority of Oromo and their reconciliation with
Harari in opposition to Christian outsiders.\[^{30}\]

In spite of the underlying resentment, Harari Muslims had to come to terms with, and eventually to open their neighborhoods to, Amhara Christians in order to retain their power in the city. The first governor, Ras Mekonnen, established a system of indirect rule, using local notables as his administrators and allowing Harari to retain their land in and around the city.\[^{31}\] The Emperor claimed and distributed land in the rural areas to soldiers and civil servants in place of salaries, encouraging Christians to immigrate. By the 1930s some indications of land scarcity were already apparent in the rural areas, even as the land was measured and the “surplus” distributed to settlers and to the Orthodox Church.\[^{32}\] A large garrison of soldiers posted in Harar, due to its strategic value as the main commercial access to the sea and international trade, imposed an enforced peace.\[^{33}\] Many Harari supported the emperor, Lej Iyasu, who ascended to the throne after Menelik in 1913 because he promoted the incorporation of Muslims in state politics.\[^{34}\] But, because of his alleged conversion to Islam, a coup resulted in Christians killing hundreds of Harari and Somali Muslims on what has become known as “Somali Black Monday.” This tragedy opened housing in the walled city to Christians as Harari left or lost their homes, leading to Harar’s first integrated neighborhoods.\[^{35}\]

Under Emperor Haile Selassie, Muslims throughout Ethiopia were treated as second class citizens, even as aliens, in a state whose identity was overwhelmingly tied to Orthodox Christianity and Amhara ethnicity. In many places Muslims couldn’t own land, observe religious holidays, serve in the army or participate in politics. They were largely traders and craftsmen—occupations despised by Orthodox Christians. However, state policy sought to assimilate Muslims, gradually ameliorating discriminatory laws.\[^{36}\] Assimilation was also an affront to Muslim pride and many Harari remembered Haile Selassie’s reign as a time of continued Christian domination and the suppression of local identity.\[^{37}\] But Harari hopes were resuscitated again during the Italian occupation (1936-1941) when Muslims were favored and were able to build more mosques throughout the country. During the Italian occupation, Harari moved away from agriculture to full dependence on trade as they took over shops from their Greek, Armenian, Arab, and Indian employers. Eventual Harari class domination over others in the city can be traced to this period of prosperity and freedom.\[^{38}\] When Haile Selassie regained the throne after the occupation, he came down hard on Italian collaborators. In 1948 a significant rebellion of Harari (with Somali allies) against the
empire resulted in imprisonment and loss of property, wealth, and life for many.\[39\]

Historian Timothy Carmichael describes this 1948 movement (Kulub or Hanolato) as “the central defining event of twentieth century Harari history.”\[40\] It was also the beginning of the first Harari migration out of the walled city, breaking their close connection to place. By 1977 more Harari lived in Addis Ababa than in Harar. The brutal suppression of that resistance is a live memory in Harar today.\[41\]

Given this antagonistic history one might wonder how Muslims and Christians built any common associations at all. Indeed many scholars have interpreted the imperial period in Harar as one of Muslim separation and isolation, strengthening intracommunal rather than intercommunal associations. Some people we talked to also declared Harari to be an exclusive in-group who do not intermarry or associate with others in the same neighborhood, remembering times of violence between the communities.\[42\] The pioneering ethnography of Sidney Waldron, in the last years of Haile Selassie’s reign (1973-4), depicts a self-contained ethnic Harari community within the walls (Jugol). He asserts that they carefully controlled their boundaries through the three social institutions of kinship, friendship and intracommunal neighborhood associations.\[43\] Wolf Leslau’s interviews with Harari elders in 1965 reiterated the sentiment that, “The Muslim adheres to his Muslim way of life and the Christian to his Christian way of life.” Harari elders told him that “the gates are closed and no outsiders could enter.”\[44\] Carmichael also describes Harari identity as one of upper class prestige, with its own exclusive language, and where anyone who converted to Christianity would be “considered dead.”\[45\] The Harari diaspora is also responsible for promoting this exclusive view of Harari identity.\[46\] Yet inconsistencies in this picture of a hermetically sealed religious community have convinced other scholars that Muslim-Christian association has been developing over the long term. Anthropologist Camilla Gibb, who conducted research during the period of the communist government, demonstrated that Harari have always been able to cooperate with and assimilate others. Anyone who learned the Harari language, converted to Islam, had wealth and property, assimilated the culture, and married a Harari could become ge usu, “a person of the city.” In fact in the earliest Harari dictionaries the word ge limaad is defined as “one who is learning the ways of the city,” a term used by assimilated Harari today, even some who are not Muslim. The Harari use of shallow genealogies, remembering only a few generations, serves to mask the assimilation of strangers under the fiction of ethnic purity.\[47\] A number
of people said that Harar is a place, not an ethnicity.\(^{[48]}\)

While the city became more integrated during the communist period (1974-91), it is also clear that boundaries were not impermeable before that time. During our interviews we talked to Harari who said that in the 1960s, or even before, they had close Amhara friends and neighbors with whom they met regularly in groups to chew chat (a leaf used throughout the region as a mild stimulant). Amhara acted as groomsmen at their weddings and were members of their music bands.\(^{[49]}\) At that time some housing integration existed within the walled city. Leslau reported that in 1965, at the lower gates near the wall where the houses were of poorer quality, there lived Amhara Christian women who sold beer, rural (Oromo) immigrants, Somali Muslims, and blacksmiths.\(^{[50]}\) It is thus clear that the robust Muslim-Christian associations visible today have their roots in the imperial period, if only tentatively.

With the communist revolution in 1974, Harar’s people, as others in Ethiopia, experienced increased class and state level conflict, but, paradoxically, closer integration of Muslim and Christian communities.\(^{[51]}\) The Marxist regime, known as the Derg, suppressed all religions, but, as a result, equalized Islam and Christianity, at least in their sense of oppression.\(^{[52]}\) Harari desire for autonomy from the state reemerged in various opposition movements and continued cooperation with the Western Somali Liberation Front. The exodus of young, wealthy and educated Harari continued during the revolution, to exile outside of the country.\(^{[53]}\) Even prior to this time, many Harari Muslims gained an education in the Middle East through scholarships in Islamic universities where they felt a heightened sense of their global Islamic identity.\(^{[54]}\) Many Harari and Somali remember the Derg years as a time of persecution when their relatives died in prison or fled across the Somali border, which was a conduit to the west.\(^{[55]}\) At the same time, integration within the city accelerated after 1974. As a result of Harari migration and the redistribution of land, including additional urban properties, many more Christians began renting houses within the walled city, and neighborhoods became much less religiously exclusive. With their class privileges taken away and declining economic power, Harari needed alliances again to survive and could not afford to isolate themselves.\(^{[56]}\)

Economically, too, the revolution brought increased intercommunal cooperation between the city and the countryside. With communist land redistribution in the rural areas Harari
(and Amhara) lost their land, while peasants who got land could improve it and choose what to plant. Thus Oromo Muslims came to dominate and control the local produce trade, including chat. Many Oromo decided that it made economic sense to grow chat as a cash crop and buy their food at subsidized prices in the city. While the Derg government began to regulate the price of coffee, making it much less profitable, chat was smuggled across the border to Djibouti, bringing a high price. With chat profits, Oromo smugglers could then bring contraband manufactured goods back across the border to sell in Harar. Thus the economy of the whole region flourished around this illegal cross border trade that involved the cooperation of many communities, including Oromo producers in the rural areas, urban Harari and Amhara buyers, Somali transporters and Gurage contraband traders. This remained a fairly democratic process, since small operators were competitive with the larger operators. People from all classes, religions and ethnicities had a piece of this lucrative trade, especially young men looking for opportunity.[57]

The fall of the Derg government in 1991 brought new opportunities as well as challenges for intercommunal association. Soon after the present Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) came to power, they instituted a federal system based on ethno-linguistically-based regions and political decentralization. As a result, ethnicity, with religion as a subset, became politicized as the basis for democratic expression in Ethiopia today. Harari and Oromo now had the right to go to school and do official business in their own language.[58] Specific policy changes instituted religious freedom, making Islam equal to Christianity in the public sphere and recognizing the Supreme Council of Muslim Affairs. Harar and its immediate hinterland became an autonomous region (Region 13) called The Harari People’s National Regional State, which included the city and the surrounding seventeen Oromo Farmer’s Associations.[59] Harari, who now represent only a minority, even in the city, rule this region on the basis of their historical claim. According to the 2007 census, the total regional population is 183,344. Of that number, 99,321 people live in the urban area, and of the urban population only 12 percent is ethnic Harari, with 40 percent Amhara, 29 percent Oromo, 8 percent Gurage, and 7 percent Somali, and 4 percent other. Muslims are also a minority at 45 percent of the urban population, with Orthodox 49 percent, Protestant 6 percent and Catholic .5 percent, making the balance of power precarious at best.[60]

In order to keep from being swallowed up by the demographically dominant Oromo in the
neighboring region of Oromiya, Harari found it expedient to form an alliance with the Christian government in Addis Ababa. Since that time Harar has experienced an ethnic revival of pride in Harari history and culture with a proliferation of museums, cultural festivals, and tourism, all overseen by the Cultural Affairs Bureau. At the same time, Harar is experiencing a religious revival among both Muslims and Christians, which has heightened tensions within the city. Ethiopia has long been resistant to the influx of more radical Muslim fundamentalist movements from the Middle East, yet many fear that the balance has shifted since 2001 with outbreaks in Ethiopia of Muslim/Christian violence in various cities.\[61\]

It is thus clear that communal identities as well as intercommunal relations have changed over time and in relation to one another. An exclusive Harari Muslim identity within the walls may only date to the Empire’s conquest in 1887, while a more tolerant ethos developed during the post-1974 years of the revolution. Yet even with these ebbs and flows, underlying institutions of associational life based on mutual interests evolved, which set the context for interactions that required coexistence while still asserting difference. What is most amazing about this rich history of relations between Muslims and Christians in Harar is that in spite of the obvious political antagonisms and strong potential for violence, people at the grassroots level, managed to build and maintain a culture of peace and tolerance over the long term.

**Informal Muslim-Christian Associations as the Basis for Peace in Harar**

Varshney posits that networks of intercommunal association foster peace because they provide the mechanisms for channeling and resolving the inevitable tensions of plural societies without violence. Civil society associations bring people from different backgrounds into face-to-face contact where they have access to information from the other side. This serves to constrain those who seek to mobilize identity for their own interests. When conflict breaks out, rumors spread quickly within intracommunal channels, fanning the flames of violence. Intercommunal associations, however, facilitate communication across religious and ethnic lines. These associations are able to quash rumors, keep law enforcement informed, police their own neighborhoods, organize peace committees, cool tempers, and mediate conflict because they have a vested interest in maintaining peace.\[62\] Other theories attribute peace in the community to the maintenance of networks through
which information travels. If those networks include people from the “other” side, it becomes much harder to spread damaging information.\[63\] Varshey’s study teaches us that difference by itself does not produce violence and does not have to be minimized to avoid violence. Maintaining peace, rather, depends on the “thickness” of relationships across those boundaries.\[64\]

In Harar, the most obvious forms of intercommunal association are the informal and everyday interactions of diverse people in the city. Although one can hear similar stories of coexistence throughout Ethiopia, it is especially notable in Harar where citizens talk frequently about growing up with people from different religious and ethnic background as neighbors and friends. They enjoy celebrating religious holidays together, both Muslim and Christian, and attending each others’ weddings and funerals. Both Muslims and Christians affirmed that their culture teaches tolerance and peaceful coexistence, noting the remarkable show of civility in Harar during the tense period after the fall of the communist government. In general, people were anxious to let us know that Harar is a place of affection and love for all, including strangers, where people care for peace and also desire to carry on their way of life.\[65\] The sentiment of a Somali woman who said, “Peace is not imposed by the government; you learn civility and love for others from your parents,” was echoed by many others.\[66\] These sentiments are especially remarkable given the contested history of Christian domination in Harar.

The space of the city with its imposing dividing wall, which ostensibly separated the old Muslim city inside from the new Christian city outside, is laid out to accommodate interaction without minimizing difference. Historically, each of the long-distance trade routes entered the city through five gates, locked and guarded each night. Each gate was associated with the tomb of a saint and corresponded to five main city sections, each of which housed one of the grand mosques.\[67\] Yet, the gate itself was not just a barrier or boundary, but also a space of interaction between city dwellers from inside and farmers, herders, and traders from outside the walls. Each gate had a spring and a reservoir for irrigation where people came to draw household water, bathe, and wash clothes. Each gate also hosted a market that attracted sellers and buyers from the surrounding area. The sixth gate, cut into the wall after the Imperial Conquest in 1887, provided entrance for the first motor road, which became the main business street.\[68\] Originally a Muslim walled city, Christians have increasingly made their homes inside the wall since the conquest, while
Muslims continue to find more modern accommodation outside the city walls.\[69\]

Neighborhoods within the five quarters of the city, where Muslims and Christians increasingly live side by side, facilitate informal intercommunal association critical for peace. Some neighborhoods may be favored by a certain ethnic or religious group, but none is homogenous and all are integrated at the most intimate level. Harar thus provides a contrast to other pre-industrial Muslim cities characterized by separate and semi-autonomous ethnic, religious, or occupational quarters.\[70\] Neighborhoods developed a common identity around their local shrine and, regardless of religion, all cooperated to keep the streets clean and the shrine maintained.\[71\] The narrow winding streets of Harar follow high walls, where doors occasionally open into the compounds of multiple family houses built around a common courtyard. Many compounds contain both Christian and Muslim households of various ethnic groups who get along like family, calling each other by kinship names.\[72\] Women assume family relations with their neighbors by disciplining their children, nursing their babies, taking coals from their fires, and borrowing implements or food.\[73\] Both Christians and Muslims said their families raised children from another faith in their homes, often for reasons of education or out of personal obligation.\[74\] Many concurred that a tradition of tolerance and hospitality comes simply from living together in close proximity for so long.\[75\] Living together facilitated the formation of informal association but the interdependence of these communities pushed them beyond mere tolerance.

As a sign of intimate and sustained association, interviews in Harar overwhelmingly attested to the significance of eating together was a way of building peace. Sharing food has particular significance in the Ethiopian context where Muslims and Christians each have their own strict dietary laws, particularly concerning meat and its preparation.\[76\] Muslim and Christian neighbors invite each other for weddings, funerals, feasts, and holidays by cooking separate meat and paying attention to each other’s ritual prohibitions.\[77\] Every person we spoke with, formally or informally, from shoe shine boys to market retailers to the senior advisor to the regional government and the Deputy Speaker of the House, mentioned the source of their intercommunal relationships as “having eaten and drunk together.”\[78\] The value of sharing a meal in Ethiopia not only has its social value but also a spiritual dimension. As the saying goes in Ethiopia, “You do not bite the hand that has fed you.” Christians related how their families took sugar, fruits and milk to visit their Muslim
friends during Ramadan, while Muslims brought rice and other food to them during the Christian fasts. Another man noted that during the construction of his new house he killed two sheep – one following the prescription for each religion. At this most basic level, food facilitated interaction.

Friendships across communal lines were formed in the streets and in mixed schools, often leading to lifelong relationships. Schools and sports are important integration forces as Muslims and Christians study, play together, and visit the homes of their friends. A Muslim said that in the past there were some tensions and minor confrontations when adherents of one faith or the other tried to use the schools to promote their faith, but that this has been solved. In civic education classes, the schools now teach the importance of co-existence and the equality of religion, race, and gender. Harar’s old tradition of friendship groups who meet together regularly along religious lines, either daily or weekly (bercha), to chew chat or drink coffee as they discuss the local news, now often include members from different religious and ethnic groups. Coffee is brewed after a day of work or on weekends for people in the compound or for any guests.

Each chat group has its own character, and in the past was restricted to older Muslim men. A teacher who was a member of a chat group with others from his school said that chat makes people relaxed. In one chat ceremony, we found a group that included a Tigrean taxi driver, an Oromo woman, a Somali woman, an Amhara from Addis Ababa and a Harari. All of them participated in a vigorous discussion about politics and Muslim-Christian relations. One Somali Muslim man said that he was known by the nickname of “Amhara” because his friends from the police force were all Amhara (Christian). While Waldron documented the central integrative importance of friendship groups in Harar, his understanding of them as exclusively intracommunal cannot be supported. Mixed friendship groups became more common with increased integration of neighborhoods; however the institution accommodated this possibility even earlier and was easily adapted to new circumstances.

Sociologists have long identified intermarriage as a primary indicator of intercommunal integration, since it unites families as well as individuals. One empirical study in the former Yugoslavia found that the popular perception of widespread and increasing intermarriage was exaggerated; in reality rates of intermarriage were quite low and static, leading to a lack
of intercommunal associations when the genocide occurred. While statistical data on intermarriage in Harar is not available, our interviews indicate a high level of intermarriage despite religious prohibitions against it. A number of accounts indicate that the Harari have long used intermarriage as a way to assimilate strangers on their way to becoming “a person of the city” and erasing their identity as outsiders. A Somali woman said, in order to be Harari you just marry a Harari and “change your clothes.” Many said that there are no “pure” Harari and that the children of a mixed Harari marriage become Harari. Yet some Oromo countered that Harari discriminated against them in marriage, based on class, even though they are both Muslim. Strategically arranged marriages to other religious groups go back hundreds of years at least among the Emir’s family. Although many of those we talked with indicated that marriages between Muslims and Christians are frowned upon and practically difficult, they all had examples in their own families, even in their grandparents’ generation. Often mixed marriages resulted in one or the other converting and changing his or her name so that the family could be united. We talked to a number of people from mixed families, with stories of both accommodation and suffering. While rules about intermarriage became stricter with the revival of Islam after the Ethiopian conquest, our interviews indicate that intermarriage has increased since the revolution.

Harar’s more than 100 Sufi shrines of saints function as another critical space of intercommunal association and integration. Shrines range from elaborate worship spaces with a tomb to small niches in the wall or a tree, where one can make an offering. The saints, or literally the “fathers,” venerated at these shrines are the founders and protectors of the city. The caretakers of the shrines (murids) are descendents of the saints themselves and in the past were supported by produce from land owned by the shrines. Since the revolution the shrines rely on the offerings of pilgrims who come to the saint for help with an illness, a family problem, rain, fertility, prosperity, or to gain blessing. Women’s associations also take food and drink to the shrine on the saint’s day. Although these are Muslim saints, they often came from other places around the region and all are claimed by the city, welcoming anyone to pray, even Emperor Haile Selassie on a number of occasions. Gibb reports that of the more than 200 saints enshrined in the city, 57 are Harari, 46 Arab, 41 Oromo, and 29 Somali, while at least 40 female saints are known, largely to women. Everyone, women and men, Muslim and Christian, go to the shrine when there is a crisis or at regular times of all-night prayers and songs. Poor Muslims may
come on pilgrimage to a shrine at Harar in lieu of the haj to Mecca. Shrines serve as a place of refuge for the poorest and the homeless, who are fed from donated food.[95] People from every class, gender, religion and ethnicity meet at and respect the shrines.

The city’s history of peaceful, intercommunal association is remembered and defended in the accounts of its local saints, both Muslim and Christian. The best known shrine in Harar houses the tomb of its founding saint, Abadir, whose spirit was credited by many with keeping the city’s peace.[96] As one woman put it, “Abadir is for all of us.” Muslim and Christian, Oromo, Harari or Amhara pray under the same roof.[97] In addition to the inclusive Muslim shrines, Muslims also attend Christian shrines, with Kulubi Gabriel church outside of Harar being the most famous. One Muslim man we talked to told about experiences in his youth of attending Orthodox ceremonies and even spending the night at the celebration.[98] Near the city, the Orthodox Church has a site for holy water where all come for healing. In fact, the oldest Christian shrine in the walled city is the Catholic Church, which predates Orthodox presence.[99] Some of our informants acknowledged that a Muslim women’s group comes to the Orthodox Church at the center of the city (Medhane Alem) to pray at an ancient Muslim shrine that dates back to the time when the mosque first sat on this site.[100] One of the caretakers at the Aw Jalan shrine told us that the saints protect the peace of the city, and if anyone disturbs the shrines, the saints will strike them down. The protection extends against all who bring violence. As one elderly woman recounted, “The spirits of the shrines closed the eyes of the Amhara when they invaded.”[101] Although the intercommunal function of the shrines may now be diminished because fewer people visit them, the shrines are promoted and preserved by the Harar Cultural Bureau for tourism.[102]

Another significant informal intercommunal strength in Harar is the market places where all meet and mix to exchange goods and information. Like pre-modern urban centers everywhere, the free exchange of goods and services depend on the understandings between people of various nationalities, religions, and ethnic groups.[103] Leslau’s Harari informants in 1965 said that one could hear at least five languages spoken in any of Harar’s markets. While Harari have been the main shop keepers since the Italian occupation, others brought produce from the countryside to sell.[104] One woman said that becoming a trade center has broadened the minds of the Harari. Some of the retailers in the market said they meet and interact with people of other faiths each day and their business depends on the stability of
those relations. Most of the small informal traders on the street are Oromo women, while Oromo men now largely control the long distance food and produce wholesale trade. Harari have no monopoly on trade, and associations do not keep others out of business. The chat trade in particular keeps lots of people from all ethnic and religious groups employed. Overall, trade in Harar still relies on trust rather than formal contracts, and hence all have a critical interest in peace. As one merchant commented, “If the belly is full there will be peace,” while another noted, “in trade there is no war.”

All of these informal networks of association depend on the spatial integration of Harar, especially since the revolution in 1974. Once Muslims and Christians began to live in the same neighborhoods, they extended their habits of communal life, such as eating together, to the strangers among them. Neighborhood compounds, friendship groups, marriage, and worship at shrines all became increasingly intercommunal as housing options opened up for non-Muslims in the city. This happened in spite of the fact that people had the extra expense and time to prepare separate meats for the other and learn to respect their religious calendar and ritual requirements. Yet, over the last millennium, Harari also developed mechanisms for assimilating strangers when their survival depended on interdependent relations with those surrounding the wall. Sufi Islam, even without prominent brotherhood groups common elsewhere, facilitated a much more tolerant and flexible approach to religious interaction, and the emerging structure of commerce assured the material interests of intercommunal association. Evidence of long term informal association at a deep level comes from an elderly Harari woman, over 100 years old, who said that during the Italian occupation (1936-1941) Muslims hid Christians in their homes and dressed them as Harari so they would not be killed.

The Institutional Strength of Formal Associations

As foundational as these informal institutions of daily intercommunal association are in creating a culture of peace, Varshney’s study of peace-prone cities in India puts more emphasis on formal associations, which are recognized organizations with an ongoing structure, membership and leadership. While informal association works well when people know each other’s names, it becomes less effective in large cities, where even people in the same neighborhood can be anonymous. That said, Harar is still small enough that informal face-to-face relations are still possible. Certainly while we were in Harar it was not long
before most people recognized us on the street and news spread of our interviews quite quickly through informal channels. However, Varshney’s claim is valid, even in an intimate setting like Harar. Formal associations give an institutional legitimacy and interest in efforts to manage tensions across ethnic lines. Formal associations serve to link more people than is possible in face-to-face interactions. Historically formal associations in Harar have been politically suppressed. During Haile Selassie’s reign only burial (afocha) and music (mugad) associations were allowed to function openly, while under the Derg formal associational life outside the party was almost impossible. On a more positive note, both Harar’s informal and formal associations today incorporate people across class lines. Varshney’s comparison of Lucknow and Hyderabad found that mass organizations were much more effective for maintaining peace than associations at the elite level. These particular elements characterize the development of an incredible set of formal civic organizations in Harar.

The most influential and ubiquitous of Harar’s formal intercommunal associations are the many burial associations, called iddir or afocha, in which members contribute money and time to help each other with funerals, weddings, or life crises. In recent years burial associations are increasingly expanding to help with a variety of social welfare initiatives, such as care of the elderly, healthcare, and gang control. One youth we talked to said that the burial association functions to mobilize community assistance when someone faces a sudden tragedy or accident. A Harari Muslim man said that, apart from the mosque, the afocha is the single most important social organization for the Harari and a critical mechanism of identity formation and social control. He told a story from his childhood about skipping school and smoking cigarettes. His father found out about the incident and said, “My son, you are son of the afocha and there are many eyes watching you!” He called the burial association the great social equalizer since everyone, regardless of their status or class, was subjected to the same rules and regulations of mutual aid. Every adult, male or female, in Harar is a member of a burial association. Many have noted the important role of Afocha in exchanging news of the community and enforcing proper social conduct. People spoke about burial associations variously as a social safety net, the primary means of preserving culture and as a political forum.

Waldron’s analysis of Harari afocha as exclusively intracommunal must also be revised in the current context of integrated neighborhoods. Since funerals and weddings are performed
within a religious tradition, these burial associations are formally either Christian (iddir) or Muslim (afocha). Those we interviewed agreed that afocha have a more religious orientation while iddir are largely social, and certainly Harari afocha during the Haile Selassie years were more exclusively Muslim than at present. But at the time of our interviews, and to some extent before, afocha based in mixed neighborhoods also had mixed membership. Afocha, in fact, means “neighbor.” One Harari man explained the difference between the community or neighborhood afocha (for anyone in the area, regardless of faith or ethnicity) and the main or “big” afocha, which unites the smaller units (whose members are all Muslim, but from various ethnic groups). The same was also said for the iddir. A Muslim woman said she was a member of both an afocha and an iddir. One well known iddir in Harar has about 400 members, most of whom are Christian, but which also includes Muslims. It must be said, however, that the opposite happens as well. We learned of a Muslim woman who married an Orthodox man and was denied membership in the afocha as a result. The distribution of iddir and afocha throughout the city, inside and outside the walls, shows the mixed nature of the city. There are seventy-eight legally registered burial societies, with fifty-two iddir and forty-six afocha on the joint committee’s list, and anywhere from one to twelve burial societies in any of the eighteen urban administrative units. Furthermore, because of integrated neighborhoods, people attend each other’s funerals and weddings across religious boundaries, whether they are part of the same burial association or not.

Although we could not ascertain the age of burial associations, many claim to go back before the beginning of the twentieth century. Anthropologist Elisabeth-Dorthea Hecht’s study of voluntary associations found no specific mention of afocha in Harar’s earliest written accounts, in spite of the fact that similar mutual aid relations certainly existed. Although Harari claim that afocha goes back to “time immemorial” she found only one all female afocha that could be traced through three generations (or ninety years). The problem is that afocha split, dissolve, or form anew according to membership changes, making it impossible to document long term continuity. We were not able to get membership books that went back before the turn of the century, although we found a burial society list of eighty associations in which some claimed to originate as far back as 1850. Sociologist Alula Pankhurst’s exploration of iddir in Addis Ababa documented their origin around the turn of the twentieth century in relation to immigration to the city.
case of Harar, which has been urbanized for at least at thousand years, we can only say with
certainty that afocha has been in formal existence at least since the time of the Egyptian
occupation (1875-84), and may well have begun as a response to rapid changes at the time.
Because afocha took on the particular western bureaucratic forms of electing officers, and
keeping minutes and membership lists at the beginning of the twentieth century, it is hard to
tell whether other forms of mutual aid associations existed before that time.[124]

Even as an exclusively Muslim intracommunal association, the All-Afocha Committee of
Harar (the “big afocha”) has played a critical role in regulating afocha organizations and
resolving conflict within member groups since its origin in the Derg years, having had the
same chairman for thirty-one years.[125] An earlier union of afocha dates back to the 1920s
when the Harari community found itself under pressure, and a group of more educated,
progressive, Islamist elite called the Firmach (“the Signers”) presented a document to the
community to reform Harari culture. The success of the Firmach in reducing funeral and
wedding expenses, removing the stigma of despised occupations, and supporting the
establishment of Islamic schools in the 1920’s and 30’s is an important example of the
ability of intracommunal associations to police the behavior of their own people and address
social/cultural issues.[126] Other pan-afocha meetings were held in 1957, 1970 and 1975 to
address issues, such as the disruptive behavior of youth at weddings or reform in Islamic
schools, and to connect to similar nationwide movements.[127] At a much earlier date, a
meeting of “afocha from the Five Quarters” was allegedly called in 1856 to overthrow the
Emir.[128] At the intercommunal level, a joint iddir-afocha committee, consisting of seven
members representing fifty iddir and seven representing forty-two afocha, formed to work
against the AIDS epidemic in 2004-2005. Since that time the committee has taken on other
development tasks, supported by the government and often playing the role of a
representative body from the city. The joint committee has also functioned to care for elders
and raise funds for disaster relief. In spite of these efforts, some have felt that the informal
nature of the burial associations and a distrust of government sponsorship has inhibited their
usefulness as a vehicle for successfully addressing local development issues.[129]

In the event of conflict between communities, the burial associations are often the most
effective means for resolution. Leaders of burial associations are respected elders in
neighborhoods, serving as representatives in community affairs and as mediators for settling
disputes in the community, often between Muslims and Christians. One woman said there
was no need for courts if you had the afocha, even for domestic conflict. In their role as burial society leaders, they can impose fines or other sanctions to enforce their decisions. For example, one man said that the burial associations would not tolerate members who spread rumors, expelling them after three warnings. The All-Afocha committee chair said that he frequently presides over cases of individuals from all faith and ethnic backgrounds who come to him for reconciliation through a formal mediation process because of his respected reputation. As local representatives, burial associations also mediate between the community and the government.

In addition to burial associations, people also noted trade, work, school, office and neighborhood associations (mahabar or jama’a). Neighborhoods and workplaces often support revolving credit associations (ikob), among others. One teacher who said he avoided other associations is a member of a teachers’ association whose credit organization had capital of half a million Ethiopian birr ($57,471), as well as an iddir in which about 75 percent of teachers were members, including teachers of all backgrounds. There are at least four different trade and various business associations in Harar that accept members irrespective of religious or ethnic background. The city has an older history of formal associations, including Harari wedding bands (mugad) with Amhara members and mixed women’s basket weaving groups during the Haile Selassie era. We heard of a few specifically ethnic intracommunal associations, such as a Somali development association (for land), an Oromo afocha and an Oromo mutual aid association. But most of these associations are open to members from all religions. Even the current ruling party, the Harari National League, has active Christian participants.

Women in Harar are also deeply involved in a variety of associations, including their own afocha, which seem to be even more mixed in membership than men’s associations. One elderly woman remembered a Christian woman in her neighborhood, called “auntie” by the children, who spoke Harari and joined the afocha. Women use associations to get practical and emotional help in the neighborhood for their everyday tasks, large ritual events, and even for domestic abuse. Hecht’s study of women’s voluntary associations—from credit associations (baha) to friendship groups—right after the revolution asserts that these were the “most prominent feature of the social life of the Harari.” Women’s rotating credit associations became popular among younger women at the time of the Italian occupation because it freed them from the control of the older generation through the
afocha. Today, modernizing women form groups, such as the “Smart Women’s Aerobics Association,” with mixed membership. Documents going back to the nineteenth century consistently portray the relative independence of Harari women within a Muslim society. For example, they have not practiced seclusion or wearing veils. Also, a woman is free to welcome a man into her home when she is alone, obtain religious learning, take political leadership, and own a business or land. However women also noted that they still maintained low levels of polygamy, prostitution, and divorce. Associations augmented this independence by allowing women to visit friends and circulate within the city. When I visited a women’s association that met to supplement aid given by the afocha and to help each other in their small businesses, it was obvious that much of their purpose for getting together was to socialize. An umbrella organization in the city works with all women’s groups (of all religions and ethnicities), but mostly credit associations. In the past, women have also used their afocha to organize for unified protest against government action. As an example of women’s assertive use of associations, the chair of the Harari Region Women’s Association, formed with the EPRDF government, was elected to the regional parliament and served as the interim president.

Although the years of the revolution encouraged informal association at the neighborhood level, it specifically repressed formal civil society associations, which were legalized when the EPRDF government came to power and have since blossomed all over the city. A list of associations in the city show 534 in total—182 youth organizations, 118 burial societies, 70 anti-AIDS groups, and 155 other associations organized along political, economic, gender, ethnic, regional and other lines. The Youth Empowerment Office coordinates youth groups in the city while another organization does the same for women’s associations. A new NGO called Interfaith Peacebuilding Initiative is made up of representatives from all religions and opened a branch about a year ago in Harar. With civil society legislation these organizations are registered by the government and encouraged to seek outside aid. Perhaps the most impressive of these new formal associations in Harar are youth organizations. We visited a number of youth groups, all of which had mixed memberships and all of which said they worked to keep the peace in Harar, even if that was not specifically their agenda. Many of these organizations originated to address current issues, including the Gende Fero Muslim Youth Anti-AIDS Association, which also includes Christian members. One youth group concerned about gang violence between neighborhoods got together those involved in the conflict to come up with a peace
agreement. They also patrolled the streets at night with policemen. Other youth groups were involved with sports, recreation, libraries, tutoring, school support, the arts, income generation or job creation, and inviting other youth groups for special occasions. Youth groups reported various sources for funding, including a Harari Association in Canada, local merchants, US AID and other NGOs. One of the youth associations was located in an outlying suburb housing new immigrants to the city where youth criminal activity had gone unchecked. This case was similar to Varshney’s example of violence in the shantytowns of Surat where intercommunal associations had not developed and young single men predominated. In this case, the association leaders said that youth were too busy with income-generating projects to fight each other now. The proliferation of these associations is new, but the soil in which they have flourished so quickly has certainly been prepared by a long history of strong associational life.

The evidence for both informal and formal intercommunal associations as the basis for Muslim-Christian peace in Harar is overwhelming. Peace in Harar is not caused by minimizing religious difference. Muslims and Christians in Harar maintain strong religious identities, visible in their outward appearances as well as their everyday practices. Nor is peace the result of a history without conflict between religious communities. The history of Harar is still largely remembered as an unjust and bloody conquest of a Muslim community by a Christian Empire. Religious tensions rose and fell over the last century but always underlain with a simmering resentment. The increased integration of the city at the time of the revolution certainly facilitated the closer interaction of Muslims and Christians, even within their own neighborhoods and compounds. But the patterns for developing those intercommunal associations were established much earlier. Very early in its history the people of the city had to rely on interdependent relations with others to maintain their own security and prosperity. This is still the case today. Both Muslims and Christians realize that their future in Harar depends on these relationships. They have thus adapted formal intracommunal associations like burial associations, credit groups and youth groups to take on an intercommunal form. Muslims and Christians formed these associations not because they got along so well but because the tasks necessary to function in a neighborhood or a business demanded these relationships. It is these associations that provide the institutional resilience necessary for resisting violent provocation. That being said, we acknowledge that other factors that work together with this strong associational life to support the peace of the
The Role of Intracommunal Divides, Religious Associations and State Power

Not only did intercommunal associations bring Muslims and Christians together in the same organizations, but intracommunal divides kept them from uniting as homogeneous blocks against one another. Varshney’s theory also traces intracommunal divisions within Muslim or Hindu communities in India as a mechanism for maintaining peace. In the peaceful city of Lucknow, the Shia-Sunni cleavages within the Muslim community kept Muslims from uniting against Hindus. Here sectarian conflict within religious blocks created the possibility of intercommunal alliances and peace. In another peaceful city in Kerala, Calicut, cleavages fell along class rather than religious lines so that lower class Hindus and Muslims united in their quest for social justice rather than fight against one another.[144] Class and ethnic divisions have divided the Muslim community in Harar for a long time. However, as a result of more recent global trends, divisions within the Muslim and Christian communities in Harar seem to be even more contentious. This factor certainly contributes to Harar’s peace and to the surprising alliances forming across religious boundaries, but also poses significant challenges for maintaining peace.

Within Harar, Muslims are divided ethnically between Harari, Oromo, and Somali, among others. Oromo are, for the most part, rural, poor, and without access to political power. They often resent Harari, whose identity they consider to be more about class privilege than ethnicity. Harari have made significant alliances with Somalis over the centuries and relied on them for the long distance commerce and livestock trade.[145] When the current EPRDF government came to power in 1991 and instituted a federal system along ethno-linguistic lines, the Oromo experienced an ethnic resurgence, with the Oromo Liberation Front and the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia advocating for secession and revenge for old grievances. The Oromo region, Oromia, is now the largest and most populous region in the nation and entirely surrounds the small region of Harar. Some Oromo we talked to felt more hostility toward Muslim Harari landlords and merchants than toward Christian Amhara.[146] One Imam told us that his mosque preaches in Oromifa (Oromo), Arabic and Amharic, but not Harari. Thus one finds that Harari, Somali and Oromo Muslims often prefer and cultivate relations with Amhara Christians rather than with each other.[147]
Spiritual divisions among Muslims in Harar are also responsible for softening intercommunal conflicts. With the global revival of Islamic fundamentalism, divisions are increasingly visible within the Muslim community in Harar. Harar's practice of Sufism, which is a more tolerant form of the dominant Shafin (Sunni) Islam. Although followers of the more fundamentalist Wahabi Islam, often trained in Saudi Arabia, have been in Harar for a long time, it is only recently that they have attracted a significant following, particularly of young Oromo men who use Wahabism as a channel for their grievances. Wahabi imams, often Saudi trained, lead growing congregations within a number of recently built mosques in Harar, preaching primarily in Oromifa (Oromo). Wahabi identify themselves as followers of “one God,” as opposed to those who pray at the shrines or believe in spirit possession.[148] The divisions between these Islamic groups are increasingly visible in dress and expectations about personal morality. In fact, many Harari told us they felt threatened by Oromo Wahabi who wanted to destroy Harar’s shrines and return to a “pure” Islam.[149] Divisions between Orthodoxy, Catholicism, and Protestantism, visibly apparent within the Christian community, also keep these factions from uniting in opposition to Muslims. Although Catholics are a smaller and quieter presence, the Orthodox majority feels threatened by the growing community of Evangelical Protestants, referred to as “Pentes” (Pentecostals) because of their emotional and vocal expression in worship. Protestants (about thirteen different denominations in Harar), who largely converted from Orthodox families and experienced persecution during the communist years, now constitute 18.6 percent of the nation.[150] Both Muslims and Christians note the similarities between Wahabi, and Protestant “Pentes,” as extremists or fundamentalists in their insistence on an all-encompassing lifestyle, uncompromising faith and their opposition to syncretism.[151] Traditionalists on both sides fear their youth will be attracted to new religious movements (Wahabi and Pente) and the threat that represents to local cultural tolerance. Thus paradoxically, Orthodox Christians and Sufi Muslims find themselves as allies in defending tradition and their assumed dominance over the religious landscape. An Evangelical Christian said that while Muslims could join an iddir, the “Pentes” could not, and thus the social price of conversion was high. However, a number of those we interviewed had mixed families that included Protestant, Orthodox, and Muslim members. The involvement of various churches in relief and development work has also served to bring communities together.[152] Divisions within Muslim and Christian communities dilute their ability to
unite in opposition to one another.

On the other hand, these religious divisions also bring the danger of precipitating intercommunal violence. While many civic leaders believe they can still control the influence of fundamentalism, others fear that the future of Muslim-Christian relations is under threat. One Harari market woman noted that recently people seem more antagonistic to one another than in the past. Many expressed the sentiment that all people were getting “more religious” because of difficult times and competition from those who were out to proselytize. An Orthodox woman noted that religious observance had been in decline, but because of pressure from other denominations they were reorganizing and educating their youth. Many stressed that current national and world events added increased strain to relations within Harar. Both Protestants and Wahabi bring assumed alliances from outside of Ethiopia, either American or Saudi, which, in turn, influences how the government treats these movements. One Muslim man mentioned that the state tolerates foreign Christian missionaries and scholars because of U.S. aid but does not extend the same privileges to Muslims who have been denied work permits in Harar.

While Varshney sees intracommunal divisions contributing to keeping communities from being able to mobilize and unify for violence, he does not consider the possibility that strong intracommunal networks may also be used in positive ways for peace. Political scientists seeking to explain the correlation of heterogeneity and conflict found that the presence of intracommunal social networks was the one factor statistically significant for promoting cooperation within ethnic groups. It was not the homogeneity or common language of these communities but rather the presence of networks based on reciprocal ties that enabled them to keep in touch with each and thus apply pressure on their members to comply with behavior that would benefit the whole community. Community sanctions and in-group policing also could be used to prevent the use of violence if that was deemed important to the community. For example, in the past the gang violence of Harari youth at weddings was settled by the elders without calling the police. In our interviews, religious leaders, including the Harar Evangelical Churches Fellowship chairman, Orthodox priests, Fundamentalist Qadis and Islamic Council members expressed their commitment to keeping peace using their internal mechanisms for mediating community or domestic conflict. Even the fundamentalist leaders we spoke to said they taught respect for other religions and had promised not to agitate. The Islamic Council, established by the government, brings
together members from each mosque, shrine, and afocha within Harar and often serves as a
mediator between the more fundamentalist groups and others. An Orthodox priest told
us that Muslim leaders asked him to give them the names of anyone who spoke badly about
Christians and they would correct those people. In spite of their potential to exacerbate
religious conflict, many noted that these institutions served to strengthen intercommunal
understanding instead of inciting violence.

A surprising number of people we talked to asserted that peaceful relations in Harar are the
result of each group’s own internal religious theology and teaching. Priests, pastors, imams,
shyks and lay leaders, male and female alike, told us they advocate going deeper into their
own faith traditions to find the basis for building peace and never talking negatively about
the other or becoming politically involved. In a sentiment, often echoed by others, the Head
of the Islamic Council said that teaching youth the positive values of their own faith will
inspire them to work for the good of others. Paradoxically, perhaps, one practices peace not
by letting go of his or her own tradition’s truth claims but by exploring them more
deeply. One poor market woman said that the foundation for tolerance in Harar is God,
with tolerance taught by the ancestors and symbolized by the market. Another man affirmed
that the Creator keeps the peace. A Muslim woman said that the fear of Allah was the
source of interfaith tolerance and prayed that Allah would keep the two communities
together. One man noted that people looked to God for better days, not to their government.
Some of the interviewees pointed out that because of the deeply spiritual culture in Harar,
adhering to religious teachings is the source of both tolerance and conflict. Of course
teaching on its own does not guarantee that it will be put into practice. But because both
intra- and intercommunal associational life is so strong in Harar, the institutional structure
for implementing these teachings is in place.

Although Harar’s peace cannot be attributed to state policy or action, the intercommunal
associations in the city would have had more difficulty keeping the peace without state
support, particularly from the regional government. Government policies and national
politics set parameters and can exacerbate or constrain violence, but they cannot entirely
control it since the mechanisms for conflict are located at the local level. In Harar the
depended on local leadership and
collaboration in frontier areas like Harar, the state set the basic structure for intercommunal relations.[162] Some people told us that simple fear of the state, ruling through the power of the gun, maintains peace and stability. As one Orthodox leader noted, tolerance in Harar is based on respect and fear, not love.[163] Yet Varshney also points out that in weakening civil society, a totalitarian rule of fear makes it more (rather than less) likely that ethnic violence will occur. State power provides necessary but not sufficient cause to explain the prevalence of peace or violence. In Harar shifting state dynamics led to increasing intercommunal association after the revolution and increasing politicization of ethnicity after 1991.[164]

The Harari regional government is critical to the maintenance of positive interfaith relations. Under the current EPRDF government, Harar was given autonomy as its own region—the Harari People’s National Regional State—in 1995, dominated by the political party of the Harari National League. Ethnic Harari have control over the government through veto power and reserved seats in Parliament, even though they have now become a minority in their own region. Traditionally the president is Harari and the vice president Oromo.[165] Thus Harari cannot maintain a minority government without alliances, giving them an obvious interest in peacemaking. One Harari emphasized that the wall around the city was built for defense and that now peace is their only defense against extinction as a people.[166] However, many non-Harari agreed that the future of peace depends, in large part, on government becoming more inclusive and taking into account all of the city’s inhabitants.[167]

Peace has become a source of pride, a point of leverage for international aid and a commodity sold to tourists, giving everyone a larger economic stake in its maintenance. Inhabitants of Harar, Muslim and Christian alike, have developed a sense of pride in their reputation as a city of peace, pointing to the UNESCO peace prize in 2003, given for “local initiatives which contribute to strengthening social cohesion, improve living conditions in sensitive neighborhoods and develop a true urban conviviality.”[168] The Heritage Conservation Office developed a master plan to maintain and restore the character of the old city, both Muslim and Christian imperial structures, in part to attract tourism dollars that would benefit everyone.[169] The Harari Cultural Center, supported by the Harari National League, was one of the first to display Harari identity, followed by the Rimbaud Museum, the private Sherif Harar City Museum, and the Harari National Museum, which include
The Harari Region Culture, Tourism and Information Bureau, which supports the revival of Harari cultural festivals and historic sites, makes clear they are preserving the history of all Harar’s people, including that of churches in the old city. They kindly facilitated our research in their quest to promote the Harar as city of peace.

The interplay of robust intercommunal associations with the state to solve religious conflict has had a positive effect in recent years. Both Orthodox priests and the All-Afocha chairman said that they cooperate with the government, especially to reduce fundamentalist agitation on both sides. Youth associations working against crime and gangs cooperate with the police. Recently, the government and civic leadership have become involved in mediating a number of difficult conflicts between Muslims and Christians. The issue of religious “noise pollution” has been particularly contentious. Muslims complain that people cannot sleep because Orthodox and Evangelical Churches have begun to broadcast their overnight prayer services on loudspeakers, while Christians respond that the Muslim call to prayer over the loud speaker four times a day has been a constant interruption of the peace. In addition, each group is concerned with the potential for violence during public religious processions. Other complaints have been brought from both sides about the proliferation of inflammatory CDs, pamphlets, and tee-shirts putting down the other’s faith, or acts of disrespect for religious symbols. Christian Churches of all kinds asserted they could not get land allocations for graveyards and new churches or permits for renovation and expansion. At the time of this research, the Harari government had begun convening meetings with the leaders of religious groups to air these issues and seek common solutions. They have also begun providing law enforcement for religious processions and prohibiting the use of religious space to slander other religions.

A demonstration of the state’s ability to compromise, even as it promotes Harari identity, is its treatment of a particularly potent flashpoint, the central Orthodox Medhane Alem Church, built in 1887 on the site of a mosque and a Muslim burial place. Many Muslims are keenly and constantly aware of this symbolic historical injustice. After the fall of the Derg in 1991, Muslims initiated talks about restoring the church to the original mosque; fundamentalist Muslims have kept this demand alive. Yet the church is also an important site for tourism and promoted as a living symbol of coexistence. One Muslim man said that, although some would like to see the mosque reconstructed, he values the
church for its spiritual and historical heritage. Most Muslim civic and government leaders we interviewed concurred that the church makes a positive contribution and they have not supported calls for restitution. One leader suggested that an official apology from the Church would help. While some hope that the church may be turned back to a mosque voluntarily, the priority of peace keeps the issue off the table, at least for now.

In all of these ways, the regional government demonstrates its commitment to providing the infrastructure for peace, but they need the cooperation of local communities to make it work. Strong intracommunal associations that can rally their people toward this cause provide the necessary social control and neighborhood-level leadership to realize the ideals of the city. If people have material as well as spiritual interests in peace, they will invest their energy in maintaining the balance. Divisions within religious communities may distract them from uniting against another religion but also contain the potential for inciting violence. Clearly, the secret to Harar’s success today is religious, civic, and government commitments to maintaining peace by working out differences without violence. That can only hold if common everyday people continue to meet each other in integrated neighborhoods, help each other in mixed burial associations, and exchange news of the city in a variety of clubs and organizations.

Testing the Strength of Intercommunal Associations in 2001

While the presence of intercommunal associations may be a logical cause of the city’s peace, the theory must be tested to see if the mechanisms for suppressing rumor and violence actually work in a real conflict situation. That test case occurred in 2001 around an Orthodox Timket (Epiphany) street procession, resulting in violence that lasted for a day, and was responsible for three to five deaths and eight to fifty injuries. This is the only incident of Muslim-Christian violence in Harar since the 1991 fall of the communist regime. The government intervened with force, while religious and community leaders exerted their influence. No further escalation was reported the next day. Timket is commemorated throughout Ethiopia by street processions, with thousands of people surrounding the priests carrying representations of the Ark of the Covenant back to its resting places in the church after being celebrated all night in an outlying field. As in many places around the world,
religious processions are often the time when intercommunal violence is sparked.

On this particular Timket day, the procession arrived at a crossroads outside the walled city on the edge of town where recently a new mosque had been built. The procession stopped in the street to sing and dance just before the congregants from Saint Gabriel and Saint George churches separated to return to their respective locations. The mosque was so recently built that the surrounding wall had not yet been constructed, and so, as the people filled the crossroads, they spilled out into the mosque’s yard and even onto the porch. The mosque itself had the reputation of being more fundamentalist, or even Wahabi, as its Imam had studied in Saudi Arabia and its congregants were largely Oromo.\textsuperscript{180} Moreover, the procession arrived at the crossroads on Friday at noon, the time of Muslim prayers. When the noise disrupted people’s prayers in the mosque, young men came out on the porch and a scuffle ensued with Orthodox youth in the procession. Rocks were thrown and people ran. The police were standing by to keep the peace, but when fighting broke out they called in the army, which stopped the violence by firing weapons and killing at least three people that day. Two more victims were killed in the chat market at Awadaye, further out of town where the news quickly spread and people rallied to help defend the mosque. Military intervention kept a riot from breaking out and rural marchers from coming into the city.\textsuperscript{181}

Many different theories exist on the cause of the outbreak. Most people we interviewed said that the conflict was not planned but was rather the spontaneous excess of a few people in the crowd.\textsuperscript{182} Some Muslims noted that they asked the celebrants to reduce the noise and that the Christians incited the riot by beating their drums loudly during prayer, throwing stones, or even entering the mosque.\textsuperscript{183} Some Christians said that the Muslims knew this was going to happen and armed themselves with AK-47s, M-14s, as well as sticks and spikes, which they fired into the crowd. Others noted that some of the crowd was drunk and that emotions were high, bringing the mob factor into play.\textsuperscript{184} Many pointed out that people in the countryside in places like Awadaye had already been mobilized in advance or in the moment by cell phone communication and were marching toward the city to defend their faith. In any case, the consensus was that a few youth from both sides instigated the incident and then exploited the ensuing chaos.\textsuperscript{185}

Rumor obviously played a role in the spread of the conflict from the original incident. Some Orthodox Christians rumored that a miraculous “thunder” struck a mosque in revenge for
Muslim attacks on a church after the incident. Muslims told us they heard rumors in the walled city that the Christians were tearing apart the mosque.[186] Those who supported the theory that the event had been planned in advance suggested political motives, the deliberate spread of rumors, and even names of the perpetrators. Rumor had it that people in rural areas began to march when they heard of the destruction of Islamic shrines. Another report indicated the involvement of Islamic fundamentalists and the Oromo Liberation Front. What is amazing however is that these rumors did not go on to precipitate more violence. One person concluded that the violence “failed because it was not in the minds and hearts of the people.”[187]

Those we spoke with gave credit to a combination of religious, state, and associational leadership for keeping the incident under control and maintaining the peace. Varshney’s theory posits that when intercommunal associations are in place, they create a synergy with local government that leads to better communication and law enforcement.[188] Many give credit to the coercive force of the state for keeping control and bringing those responsible to justice.[189] However, the state could not patrol each neighborhood, and if people wanted to resort to violence they could have done so without any fear of reprisal from the state. Most also agree that the main role of the state was limited to the first day when it interfered to avoid bloodshed. In the weeks following the incident, a joint religious committee was formed by the government that included Muslim, Orthodox, Catholic, Protestant, burial association and civic leaders.[190] The Orthodox Patriarch and the Head of the Islamic Council later came to Harar from Addis Ababa to facilitate a settlement. A year after this incident another scuffle broke out at a celebration, but government forces quickly intervened and nothing else developed.[191]

The critical factor for keeping peace in this incident was the mobilization of intercommunal associations and informal networks to keep rumors and tempers under control. That evening there was a lot of talk around town in homes and cafes, perpetuating accusations and rumors, yet no new violence erupted. One Muslim man told us that his family had planned to celebrate the holiday by having coffee with their Orthodox neighbors. They were not deterred by the incident that day and spent the evening exchanging stories with their Orthodox friends about what they heard that day. Many noted the role of religious leaders in keeping the flames down despite some frantic attempts of youth to escalate the conflict.[192] Burial association leaders in the neighborhoods were actively talking to people that night...
about how to solve the problem and setting up groups to stabilize the situation and talk
together. The All-Afocha chairman ordered Muslim youth to go home and keep quiet, while
Oromo Sheyks asked rural youth not to come into the city.[193] These association and
community leaders took the initiative to set up a committee of elders, which remained
central to the reconciliation and investigation process of the government. One Harari man
summed up by saying that elders played a pivotal role in the immediate aftermath of the
2001 incident and that these social networks remained critical in bringing together people of
various faith and ethnic backgrounds for reconciliation.[194]

From our research it seems clear that a critical factor in keeping the peace in Harar, while
not always recognized by the inhabitants of Harar, has been the ongoing functional presence
of civil society associations along with government support. Although these religious
communities have difficult histories of persecution and oppression, somewhat exclusive
traditions and communities, and ideologies that could be used to instigate hatred toward the
other, historically they have developed ingenious and intimate ways to live together. This
robust civil society grows out of concrete interests in keeping the peace and participating in
these associations. Our research indicates that, in fact, intercommunal associations have
been a positive force in mitigating all of these factors that, in other circumstances, would
work at making Harar a violence-prone city. Harar is living proof that people with very
different and even oppositional identities can develop the institutional tools to manage
conflict peacefully.

One might wonder whether mutual aid organizations and other forms of civic association,
like shrines or afocha, are now changing form or disappearing altogether. One Orthodox
man said that recently Muslims are more reluctant to participate in the burial associations, to
which he attributes more frequent rumoring on both sides. When this happens people
increasingly come out in mass to support their respective faith. A young leader in Harar said
that his vision was to get beyond mere tolerance and work toward reconciliation of
historical injustices so that people can live together in real peace. He hoped to initiate a
forum where these discussions could begin. Everyone we met was proud of Harar’s
reputation as a city of peace and committed to keeping it that way. Most hoped to strengthen
their mutual respect for each other’s religion as the path to peace.[195] Harar is an important
case of the efficacy of civil society in peacebuilding. But these relations are subject to
erosion unless they are supported. We believe that it is important to continue to identify
relationships and associations that work to promote peace, particularly in light of the
shifting global relations between Muslims and Christians.

**Figure 1.** Harar Interviews (ages are approximate and ethnicity self-defined, names by Ethiopian convention, first names first)

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1. Special thanks to our research assistants in Harar, Mahlet Girma and Dawit Teferi, and also to those at the Cultural and Tourism Bureau who facilitated our stay in Harar, without all of them this work would not have been possible. We also thank the Institute for Ethiopian Studies in Addis Ababa and Ayub Abdelahi, Harari People National Regional State, Advisor to the President on Urban Issues for granting us research permission. The late Hussein Ahmed argued that the peaceful coexistence of Muslims and Christians in Ethiopia has often been championed without taking into consideration the significant conflicts. Our approach seeks to acknowledge the obvious tensions that make the achievement of relative peace even more remarkable.


3. Donald Nathan Levine, *Greater Ethiopia: the Evolution of a Multiethnic Society*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 44-50; Bahru Zewde, *A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2001), 1. We use “Ethiopia” throughout as the name of the highland Orthodox Empire, which has used various forms of the name over the past two millennia. Zewde claims the term “Ethiopia” was used in reference to some of the current geography since the days of Ezana, as preserved in his inscription. “Abyssinia” is the corrupted form of “Habesha,” which Europeans have used, Levin also mentions this in his book Greater Ethiopia.


10. The citations for these interviews refer to our own system of numbering and hide the identities of those interviewed. Dawit Yehualashet and Jan Bender Shetler each spent six weeks in 2007 and 2009 respectively doing interviews throughout the city of Harar. Following the model of Ashutosh Varshney, we conducted 90 interviews with 93 people, interviewing some more than once and sometimes including more than one informant in a single interview. Sixty-one of our informants were Muslim and 32 were Christian (23 Orthodox, 2 Catholic and 7 Protestant). Forty-one of our informants were Harari, 28 Amhara, 8 Oromo, 3 Somali, 4 from other ethnic groups and 9 with mixed heritage. Sixty-one of our informants were men and 32 women. Our informants came from a range of ages, educational backgrounds and occupations, including a good number representing various religious, community, and political leadership roles. In spite of general caution, we were able to talk to the Catholic Bishop, the head of Medhane Alem Church, an official from the Islamic madrasa, and some government officials. Interviews sought to determine if there is a connection between the way histories are told, the practice of intercommunal associations and the suppression of violence, particularly in the 2001 incident. In general our informants were cautious and suspicious about the motives behind our questions, particularly about the 2001 incident, in light of violence after the 2005 elections. They were only willing to speak when they heard that the project was about the causes for peace. It was particularly difficult to get high profile religious leaders to talk to us. However in the end people graciously agreed to meet with us and provided valuable information. As researchers we brought our own religious and ethnic identities, from American
Protestant and Orthodox Ethiopian backgrounds to a primarily Muslim area.


29. Interview #66 relates a story about how the Oromo helped the Amhara and kept the Harari from victory in the Battle of Chelenko, which feeds the antagonism between Harari and Oromo; Interview #43 called the battle of Chelenko “genocide.”

30. Timothy Carmichael, “Religion, Language and Nationalism: Harari Muslims in


34. Interview #40. Lej Iyasu married a Harari woman.


37. Interviews #1, #6, #20.


39. See the full account of the Kulub movement in Timothy Carmichael, “Approaching Ethiopian History: Addis Ababa and Local Governance in Harar, c. 1900-1950” (PhD diss., Michigan State University, 2001) 192-238; Interviews #34, #43, #66; One informant told us there were Christian signatories on the Kulub petition to Haile Selassie but could not verify this.


41. Ironically enough, the new emperor, Haile Selassie (the son of Harar’s conqueror, Ras Mekonnen), held a celebration of his 1930 coronation in Harar. This celebration followed the main one in Addis Ababa that Bahru Zewde called the most extravagant ceremony in Ethiopian history (*A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991* [Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2001], 137).

42. Interviews #31, #66.


48. Interviews #49, #51, #55, #56.


50. Wolf Leslau, *Ethiopians Speak: Studies in Cultural Background* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965), 43, 66-67; Interviews #32, #51. One informant says the few Christians in Jugol lived in Budaberi, now in Kebele 05. Most Somalis live in Sengaber, Kebele 02, Suktatberi, Kebele 04, and some in Aratenya. The Somalis in Kebele 08 are the ones who came after the war (field note
Informants spoke about the Bedroberi gated community and its Amhari name of Buda Birr, the “Gate of the Evil Eye.” They said that this came from the non-Harari who once lived there as blacksmiths, iron workers and leather workers. This was also an area where Christians lived.


53. Interviews #31, #43, #48, #60, #68; In 2009 we met Abdul Muhemein and Ahmed Zakaria on their way to meet the Harari Diaspora Community in Atlanta, Georgia about their project to preserve cultural heritage in Harar; Abdulla Abogne also provides a popular account of the diaspora community looking back at their childhood in Harar and of the Harari Cultural Federation of North America. Abdulla Abogne, *Bercha: Cryptic Tales of Harar and Glimpses of My Life* [Addis Ababa: Artistic Printing Enterprise, 2003], 176).


55. Interviews #51, #66, #68.


61. Timothy Carmichael, “Religion, Language and Nationalism: Harari Muslims in Contemporary Ethiopia,” in *Islam in World Cultures: Comparative Perspectives*,...


65. Interviews #10, #12, #14, #56.

66. Interviews #51, #60, field note #22.


72. Interviews #20, #44, #53, #59, #60, #68, field notes #22, #23.

73. Interviews #6, #12, #59, field notes #13, #22.

74. Interviews #7, #41, #50.

75. Interviews #4, #5, #6, #13.


77. Interviews #2, #4, #59, field notes #17, #22.

78. Abrene beleten ena tetetene.

79. Interviews #6, #13, #20, field notes #22, #23.

80. Interviews #6, #9, #11, #34.

81. Interviews #5, #59.

82. Interviews #1, #5, #6, #18, #46, #59, field notes #1, #22.

83. Interviews #34, #52.

85. Camilla C. T. Gibb, “Baraka without Borders: Integrating Communities in the City of Saints,” *Journal of Religion in Africa* 29, no. 1 (1999): 90-91; Interviews #51, #66. The piece of clothing she is referring to is the Harari pants under a woman’s dress that became popular for modesty during the Egyptian period.

86. Interviews #32, #43, #46, #54, #55, #57, #58, #66; Many have noted that even the Harar Regional President has a Christian wife.


88. Interviews #4, #19, #34, #45, #50, #66, field notes #13, #23; Some informants did deny the existence of intermarriage even though they admitted that a non-Muslim could become Harari.


93. Interviews #35, #51, #55, #69; Camilla Gibb, “Constructing Past and Present in Harar,” in *The 13th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies*, edited by E. K.
Katsuyoshi Fukui and Masayoshi Shigeta, 378-90 (Kyoto, Japan: Shokado, 1997), 388.


96. J. Spencer Trimmingham, *Islam in Ethiopia* (London: Frank Cass and Co., 1965), 249-50; Field note #14 (One informant said, “Abadir’s spirit bring peace because he teaches us how to treat each other.” There is an Amharic saying that goes, “If you go to Abadir, your stomach will not stay empty”).

97. Interviews #11, #19, #22, #35, #39, #42, #45, #58, #69, field notes #7, #13. Even Governor Ras Mekonnen would send an offering to Abadir.

98. Interview #5, #11, #56, field note #5; see also the account of Abdulla A. Abogne, *Bercha: Cryptic Tales of Harar and Glimpses of my Life* (Addas Ababa, Ethiopia: Artistic Printing Enterprise, 2003), 286-87.

99. Interviews #14, #32, #47, field note #7.

100. Interviews #43, #44, #68, field note #17.

101. Interviews #55, #57 (She refers to Awaliya spirit or Zar), #66.

102. Interviews #34, #51, #68, #69, #71, #72, field note #17.


105. Interviews #6, #15, #17, #56.


109. Interview #66.


111. Interviews #40, #41.


113. Interviews #4, #7, #8.

114. Interviews #3, #22; Elisabeth-Dorthea Hecht, “The Voluntary Associations and the Social Status of Harari Women,” in *The 6th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies* (Tel Aviv, Israel, 1980), 298.

115. P. H. Koehn and S. R. Waldron, *Afocha: A Link Between Community and Administration in Harar, Ethiopia* (Syracuse, NY: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, 1978), 26; Interviews #31, #36. Many informants asserted that afocha were certainly only Muslim, even with some Christian members as exceptions. Informant in interview #43 said you could only join a Harari Afocha if you spoke Harari.

116. [Interviews #6, #15, #17, #32, #34, #56, #59, #67, #68; Peter H. Koehn and Sidney R. Waldron, *Afocha: A Link Between Community and Administration in Harar, Ethiopia* (Syracuse: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, 1978), 29.

117. Interviews #2, #51; A Christian informant said that there were two types of iddir, the bigger, more formal Chelenko Iddir and the smaller, less formal association named after its Kebele, Number 06.

118. Interviews #1, #8, #18.

119. Interview #9. The difference in the numbers leads one to assume that there are burial societies that are not registered by the government and perhaps others that are not registered by the joint committee. From the Justice Department, Harar, we obtained a list of nonprofit associations, which we compiled into a list under the
heading “Geographical/Spatial Distribution of Iddirs and Afocha Based on Woredas and Kebeles”; also from the Joint Iddir-Afocha Committee, we obtained the list “The Harari People National Regional Government, List of Social Associations in Harar.”

120. Interview #31, field note #13.

121. Elisabeth-Dorthea Hecht, “The Voluntary Associations and the Social Status of Harari Women,” in The 6th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies (Tel Aviv, Israel, 1980), 296-97; Interviews #36, #37. One afocha leader said in an interview that the first afocha were 800 years old, another 1000 years. Also interview #43. Another said the oldest afocha went back 600 years, and, in the records from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Amir Abdul Karim did not attend other funerals, so no one came to the funeral of his daughter.

122. Field note #18; From “The Harari People National Regional Government, List of Social Associations in Harar,” obtained from the Joint Iddir-Afocha Committee. The problem with the dates on this list is that they were obtained by asking the afocha leader without substantiating the claim.


125. Interviews #36, #37.

126. Timothy Carmichael, “Religion, Language and Nationalism: Harari Muslims in
Contemporary Ethiopia,” in *Islam in World Cultures: Comparative Perspectives*, edited by R. Michael Feener (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2004), 224; Interviews #24, #31, #36, #60.

127. P. H. Koehn and S. R. Waldron, *Afocha: A Link Between Community and Administration in Harar, Ethiopia* (Syracuse: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, 1978), 35-61; Interview #34. One informant said that the Firmach were behind the Hanolato petition to Haile Selassie in 1948.


130. Interviews #9, #36, #39, #45, also #56, #60.

131. Interviews #1, #7, #36, #37, #39, #45, #56.

132. Interviews #2, #5, #6, #18, #33, #34.


134. Interviews #12, #48, #49, #52, #56.

135. Interviews #39, #45.


138. Interviews #39, #45, field note #13; P. H. Koehn and S. R. Waldron, *Afocha: A Link Between Community and Administration in Harar, Ethiopia* (Syracuse: Maxwell
139. List of nonprofit associations obtained from the Justice Department, Harar.


141. Interviews #3, #6, #50, #61, #67, field note #25. This association was in a leprosy colony and most of the youth were children of lepers. The chairman said that the disease did not discriminate by religion, so why should they?

142. Interviews #50, #61, #62, #67.


145. Interviews #48, #49, #51, #68.

146. Interviews #34, #40, #43, #49.

147. Interviews #49, #52, #66, #70.

148. Interviews #2, #34, #62, #68, #69, #70, field note #6. Some say the first Wahabi came over fifty years ago, during the imperial years, and that the government chased them out. Others said that if a Harari becomes Wahabi, he is ostracized by his community.


151. Interviews #5, #41, #54, #59, #62, #68.

152. Interviews #33, #54, #20.

153. Interviews #4, #18, #34, #37, #40.

154. Interviews #9, #11, #14, #16, #19, #20, #59.

Interviews #34, #41, #42, #54, #62, #69, #70.

157. Interviews #43, #44, #62, #70.

158. Interviews #3, #6, #10, #11, #12, #14, #53. Each religious community has a number of associations that are restricted to its members, including Orthodox and Catholic associations dedicated to a saint or Protestant choirs, Islamic Madrasa schools (dating to 1932), and Islamic youth or women’s associations.

159. Interviews #44, #47, #51, #53, #54, #62, #68, #69, #70.

160. Interviews #7, #13, #16, #17, #18.


163. Interviews #10, #14, #20.


166. Interviews #22, #43, #72, field note #6.

167. Interviews #18, #19, #24, #32, #59, field note #4.

168. Interview #71, UNESCO, Cities for Peace Prize.


[fn] Posters around the city and in the tourism office proclaim Harar’s achievement, along with a designation in 2005 of the walled city as a World Heritage site, allowing the city access to international funds. UNESCO, World Heritage Centre, Harar Jugol, the

169. Interviews #38, #39, #68, #71, #72. Informants indicated a variety of donors for cultural preservation ranging from wealthy Ethiopians, the American Embassy, CIDA, World Bank, and UNESCO among others.


171. Interviews #34, #38, #39, #71, #72. Thanks especially to Abdulhakim Oumar, Cultural Department Head, Ibrahim Abdulrahamen Sherif, Heritage Conservation Office Representative, Abdulnassir Idris, Tourism Promotion and Development Process Owner, Sammy Muktar, Tourism Bureau, Imran Ahmed, Head of Heritage Preservation and Yimaj Idris, Head of the Cultural and Tourism Bureau.

172. Interviews #37, #47, #65, #67.

173. Interviews #43, #44, #47, #53, #59 #62, #69.

174. Interviews #41, #47, #53, #54, #60, field notes #19, #20; The government asserts that there are already enough churches and that affirmative action will make things even now.

175. Interviews #33, #44, #47, #53.

176. Interviews #18, #40, #43, #47, #68; The priest of Medhane Alem said that the mosque was built by the Egyptians not long before the conquest and so was not really a mosque of the Harari people or of Ethiopia. The Christian emperor built the church out of retaliation for an incident in Egypt where a mosque was built on the site of a Coptic Church. The Ethiopian Orthodox Church is related to the Coptic Church in Egypt. Pankhurst also refers to the destroyed mosque as the Egyptian mosque (Richard Pankhurst, History of Ethiopian Towns: From the Mid 19th Century to 1935 [Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1985], 260), however, many Harari Muslims do not think it matters whether the mosque was Egyptian or not.

177. Interviews #4, #5, #6, #47, #71, #72.

178. Interviews #1, #38, #43, #44, #72, field notes #6, #20.

180. Interviews #33, #41, #53, #68, #70, field note #20.
181. Interviews #6, #70, #72, field note #20.
182. Interviews #7, #12, #59, #68, #72.
183. Interviews #1, #4, #9, #11, #17, #18, #37, #69.
184. Interviews #4, #6, #41, #44, #53.
185. Interviews #1, #5, #33, #68, #70, #72.
186. Interviews #10, #14, #16, #18, #47, #50.
187. Interviews #5, #6, #9, #19, #21, #22.
189. Interviews #4, #5, #12, #19, field note #6.
190. Interviews #2, #5, #39, #53, #56, #62.
191. Interviews #2, #5, #6, #17, #19, #33, #43, #53.
192. Interviews #1, #4, #6, #20, #28, #68.
193. Interviews #12, #37, #62.
194. Interviews #2, #4, #7, #9, #36.
195. Interviews #2, #3, #13, #23, #72.